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Abstract 
The relationship between mismanagement of information and its adverse effect on plant 
safety in the process industry is now widely recognised. Ignorance of essential facts and 
messages wi11lead inexorably to a catastrophic outcome. This process has been called 
an 'information disaster' . Many incidents provide lessons on improving Safety 
Information Management (SIM). Evaluating SIM performance can provide 
interventions to prevent disasters and improve plant safety. 
In order to improve SIM performance for the process industry, this research adopted the 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC) concept to design a performance measurement framework. 
The framework includes 4 'perspectives' and 28 'indicators' with their own measures. 
The framework has been developed from an extensive literature review, a plant 
investigation and two incremental surveys, one of professional opinion in the process 
industry in Taiwan and the second a broader verification from experts. Using a scoring 
system the framework was turned into an integrated tool called the Safety Information 
Management Performance Measurement (SIMPM) tool. The tool concentrates on 
pro active measures in order to diagnose the performance level, identify the deficiencies 
of current status, and return this information into improvement processes. The 
framework and the SIMPM tool have been tested with a case study to demonstrate their 
implementation and efficacy. 
Several conclusions were drawn from the work, the most important of which are as 
follows. First, it confirmed the need for enhanced safety information management 
performance in the process industry. Second, the research defined the concept of SIM 
performance improvement. Third, it extended the SIM performance measurement 
framework comprehensively via systematic translation of the conceptual framework 
into measurable items. Fourth, it supported practical evaluation tools. Nevertheless, as 
every industry and/or organisation has its own business scope, characteristics, and 
safety culture, it is recommended that the framework and tool should be applied with 
relevant customisation. Therefore, the proposed framework and tool should be 
continuously revised and updated, so as to different industries, organisation types and 
manager's needs. The ultimate goal is a computerised tool that could be used to monitor 
and provide guidance for the improvement of safety information management 
performance. By this means ·potentially catastrophic outcome of accidents can be 
prevented in the early stages. 
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Chapter] Introduction 
Chapter I-Introduction 
1.1 General remarks 
Safety information is a critical building block for the important process of creating 
knowledge, developing skills, and performing safety related activities and tasks in 
accordance with planned occupational health and safety objectives. Ideally, persons 
engaged in health and safety responsibilities, or affected by the activities, need to be 
provided with specific, accurate and relevant information to assist them to learn and to 
accomplish their duties (Hong, 1999). In particular, the process industry has been 
required to operate at a high level of safety by the authorities and the public, because 
there is the potential for the consequences of an industrial incident to be high, even if 
the likelihood of the incident is very low (Kletz, 1993). Therefore, the control and 
management of safety information has become an issue of crucial importance 
throughout the process industry. 
On the other hand, in studies of organisation disasters and accidents, information 
failures have been cited as a significant contributing factor to the cause of accidents and 
indeed are a necessary precondition of an incident (Horton & Lewis, 1991; Kletz, 1993; 
Reason, 1997, Toft & Reynolds, 1997; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997; Vaughan, 1997). For 
instance, Horton & Lewis (1991) introduce the term 'information disaster' and Kletz 
(1993) states that 'organisations have no memory and accidents recur' to illustrate the 
issue of information failures in accidents. Throughout the history of the process industry, 
examples abound of missed or ignored warning signals, and of failures to handle safety 
information in ways that could have prevented catastrophic outcomes (Maclntosh-
Murray & Choo, 2002). 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
Traditionally, there has been an abundance of safety related documentation in the 
process industry. There is an overwhelming amount of safety information available in 
print, on video and on the Internet. With the growing amount of legislation and new 
developments regarding safety in process engineering it can be expected that the 
amount of safety information in the industry will increase yet further. This can be seen 
as important in the context of complying with regulatory requirements and also in 
stimulating corporate level safety initiatives (McAlinden, 1998). The role of safety 
1 
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information has been succinctly described by the Center for Chemical Process Safety . 
(CCPS, 1993), a directorate of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), 
who stated: 
"Documentation is important to long term management as well as the day to day safe 
operation of a chemical facility, As the regulatory mandate for documentation evolves, 
failure to maintain accurate and complete records can become a liability, Documentation 
is frequently the means to implement a corporate process safety management program and 
10 verify plant compliance to its provision", 
During the last decade, there has been a revolution in information handing technology. 
For example, many types of documents are now created, revised and stored using 
computers and the Internet. The opportunity and challenge today is to make the best use 
of new technology to more effectively manage the increased volume of safety 
information, Learning how to properly acquire, utilise, apply and share safety 
information can be considered the very core of a successful safety programme. 
Moreover, with the emergence of quality systems and their requirement for adequately 
and properly structured documentation, emphasis on better SIM has continued to grow. 
When analysing SIM there are both internal and external considerations to be taken into 
account. Internally, there are scenarios, such as where designers need safety information 
to progress an 'inherently' safer design, and where operators need safety information to 
prevent inadequate judgement and action. Externally, safety information has typically to 
be passed to the regulatory authorities, and, in the case of operators complying with 
safety legislation, information has to be passed between operators and sub-contractors, 
and vice-versa. 
Many industrial incidents are a result of unsafe operation, maintenance or modification 
of a plant, often such incidents could have been prevented if information held 
somewhere within the organisation had been available. However, this information was 
'inactive' because, for example: it was misfiled, the 'owner' had moved on, the file was 
lost (no-one knew about it), etc. There have been too many experiences in which even 
simple data were not noted because they were relatively hard to find (CCPS, 1995), 
Turner (1978) writes "Disasters equal energy plus misinformation" and King & Hirst 
(1998) modify the equation to "Disasters equal energy and/or toxic substances plus 
2 
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misinformation or rejection of information" to emphasise the importance of handling 
information for preventing disaster. Kletz (1993) also stated that industrial accidents 
recur because organisations have no memory and do not use the knowledge that is 
available. 
On the other hand, growing amounts of intellectual and financial capital are being 
invested to collect, process, store and disseminate safety information in and between 
organisations of the process industry. As the resource commitments to SIM continue to 
escalate the following type of questions are being asked more frequently than ever 
before: Is the investment in SIM really worthwhile? Is the SIM application we 
implemented a success in preventing accidents? Is our SIM efficient and effective? 
Recent surveys indicate that issues such as 'measuring the value of SIM' and 
'evaluating SIM performance' are of great importance to managers in places like: the 
United States of America (Vaughan, 1997; DoD, 1996), Taiwan (Chang & Yang, 2002), 
the United Kingdom (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997), Canada (Maclntosh-Murray & Choo, 
2002) and Finland (Keikkila et al., 2004),. Giving the increasing role of SIM In 
achieving business safety & health goals, the extensive interest of managers in 
measuring and evaluating both SIM processes and outcomes is not surprising. 
Traditionally, the process industry has tended to rely on traditional (bottom line) 
performance measures, such as efficiency, accident rate, return on capital employed and 
profitability, etc. These measures have been justifiably criticised, mainly because they: 
• are retrospective (and hence always, to some extent, out-of-date); 
• do not accurately reflect the interests of the public and authorities; 
• over-rely on financial aspects; and 
• are inactive. 
Although some proactive performance measurements such as safety audit, safety 
climate, and safety rating system have been applied to assess safety performance, 
accidents still occur due to inadequate safety information and its management. The main 
reason is that these measurements cannot discover this fundamental problem at the early 
stage of accident development. The process industry needs an integrated approach to 
evaluate the performance of SIM as well as to locate and identify problem areas. In 
other word, from accident development sequence viewpoint, SIM performance 
3 
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measurement can be expected as an earlier proactive measurement than safety audit in 
preventing accidents (see Figure 1.1). However, evaluating a practical SIM system 
raises a number of questions, including: 
• Why and how does a SIM system fail? 
• What is the difference between data, information and knowledge in SIM? 
• Does all the information have to be in the same format? 
• What are the scope, function and model of a good SIM? 
• How to make SIM available proactively during all interactions with the plant? 
• How to evaluate SIM? Reactive or proactive measurement? 
These problems and questions remain unanswered. Therefore, this research seeks to 
explore these issues and develop means of introducing appropriate methods for 
assessing the performance of SIM. 
Accident development 
~ 
Unclear or 
conflicting 
goals 
Mishandled 
information 
Incorrect or 
incomplete 
action 
SIM performance 
measurement 
Safety audit 
Failure to 
monitor 
Safety protection 
equipment and 
emergency response 
Figure 1.1 SIM performance measurement can be an early intervention to prevent accidents 
1.3 Objectives of the research 
From both accident prevention and productivity points of view, every process plant 
must ensure Safety Information Management (SIM) functions satisfactorily. An 
integrated approach is needed to evaluate the performance of SIM as well as to locate 
and identify problem areas. Therefore, the principal aim of this research is to investigate 
current SIM systems, to determine how the performance of SIM is measured, and to 
identify the key performance indicators that should be adopted. The final aim is to 
4 
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develop a proactive tool to improve the evaluation of the performance of SIM systems 
in the process industry. Addressing these issues will help to improve the safety of the 
process industry. This will be realised through achieving the following four objectives: 
• Identify and classify inadequate SIM by conducting causal analysis of accident reports. 
• Identify current practices of SI M in the process industry. 
• Identify the important proactive indicators of SIM performance. 
• Develop a SIM Performance Measurement (SIMPM) tool and demonstrate its 
implementation to determine its accuracy and usefulness. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
The research approach to be adopted to realise the aim of this study is highlighted in 
Figure 1.2. This figure shows several essential stages that include: 
1. Literature review and accident review 
2. Plant investigation 
3. Develop a conceptual framework 
4. Survey I and Survey 11 
5. Statistic analysis 
6. Scoring factors 
7. Develop the SIMPM tool 
8. Implement the SIMPM tool 
A comprehensive literature review on safety management, performance measurement, 
process safety, and information management/technology was conducted to study the 
scenario of safety information management and its performance measurement. The 
essential information obtained from the literature review includes: 
• The definition, type, category, and users of safety related information. 
• The currently used SIM systems. 
• The various approaches used to evaluate performance. 
• The factors that affect SIM performance and subsequently lead to information 
failure. 
• The various methods of analysing data including statistical methods. 
• Software that would be suitable for the development ofthe measurement tool. 
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Plant Investigation 
(problem Identification) 
Develop a conceptual framework 
Survey 11 
(Expert judgment) 
Scoring factors 
Survey I 
(Current practice survey) 
Statistical analysis 
Refine the framework and develop a 
performance measurement tool 
Implement the tool (Case study) 
Discussion and conclusions 
Figure 1.2 Research methodology 
Introduction 
During the stage of extensive literature review, an accident collection and review was 
conducted to determine the nature of SIM system failure in the process industry. 
Identification and classification of an inadequate SIM system by conducting causal 
analysis of past incidents can provide more details on this issue. In order to view a wide 
range of accident cases, electronic accident databases such as IChemE Accident 
Database and MARS Database were used. The accident review helped to recognise the 
situations, events or outcomes that should count as characterising SIM system failure in 
the process industry. The essential information obtained from the accident review 
includes: 
• The evidence to prove that inadequate SIM leads to accidents. 
• The relationship between information failure and accidents. 
• The information handling difficulties during stages of accident development. 
• Methods of identifying problems with SIM that can be employed in the 
development of a performance measurement tool. 
6 
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Following the literature review and accident review an investigation of six process 
plants in Taiwan was conducted. Through this investigation the focus for this research 
was identified. The output from the investigation was especially significant in 
understanding current SIM practices. 
There are many approaches that can be used in performance measurement but most of 
them are concerned with economic and technological issues. This study has focused on 
adopting the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) approach to develop a conceptual framework 
for SIM performance measurement. The conceptual framework was structured using a 
hierarchy of performance perspectives, indicators and measures. The framework was 
later refined through Survey I and Survey 11. 
The two surveys (Survey I and Survey 11) were undertaken within the process industry 
and within the safety expert community in Taiwan. Survey I adopted the questionnaire 
approach to investigate SIM current practices and industry opinions. Survey I also 
helped to establish performance perspectives and indicators, and enabled relative 
weights to be assigned. Survey 11 focused on expert judgment using the Delphi Method 
to evaluate the degree of importance and the weight of each measure under its mother 
factor (indicator). 
Normal statistical tools such as Microsoft Excel 2000 and Microsoft SPSS (Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences) 11.0 were chosen for analysing data colleted from 
Survey I and 11. After the quantitative analysis of the data from Survey I and 11, the 
conceptual framework was then refined. The aim of this stage of the research was 
twofold: (1) to provide the framework with a strong orientation on the process industry; 
(2) to adjust and refine the conceptual framework. The refined framework was for 
incorporation into the SIMPM tool. 
The SIMPM tool design is based on the conceptual framework using the BSC and 
indexing approaches. A SIM hierarchy was developed (see Figure 1.3). The SIMPM 
tool required input from various individuals to a set of questions. The target respondents 
of an organisation were divided into five categories as site manager, safety manager, IT 
staff, line supervisor, and operator. In the proposed SIMPM tool three methods are used 
to provide means of assessing the existence and effectiveness of a plant's SIM 
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performance as well as to reduce respondent's bias. These three approaches were: (1) 
Questionnaires to verify comprehension of the SIM system; (2) Observations to verify 
implementation and effectiveness; and (3) Document review to indicate system 
continuity. 
The next step was to identify the way in which the SIMPM tool was to be implemented. 
It was decided that an interactive and objective-based application would be developed. 
Therefore, a paper form of the SIMPM tool was created and then was implemented and 
tested at selected process plants in Taiwan. The testing enabled the effectiveness of the 
SIMPM tool to be evaluated. 
SIMPI (SIM Performance Index) 
I 
I I I 
PI P2 P3 P4 
I 
ID1.1 ID 1.2 ID1.3 ....... .ID1.n 
I 
I 
M1.I.1 M1.1.2 M1.1.3 ......... M1.1.n 
Notes: l.Final Output of SI M performance measurement: SIMPI (SIM Performance Index) 
2. P= Perspective; ID =Indicator; M = Measure 
3. The Weights of each Perspective, Indicator and Measure are developed from industry opinion 
and expert judgement through scoring methods used in this research. 
Figure 1.3 The hierarchy of SIMPM tool 
1.5 Layout of the Thesis 
This thesis comprises of four major parts which can be summarised as follows: 
1. General investigation of the background to the problems. 
2. Development of the safety information management performance measurement 
tool. 
3. Implementation and validation ofthe SIMPM tool. 
4. Discussion and conclusions. 
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A diagrammatic guide to the thesis is showed in Figure 1.4. There are 10 chapters in 
this thesis, described briefly as follows: 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
This chapter presents the introduction to the research study. The target problems, 
objectives, scope, methodology of the research, as well as the format of the thesis, are 
provided in this chapter. 
Chapter 2 - Safety Information and Its Management 
This chapter discusses safety information and its management through literature review. 
This chapter identifies the definition and scope of safety information in the process 
industry, and the potential applications and benefits of innovative SIM. 
Chapter 3 - Information Failure and Accidents 
This chapter reviews how information fails and the correlation of information failure and 
accidents. 
Chapter 4 - Investigation of Current Status of SIM in the Process Industry 
This chapter describes the method, process and results of an investigation focusing on 
the current status of SIM in the process industry. The results of the investigation indicate 
the degree of importance of SIM and its performance measurement. 
Chapter 5 - Developing a Performance Measurement Framework 
This chapter discusses current methods of assessing safety performance and presents 
performance measurement techniques that can be adopted to evaluate SIM in the process 
industry. Then, this chapter presents the state of IM performance measurement research 
by reviewing a number of industrial studies. The limitation and deficiencies of existing 
frameworks are assessed, along with justification for the development of the proposed 
SIM performance measurement framework. 
Chapter 6 - Methods of Analysing Perspectives, Indicators and Measures 
This chapter outlines the methods used to collect data and the analysis of all the 
information gathered to determine the direction of the research. 
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Chapter 7 - Data Collection and Analysis 
This chapter presents the development of the proposed SIM performance indicators and 
measures through data collection and data analysis. 
Chapter 8 - Developing a SIMPM Tool 
Based on the proposed framework and the results of the data collection and analysis, this 
chapter describes the process of developing an interactive SIM Performance 
Measurement (SIMPM) tool. This chapter also presents that the proposed tool includes 
two stages in evaluating SIM performance. The result interpretation is also given in this 
chapter. 
Chapter 9 - Implementation and Validation 
This chapter details the case studies undertaken within the process industry in Taiwan. 
These studies implement the refined SIM performance measurement framework and the 
proposed tool. These case studies illustrate how the developed framework and tool can 
be employed in the process industry. 
Chapter 10 - Discussion and Conclusions 
This chapter discusses the use and limitation of the proposed tool and presents the 
outcomes of this research, associated conclusions and recommendations for further 
study. 
References - References related to the research are presented in this section. 
Appendix - The section provides relevant information and data ofthe research. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature review 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
An overview of the thesis 
Introduction 
Review the safety infonnation and its management 
Chapter 3 - Accident review 
Examine the relationship between accident and 
safety infonnation management 
Chapter 4 - Plant Investigation 
Investigation of current practice and status of safety infonnation 
management in industries 
Chapter 5 - Developing a framework 
Developing a conceptual framework for SIM perfonnance 
measurement 
Chapter 6 - Methods of data collection and analysis 
Identify the methods of gathering data sample and 
statistical test to analyse the data 
Chapter 7 - Data collection and analysis 
Establish the issues addressed through 
appropriate methods of analysis 
Chapter 8 - Developing a SIMPM tool 
Describe the processes of refining the framework and developing a 
measurement tool 
Chapter 9 - Implementation and Validation 
Case studies to test the tool on operating plants 
Chapter 10 - Discussion and Conclusions 
Figure 1.4 Structure of the thesis 
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Chapter 2 - Safety Information and Its Management 
2.1 General Remarks 
Information is vital to today's society; it is needed in every walk of life, but none more 
so than in the safety management field. The term information has so many 
interpretations. For the safety information seeker and provider it can appear in many 
forms and be presented in many different ways. 
In every process plant, a mass of information is produced, transferred and utilised in 
daily operation as well as emergency response. This large amount of information in 
current use has enforced organisation knowledge ranging from the unstable memory of 
oral transmission to the written text, and from printed paper to, in the last decade, digital 
data. These digital data can be of different formats including: text, spreadsheet, database, 
email, drawings, pictures, and Hyper Text Mark-Up Language (HTML), etc. Therefore, 
information technology has been innovated and improved to make it possible to manage 
safety in a new way and to control the operation ofthe plant more effectively and safely. 
However, the new information technology is also a challenge for the management and 
dissemination of safety information (Aaltonen & Laitinen, 1997). 
The first part of this chapter gives an overview of the change of safety requirement and 
safety legislation affecting the process industry. Secondly, this chapter discusses the 
types of safety information and its management issues in the process industry through 
literature review in order to define the scope of this research. 
2.2 Safety in the process industry 
First of all, it is necessary to define the term 'the process industry' in order to 
distinguish the research domain. This research follows the suggestion from King & 
Hirst (1998) who recommend a sound definition of 'the process industry' issued by the 
Journal of Process Engineering as: 
"The process industries are ... involved in changing by chemical, physical 
or other means raw materials into intermediate or end products. They 
include gas, oil, metals, minerals, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, fibres, 
textiles, food, drinks, leather, paper, rubbers and plastics". 
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From the safety management point of view, changes in the process industry in recent 
years have meant that inventory levels and process conditions, such as temperature and 
pressure, have become more severe. This has increased the likelihood of hazards 
occurring, thus increasing the potential for loss in both human and economic terms 
(Lees, 1996). Despite this, the process industry has a relatively good record, which can 
be attributed, in part, to severe and serious safety legislation imposed on plant operators 
by regulatory authorities (King & Hirst, 1998). 
The main safety legislation in the UK comes under the 1974 Health and Safety at Work 
Act (HSWA) that places emphasis on employers and employees, collectively, to resolve 
health and safety problems. The HSWA is goal setting. It lays obligations on designers, 
manufacturers, suppliers, employers, self-employed persons, etc. in a non-prescriptive 
manner; it states what objectives should be achieved rather than how they should be 
achieved. It also created new powers of inspection and enforcement. The HSW A 
enforces many regulations which are applicable to the process industry, including the 
Notification of Installations Handling Hazardous Substances regulations (NIHHS), 
Control of Substances Hazardous to Health regulations (COSHH), Control of Industrial 
Major Accident Hazards (CIMAH), and the Management of Health and Safety at Work 
Regulations 1999. The CIMAH regulations have been superseded by the Control Of 
Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) regulations since 1999. These regulations require 
employers not only to provide and communicate necessary information to employees, 
but also to the authorities and the pUblic. 
Increasingly, in Europe, safety legislation is becoming similar as the European 
Commission attempts to harmonise legal systems between member states. In particular, 
the Seveso 11 Directive supports the submission of a 'Safety Report' to a regulating 
authority by operators of certain types of chemical installations. The Seveso 11 Directive 
is implemented in the UK under the COMAH regulations, which require the submission 
of a Safety Report to Health and Safety Executive (HSE). Operators are required to 
submit information to HSE on the following: 
1. Dangerous substances used at the installation. 
2. The installation and its greater geographical area. 
3. The safety management system for the installation. 
4. Potential major hazards that could occur at the installation. 
13 
Chapter 2 Safety Information and Its Management 
This Safety Report focuses on providing information that demonstrates that the safety 
requirements of the plant have been achieved. The information in the Safety Report 
includes stating what is done or predicting what might happen in a major hazard. 
Therefore, the Safety Report can be large with each section containing a considerable 
body of information. The information must be gathered from many disparate sources 
within an engineering enterprise. The logistics of this gathering exercise, and the 
structuring of the information is substantial. Moreover, the information contained within 
the Safety Report is also used to show that additional measures are 'not reasonably 
practicable' or 'not a necessary measure'. The HSE dictates that the Safety Report 
should be updated to reflect modifications made by the operators, as well as periodically 
updated to take into account new technical knowledge that may have arisen in the field. 
In the USA the major regulation implementing a similar requirement is Occupational 
Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) 'Process Safety Management (PSM) 
regulation' (29CFRI910.l19). It requires an employer to complete a compilation of 
written process safety information in order to enable those involved in operating the 
process to identify and understand the hazards posed by the chemicals involved. The 
compilation of process safety information includes information on the highly hazardous 
chemicals used or produced by the process, the technology of the process and the 
equipment in the process. 
Taiwan has no equivalent authority to the UK based HSE, but instead it has three 
ministries who provide the basic law relating to process plant safety. There are: 
I. Ministry of Labour- This ministry deals with law on occupational health and 
safety. 
2. Ministry of economy - This ministry deals with high pressure gas control law. 
It also handles law on the prevention of disasters at mining sites and other 
facilities. 
3. Ministry of home affairs- This ministry deals with fire service law. 
Combined, these ministries are basically in charge of process plant safety in Taiwan. 
Moreover, similarly to the Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) regulations in 
the UK, Taiwan's Major Hazardous workplace approving for Operation (MHWAO) 
regulation requires every major hazardous site to submit a safety report to the Safety 
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Authority. These sites can only operate after obtaining a formal permit from the 
authority. 
2.3 Definition of safety information 
In principle, the definition of safety information is various from different levels and 
perspectives: provider or user, employer or employee, internal or external, international 
or national, and authority or company. In order to operate successfully in a process plant 
and make reasonable and prudent decisions to reduce risks, management must have an 
adequate information system available. Hammer & Price (2001) emphasise that 
management and safety professionals should institute and maintain a safety information 
system. The system must enable management to determine if the safety program is 
adequate to meet stated goals and objectives, and accept, eliminate, or control risks on a 
reasonable and prudent basis. However, prior to the management of safety information 
and development of an effective safety information system, the definition and scope of 
safety information must be clear. 
Although safety information is used in all aspects of operations and maintenance in the 
process industry, the definition and scope of safety information appear in many forms 
and is presented in many different ways from time to time. For instance, one decade ago, 
when Mannan & Pfenning (1992) proposed a relational database approach for process 
safety information, they did not define the term 'safety information' but emphasised that 
safety information is the core of a safety management programme (see Figure 2.1). 
They identified 11 types of process safety information, which are listed in Table 2.1. 
CCPS (1993) describes 'process safety information' as the data describing the process 
and its chemistry. Similarly with the above categories of Mannan & Pfenning, CCPS 
identifies 14 types of process safety information (see Table 2.1). It can be argued that 
the Mannan & Pfenning's list and CCPS's 1993 list of process safety information did 
not cover most of safety management activities in a process plant. 
Furthermore, CCPS (1995) utilises the term 'process knowledge' to describe process 
safety information as: 
'The information, which encompasses process chemicals, technology and 
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equipment, is the foundation for understanding the potential hazards of a 
process for supporting a comprehensive process management program '. 
Figure 2.1 Process Safety information in use (Mamma & Pfenning, 1992) 
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This definition implies a considerable amount of process knowledge required for 
the design, operation, and maintenance of a process facility. Following this 
definition CCPS (1995) proposes another list covering 15 types and hierarchies of 
information (see Table 2.1) typically encountered in the documentation of Process 
Safety Management (PSM). 
In his famous book 'Loss Prevention in the Process Industries' Lees (1996) lists 
some of the principal subjects on which documentation is needed for a chemical 
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plant. The subject areas only are also listed in Table 2.1. 
Jacobsson (2000) states that important documents for the safe performance of their jobs 
shall be available for all those requiring them. He defines 'safety information' in a 
process plant as: 
HA complete and up-to-date set of engineering documentation required to 
maintain a basis for a good level of performance in the safety, health and 
environment area" 
Jacobsson lists 26 types of safety information (see Table 2.1) but categorises them into 
four major subjects as: 
1. Basic process information. 
2. Detailed engineering documentation for all process and utility/service systems. 
3. Operating and maintenance documentation. 
4. Other Safety, Health and Environment (SHE) documentation. 
In the USA, the Process Safety Management (PSM) regulation (29CFRI91O.119) 
identifies that an adequate PSM system must content 12 elements. One of the elements 
is 'Process Safety Information' which requires the company to establish complete and 
accurate written information concerning process chemicals, process technology, and 
process equipment. According to this regulation, Davis (2002) divides 'Process Safety 
Information' into four major types and 19 sub-types (see Table 2.1). 
In summary, safety information is critically important throughout design, fabrication, 
operation, maintenance, and decommissioning of a process plant. In spite of the variety 
of descriptions for safety information as mentioned above, comparison of these 
description shows that they are very similar. All of these definitions and categories of 
safety information cannot be considered comprehensive since plant size, nature, 
regulatory requirements and other factors affect the levels and amount of safety 
information needed and hence to be managed for various facilities. However, these 
definitions and categories provide a good guide to the management of safety 
information. This research adopts the definition and categories of safety information 
defined by CCPS in 1995 since these are clear and well known. 
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Table 2.1 The categories of safety information 
Mannan & Pfenning (1992) CCPS (1993) CCPS (1995) 
1. Basic chemical data 1. Chemical data 1. Process knowledge 
2. Process flow diagrams 2. Design data 2. Process hazard analysis 
3. Process equipment 3. Design basis Process flow 3. Quantitative risk assessment 
specification sheets diagram 4. Process equipment integrity 
4. Mechanical design data 4. Special design consideration 5. Human factors 
5. Safety protective systems 5. Pipe and Instrumentation 6. Management of change 
6. Plot plans with electrical drawings 7. Operating procedures 
area hazard classification 6. Plot plans Electrical 8. Training 
7. Electrical design data classification plot plan 9. Emergency response 
8. Piping and instruction 7. Plot plan of underground 10. Auditing 
drawings services 11. Incident investigation 
9. Inspection records 8. Equipment specification sheets 12. Standards, codes, and 
10. Current operations 9. Piping specifications regulations 
procedures 10. Safety critical instrumental 13. Contractor issues 
11. Process hazards analysis index 14. Safety work practices 
reports 11. Electrical one-line diagram 15. Control software 
12. Programmable controllers and 
computers 
13. Vendor information 
14. Other information: hazard 
analysis, audit, and incident 
investigation report. 
Lees (1996) Jacobsson (2000) Davis (2002) 
1. Company systems 1. Basic process information; 1. Chemical information: 
2. Standards, codes and legal • Design basis • Toxicity information! permissible 
requirements • Mass and energy balances exposure limits/physical datal 
• PFDs reactivity data 3. Organization 
• General process equipment • COITosivity data 
4. Process design specifications • Thermal and chemical stability data 
5. Plant layout • Calculations of specific safety • Hazardous effects of inadvertent 
6. Mechanical design equipments mixing 
• Process description 2. Technology information: 7. Services design 
• Process manual • Block or simplified process flow 8. Electrical, civil, structural • Engineering standards diagram 
design 2. Detailed engineering • Process chemistry 
9. Plant buildings documentation • Maximum inventory 
10. Control and instrumentation • P&IDs • Safe upper and lower limits 
11. Effluents, waste disposal, • Equipment specifications • Consequences of deviation 
• Electrical and earthing diagrams 3. Equipment information: 
noise 
• Instrument specifications • Materials of construction 
12. Fire protection • Instrument loop drawings • Piping and instrument diagrams 
13. Plant operation • Software programs • Electrical classification 
14. Training • Isometrics • Relief systems design and design 
• Underground piping and cabling basis 15. Safety equipment 
• Layout drawings • Ventilation system design 
16. Hazard identification and • Plot plans 
· 
Design codes employed 
assessment • Building drawings • Material and energy balances 
17. Security 3. Operating and maintenance • Safety systems 
18. Plant maintenance documentation: 4. Management issues 
19. Plant inspection • Operating instructions • Availability of all process safety 
• Laboratory instructions information 20. Emergency planting 
• Maintenance instructions • Document management system 
21. Environmental control • Maintenance manuals • Access and update procedures 
22. Medical • Inspection files 
4. Other SHE documentation: 
• MSDSs 
• Safety equipment documentation 
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2.4 Who needs safety information? 
Safety information is a fast moving area which is constantly being updated and has no 
country or language boundaries. Anyone working in any industry or in a commercial 
enterprise needs to be aware that today's information is probably, somewhere in the 
world, being updated. There is growing awareness of occupational safety and health 
matters because there is an increased knowledge of possible effects on the safety and 
health of the workforce from the industrial processes. Wherever their working 
environment may be, the workers and their employers need to know the latest 
developments surrounding their own working conditions. Every worker needs 
information at some time regarding his own working conditions. Also, with the 
introduction of legislation, a wide range of people will need safety information, such as: 
inspectors; doctors and nurses; engineers from all disciplines; chemists and biochemists; 
scientists and technicians; lawyers and administrators; consultants and specialists; 
health and safety managers and officers; individual works; contractors; etc. 
From the regulation perspective, the rules mentioned in Section 2.2 focus strongly on 
providing information to workers concerning the risks in the workplace, training in 
safety working methods, and using effective communication methods to transfer the 
message to the workplace. Moreover, employers not only must inform their own 
workers and/or representatives but also contractors and employers from any outside 
organisation whose employees are engaged in work on their premises. 
From a process plant's perspective, the various safety responsibilities in a company fall 
on different personnel groups, and therefore, these groups have different needs for 
safety information. This compiled information will be a necessary resource to a variety 
of users including: the team that will perform the process hazards analysis; those 
developing the training programs and the operating procedures; contactors whose 
employees will be working with the process; those conducting the pre-startup reviews; 
local emergency preparedness planners; and insurance and enforcement officials. 
According to a Finnish study (Aaltonen & Laitinen, 1997), the need for safety 
information in a process plant, and the types of safety information systems can be 
classified into three main categories (also see Table 2.2): 
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1. Supportive safety infonnation available outside a company: this kind of 
infonnation fonns and maintains the basis for the entire safety management in a 
company. 
2. Safety infonnation produced within a company: this kind of infonnation can be 
classified as monitoring data on working conditions and as data on safety 
planning and execution. Utilisation of the safety infonnation produced within a 
company entails huge potential for improving the safety and productivity of the 
company. 
3. The need for safety infonnation outside a company: these are typically 
administrative safety data that a company should provide for insurance 
companies or authorities. 
Table 2.2 The need for safety information in a company (AaItonen & Laitinen, 1997) 
Domain of information Detailed domain of information Examples of safety software 
need need 
Supportive safety Safety legislation, safety agreements -database on safety, health -
information available between labour unions and employer bibliographic database on safety, 
outside a company federations, safety standards, safety health, and ergonomics 
literature, educational material, etc. -internet services on the topic 
-training packages 
-expert systems for decision support 
Safety information Proactive safety data, e.g. MSDSs, -MSDSs information systems 
produced within a safety audits and inspections, task -information systems for work and 
company observations, hazard screenings, safety instructions 
organisational rules and work permits, -audit information systems 
information on personal protective -hazard screening information systems 
equipment, etc. 
Proactive safety data, e.g. accidents, -accident information systems 
near-misses, sickness, fires, losses, -sick level information systems 
costs, etc. -loss control information systems 
Data on ergonomic design and safety -CAD software for human modelling 
planning, e.g. emergency planning, -emergency response information 
ergonomic design of work places, first systems 
aid planning, etc. -safety analysis information systems 
Safety data included in other -company-specific information systems 
information systems, e.g. in 
production management systems, in 
maintenance information systems 
The need for safety Administrative safety data which a -accident information system provides 
information outside a company should provide for insurance specific accident information for labour 
company companies or to authorities, e.g. inspectorate and insurance companies 
labour inspectorate -electronic accident and claim data 
transfer between companies and 
insurance companies 
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2.5 Safety information flow 
The development of information flow enables the information that is acquired and 
generated by the organisation to be identified. Information flow links the respective 
information with who acquires or generates it, who uses it and how they use it. 
Moreover, the mapping of information flow assists in the identification of gaps, 
duplications and inefficiencies that hinder effective information provision. 
The UK Process Industries STEP (STandard for the Exchange of Product model data) 
consortium has developed a Process Plant Engineering Activity Model to describe the 
main activities and data flows associated with the process plant life cycle (PI STEP, 
1994). Safety information is explicitly stipulated in the model. This model emphasises 
that safety information must be retained and managed throughout the process plant life 
cycle. The model presents two major considerations, one of archiving such information 
effectively, and the other of providing efficient mechanisms for the information to be 
managed properly. 
CCPS (1995) defines five stages for a typical project/facility life cycle and proposes a 
pattern of information flow through this life cycle. These five stages are: design, 
fabrication and inspection, installation, startup and initial operation, and continued 
operation and maintenance. This safety information flow pattern illustrated in Figure 2.2 
is from the viewpoint of facility life cycle, and provides an easily understandable 
structure of safety information flow for the process industry. 
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Figure 2.2 The overall information flow (Based on CCPS, 1995) 
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It is necessary to identify, categorise and handle safety information during the life cycle 
of a facility. A key aspect of safety information flow is the interaction with agents 
(information provider, creator and user) and tasks, and the means to describe these 
relationships. A simplified safety information flow diagram in a process plant has been 
drawn in Figure 2.3 to illustrate the basic safety information needed of major tasks at 
each stage of the plant life cycle. 
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Figure 2.3 Safety information flow in a process plant 
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In order to assess the safety information flow, it is also useful to discuss the 
dissemination of information from the viewpoint of the information life cycle. A safety 
information life cycle represented schematically in Figure 2.4 is based on Takala's 
revision of Robert's models (Takala, 1997). This cycle identifies 7 steps for creating 
and disseminating safety information: 
1. Send original information to a publisher or editor. 
2. Published documents can be used directly by a user. 
3. The information is sent to an information centre to be included in a database. 
4. The database is targeted to the user. 
5. The information is used to reduce accidents. 
6. Experience learned by user. 
7. The learning transfers to report and documents which then are sent to publisher 
thus completing the cycle. 
Letter to the editor 
-.... , 
75' 
\ 
\ , 
Enterprise level 
Safety practice 
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Figure 2.4 The Safety Information Life Cycle (Takala, 1997) 
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2.6 Safety information management (SIM) system 
Prior sections presented the categories and definitions of safety information. The main 
task for a process plant is not only to collect and keep safety information 
comprehensively but also to share and utilise this information adequately. Such a task is 
Safety information Management (SIM) which can be defined as a set of management 
initiatives used to effectively produce, co-ordinate, store, retrieve and disseminate safety 
information from internal and external sources in order to improve the safety 
performance of the organisation. When a plant wants to implement SIM, categorising 
safety information and mapping safety information are early tasks. The main task is 
then to develop a SIM system. A SIM system is a system that optimises the collection, 
transfer, and presentation of safety information through an organisation, in accordance 
with defined procedures, whether automated or manual. 
Even though safety management is studied widely, little attention has been paid to the 
relationships between modem safety management practices and supporting SIM 
systems. The specific literature on safety management rarely considers 'safety 
information management systems' as a specific dimension of safety management 
framewor~s. However, the SIM system should be treated as the core in supporting 
Safety Management Practices. Figure 2.5 shows the role of a SIM system in the safety 
framework. 
Safety Management Practices 
Safety Performance 
Safety Information Management System 
• Safety infonnation flows 
• Infonnation technologies 
• Infonnation management activities 
Figure 2.5 The role of safety information system in safety management 
Practically, a SIM system encompasses both the procedures and the equipment required 
to effectively handle the safety information. A SIM system should be tailored to the 
individual needs of the facility. A SIM system can range from a completely manual, 
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paper-based system with filing cabinets and manual indexing to a paperless 
computerised system where all information is entered and all documents are stored in 
computers. Some combination of these two approaches, addressing the operational and 
economic needs of the facility, can be effective for many users. The selection of a 
manual, computerised, or combination system will depend on the requirements 
established by the organisation for its safety management programme, such as: 
1. What types of information are needed? -text, drawing, sound, image, video ... 
2. Who needs access to various information? -operators, supervisor, authorities ... 
3. How quickly must the information be available? -shift, day, immediate .... 
4. Where is the information needed? -single or multiple sites, internal or external. 
Because of the abundance and complexity of safety information and the regulatory 
requirement of providing up-to-date information, the process industry has introduced 
and utilised computerised management systems or combination systems to cope with 
safety information since the start of the last decade. Some process plants developed SIM 
systems themselves in order to fit specific requirements and organisation culture. 
Meanwhile, many software packages for safety documentation or safety information 
management are also available in the market. For instance: 
1. THESIS (The Health Environment and Safety Information System) is a software 
package originally developed by the Shell Group in 1996 (Lidstone, 1998). 
THESIS is currently managed by ABS (ABS Consulting, 2006). 
2. IMPACT Safety is a EH&S performance solution developed by Behavioural 
Science Technology Inc (Stioff, 2001). 
3. Tr®ction™ is a web-based global health, safety, security, environment, and quality 
(HSSEQ) information system developed by British Petroleum (BP) Ltd. and 
available through PA Knowledge Limited (PA, 2003). 
4. LEIMS (Lehder EHS information service) is developed by Lehder Environment 
Service Limited to assist to the management of EHS data and turn it into 
information used for making decisions (LEHDER, 2003). 
5. Safety Partner™ is a computer based safety information management system 
developed by Technical Training Resources, Inc. It integrates safety information, 
company safety policies, and regulatory message into a program (TTR Software, 
2002). 
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How to select or develop a suitable and functional SIM system is always a challenge. 
System choices can be based on various performance requirements, such as speed of 
retrieval, indexing or search capacities, or data storage capacity required. Considering 
the integrity of a management system for safety information, Chen et al. (2002) suggest 
SIM, at least, should have the following key functions: 
1. The ability to information share. 
2. The allocation of accessibility rights. 
3. The ability to inquire about the safety work information. 
4. The ability to modify personal information. 
5. The ability of sending safety work information and to get feedback. 
6. The ability to conduct works online. 
Modern SIM can not ignore new information technology. For instance, the Internet and 
Intranet are very popular in organisations. The Internet and Intranet applications have 
many potential advantages, such as visualising the information, integrating a huge 
amount of various kinds of information needed for effective and safe working methods, 
and, in on-line systems, needed information is acquired just-on-time. It provides a new 
powerful tool for safety management within plants and for use in other contexts. 
However, a disadvantage of these mediums is that the target group has to have easy 
access and has to take the initiative to search for the information. Some other 
disadvantages such as hikers and viruses will affect the use of new information 
technology for SIM. 
2.7 The importance of SIM 
2.7.1 A key element for safety management programme 
SIM must be considered as a key strategy in improving working conditions and the 
environment. Within a process plant, safety is a common objective in all activities 
throughout the plant lifecycle. The integration of SIM must enable the sharing of safety-
related information between different operations. One of the worthwhile safety 
information management goals is to enable workers to focus their energies and 
resources on using the information to create learning opportunities and engage in 
specified activities and tasks that result in the prevention of occupational illnesses and 
injuries. 
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As described in Section 2.2, in the UK, USA and mainland Europe, the main safety 
legislation for the process industry requires process plants to employ a Process Safety 
Management (PSM) system to focus on engineering practices that could prevent 
process-related accidents. To achieve the ultimate worth of a PSM program, results 
from the implementation of each individual element of PSM must be documented. This 
ensures that information is available to be communicated to those persons responsible 
for implementing other PSM elements (CCPS, 1995). In fact, most PSM elements are 
dependent on the flow of safety information to function properly. For example, 
important information on how to accomplish a task safer may be identified in a Process 
Hazard Analysis (PHA). This PHA information would be of little value unless 
communicated to the appropriate personnel through procedures and training. 
There are many PSM models in the world, which include models that have been 
published by American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), American Chemical 
Council (AMC), American Petroleum Institute (APl), The USA Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), OSHA and HSE since 1990's. There are a variety of 
descriptions for these PSM models summarised in Table 2.3. Comparison of these 
models quickly shows that they are very similar. There are differences in terminology 
and emphasis, but the fundamental concepts of process safety management are 
consistent (CCPS, 1994). Moreover, in all these models, a critical truth that can be 
identified is that safety information is one of major elements of each model. 
2.7.2 Foundation of business 
Operation of a process plant needs operating procedures which are one type of safety 
information used to provide a clear set of instruction that include the correct steps, listed 
in the proper sequence, to safely perform a task. Some of the benefits of having 
effective and comprehensive operating procedures include reduced risks, higher product 
quality due to repeatability of operations, and smoother transition between operating 
shifts, all of which can contribute to reduce operating costs. Operating procedures also 
serve as aids for training new employees and maintaining the competency of existing 
plant personnel. 
On the other hand, every process plant is the safety information provider of its products. 
The requirement is to provide essential information on chemicals, their properties and 
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appropriate safety measures in a concise format to be used by customers. The 
information must be up-to-date and accurate in order to keep customer satisfaction and 
avoid misunderstandings leading to incidents. 
Table 2.3 The elements of PSM models 
AIChE model AMCmodel APImodel 
(PSM guidelines) (Responsible Care programme) (API750) 
1. Accountability: objectives and 1. Management leadership 1. Process safe!}: information 
goals 
• Commitment 2. Process hazard analysis 2. Process knowledge and 
• Accountability 3. Management of change documentation 
• Performance measurement 4. Operating procedures 
3. Capital project review and 
• Incident investigation 5. Safe work practices 
design procedures 
• CAER integration 6. Training 
4. Process risk assessment 2. Process safety management of 7. Assurance of the quality and 
5. Management of change technology integrity of critical equipment 
6. Process and equipment 
• Design documentation 8. Pre-startup safety review integrity 
• Process hazards information 9. Emergency response and 
7. Incident investigation 
• Process hazards analysis control 
8. Training and performance 
• Management of change IO.Investigation of process-related 9. Human factors (error 3. PSM of facilities incidents 
assessment, task design, 
• Sitting 1 1. Audit of process hazards 
ergonomics) 
• Codes and standards management systems lO.Standards, codes, and laws 
• Safety reviews 1 1. Audit and corrective actions 
• Maintenance and inspection 12. Enhancement of process safety 
• Multiple safeguards knowledge 
• Emergency management 
4. Managing personal of process 
safety 
• job skills 
• safe work practices 
• initial training 
• employee proficiency 
• fitness for duty 
• contractors 
EPAmodel OSHAmodel HSE model 
(Risk Management programme) (Regulation 29CRFI919.l19) (HSG 65) 
1. Hazard assessment 1. Employee Participation 
2. Prevention program 2. Process safe!}: information 1. Policy 
• Management system 3. Process hazard analysis 2. Organising 
• Process hazards analysis 4. Operating procedures • Control 
• Process safe!}: information 5. Training • Co-operation 
• Standard operating 6. Contractors • Communication 
procedures 7. Pre-statrup safe review Effective communication 
• Training 8. Mechanical integrity about health and safe!}: relies 
• Maintenance (mechanical 9. Hot work permit on information 
integrity) 10. Management of change -coming to the organization 
• Pre-startup review 11. Incident investigation -flowing within the 
• Managementofchange 12. Emergency planning and organisation 
• Safety audits response -going out from the 
• Accident investigation 13. Compliance audits organisation 
3. Emergency response program 14. Trade secrets • Competence 
4.Risk management plan 3. Planning and implementing 
4. Measuring performance 
5. Reviewing performance 
6.Auditing 
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In recent years, the amount of environment ergonomics, safety and health standards has 
increased rapidly. Standards are necessary to provide quality control and to support 
legislation and regulations used in the establishment of an acceptable international 
market. Therefore, most process plants adopt international certification standards to 
demonstrate their safety performance. Examples of these standards are: BS 8800 
(British Standard: guide to Occupational Safety and Health Management systems), and 
OHASA 18001 (British Standard: guide to Occupational Health and Safety Assessment 
Series). These standards provide certain guidelines for Occupational Safety and Health 
documentation and communication. For instance, BS8800 states that (BSI, 1999): 
"Documentation is a key part of any communication system and should be 
tailored to the needs of the organization. The complexity of the organization 
and the risks that have to be controlled will normally dictate the detail of 
documentation required, although it has to be recognized that legal 
requirements demand some documentation and records, e.g. organisations 
with five or more employees are required to have a written statement of 
OH&S policy and a record of the significant findings of any risk assessment. 
Documentation should support the health and safety management system, not 
drive it. Key documents, such as working procedures, records and 
instructions, should be accessible at the point of use. It is necessary to ensure 
that people who need to refer to any of the documents or data as part o/their 
job have correct and up-to-date versions available to them. How changes to 
documents and data are to be made and who has the authority to make 
changes should also be defined". 
These standards require the certificated organisation to establish and maintain 
procedures for identification, maintenance and disposition of OH&S records, as well as 
the results of audits and reviews. Therefore, an integrated SIM system can contribute 
the maintenance of certification standards. 
2.7.3 Accident prevention 
The 1978 edition of Turner's remarkable book 'Man-Made Disaster' provided insightful 
observations about the origins of disasters and lays the foundations for understanding 
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the important role of information failure. Turner suggests that we must pay attention to 
two elements which are basic to all disasters: energy and information. He states the 
general principle that: 
Disaster equals energy plus misinformation 
If this proposition is accepted, it becomes clear that SIM is a key to the prevention of 
accidents. If the first message/item that constitutes the start of the incubation period of 
accident were properly received and its implications fully understood, and if all 
subsequent items were dealt with in SIM activities, the accident would never happen. 
For instance, the operators of process plant often now have computer assistance in 
deciding what action to take in case of an unexpected breakdown, in order to avoid 
worsening the situation resulting in an accident. 
Actually, a number of papers have been presented from a range of industries on the 
subject of poor safety information flow. These researchers cite 'information failure' as a 
significant contributing factor and precondition of disasters. Further reviews and 
discussions of the relationship between safety information and accidents are presented 
in Chapter 3. 
2.8 Summary 
The design, operation, and maintenance of a process plant require a considerable 
amount of safety information. This safety information, which encompasses process 
chemicals, technology and equipment, is the foundation of not only understanding the 
potential hazards of a process but also of supporting a comprehensive safety 
management programme. Therefore, an adequate SIM system is needed for each 
process plant to handle safety information accurately and up-to-date. 
In the 21 st century, more flexible and critical production is required in the process 
industry. At the same time, a growing amount of safety information and immense 
changes in information technology have erupted. The control and management of safety 
information in conjunction with new information technology has become one of the 
crucial factors throughout the process industry. 
30 
Chapter 3 Information Failure and Accidents 
Chapter 3 -Information Failure and Accidents 
3.1 General Remarks 
Safety information is universally recognised as the important asset that an organisation 
can own in order to prevent accident and increase productivity. Despite this recognition, 
incidents and accidents occur when the information is not available or is not used as 
expected and its overall performance is sub-optimal. There are, of course, many 
degrees of problem relating to information, ranging from 'flawed but usable' to 'totally 
usable', 'unused' or 'an absolute disaster', and while there is probably much flawed 
information in use, it is usually only the absolute disasters that receive wide public 
attention (Flowers, 1996). 
To avoid information problems leading to accident, implementing SIM is the 
fundamental step. The purpose of SIM is the overall management and control of an 
organisation's activities on safety information, including identifying and sharing 
information, ensuring standardisation, control, security and integrity of data stored. 
Nevertheless, inadequate implementation of SIM also creates problems that may lead to 
an accident. 
This chapter, firstly, gives a review of problems relating to information, information 
systems and information management. Then, the relationship between accidents and 
information failures is discussed. Finally, a review of four major accidents provides 
robust evidence that inadequate SIM is one of the root causes of accidents. 
3.2 Information handling difficulties 
A growing concern in the process industry is the need for better information to support 
decision-makers in incident prevention. Although a variety of data are collected, key 
information and the analysis that could support understanding of safety performance 
and needs are often lacking or are not available in a timely manner. These information 
problems have been described as 'information handling difficulties' (Turner, 1978) or 
'information failures' (Maclntosh-Murray & Choo, 2002). When viewing these 
problems, the concept of 'information failure' can be discussed from information, 
information systems and information management points-of-view. The relationship of 
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these three domains is illustrated in Figure 3.1. An information system is comprised of 
all the components that collect, manipulate, and disseminate data or information. An 
information system can improve the quality and productivity of individuals and an 
organisation, only if it is actually used. Information management includes the 
formulation of information policy, design, evaluation and integration of effective 
information systems and services. Therefore, information management must consider 
, people' as the core of its activities. 
• Input 
I Information Management 
Control S Feedback 
I Information Systems I 
Processing 
+ 
Output 
Information Information Information 
Figure3.1 The framework of information management (Based on O'Brien, 2004) 
When considering information alone, failures may include lack of information, incorrect 
information, ambiguous information, complicated information, and too much 
information. The key issue will be the availability of information. Fowler (1995) 
suggests six factors influencing the availability of information, which are the following: 
• Controlled access-making data accessible by only those who need it. 
• Timely access-making data available when it is needed. 
• Version management - identification of particular versions of data. 
• Data redundancy - making sure that important data is made redundantly. 
• Location of data - identification of where the data resides. 
• Format of data - making sure data is in the correct format, or translation 
mechanisms exist by which a suitable format can be established. 
On the other hand, many researches on information system failures have been done in 
the past decade. In general, an information system failure can be defined as some 
combination of computer hardware, communication technology and software designed 
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to handle information related to business processes (Flowers, 1996). The failure of an 
information system occurs when the system as a whole does not operate as expected and 
its overall performance is sub-optimal. Lyytinen & Hirscheim (1987) have provided a 
comprehensive review of the literature on Information System (IS) failure. They point 
out that failure is an extremely complex concept and that failures can occur in several 
different domains (technical, data, user, and organisational). Many researchers argue 
that few information systems are successful. For example, a 1991 survey of large 
companies found that 65 percent of IS projects were over budget, and that many of 
these were extremely late and unproductive (Cringely, 1994). Moreover, Laudon & 
Laudon (2000) suggest as many as 75 percent of all large information systems may be 
considered to be operating failures. 
Macaulay (1996) states that IS failures can be classified into four types: 
1. Correspondence failure: this occurs when the design objectives are not met. 
2. Process failure: this type of failure occurs when budget, time, or resource allocations 
are so overrun that any benefits of the new system are already negated. 
3. Interaction failure: this type offailure is indicated by low usage ofthe system. 
4. Expectation failure: this occurs when the system has failed to meet the 
expectations of at least one client group. 
However, these Macaulay's categories on information system problems have not fully 
covered users who should be the main subjects of every information system. From an 
information system user viewpoint, Jalonen et al. (1999) suggest five major problems 
which are: (1) technical problems; (2) problems in the user interface; (3) problems in 
the usage of the system; (4) problems related to skills and knowledge; and (5) problems 
related to division of labour and work processes. 
Furthermore, information management is the planning, budgeting, control and 
exploitation of the information resources in an organisation. The term encompasses both 
the information itself and related aspects such as systems, personnel, finance, 
organisation and technologies. Therefore, information management that includes 
information and information systems is the base for running an organisation. There have 
been many empirical studies of factors associated with the success of information 
management over the last decade. Information management failures have attracted 
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much less attention. Information management falls under various themes: vision and 
policy, change implementation, alignment of strategies to information technology, 
business process re-engineering, the review of new systems and information technology 
infrastructure (Khosrowpour, 1999). In the information management domain, Henczel 
(2001) suggests information failures can be found in the following areas: 
• Information hoarding - A person or department acquires a significant amount of 
information and does not pass the information on to others either in its original 
form or in the form of a filtered resource. This could be a 'people' problem rather 
than a 'process' problem as many people recognise the power of being the holder 
of exclusive information. 
• Biased distribution of resources - Once needs have been identified, it is a 
problem if a department with similar needs does not have access to a similar level 
of resources. Often it is a case where those who claim the most necessity win 
access to the most resources, while others do with fewer. 
• The use of sub-standard, redundant or inappropriate resources - Users adopt 
superseded editions of print resources, outdated data, inefficient electronic 
resources or resources that are not suitable for their needs. This is particularly 
important where the tasks that resources support have been identified as 
strategically significant. 
• Gaps in the provision of resources - Where needs have been identified yet no 
resources are being provided to meet them. 
• Duplication of information - Where resources are entering the organisation 
through inefficient channels or where flows from one department to another are 
not as direct as they could be. 
• Information overload issues - Too many resources are being provided on a 
specific level of need. This could be multiple resources that supply similar 
material or it could be just too many resources being acquired unnecessarily. 
• Lack of transparency and accountability - In information handling, lack of 
transparency and accountability leads to unproductive use of information 
resources. Resources might been acquired by departments independently rather 
than through a central unit resulting in duplication, higher costs, the use of 
inappropriate resources and costly inefficiencies in flows due to hidden resources. 
• Lack of information tractability - When information is transformed/filtered and 
provided to the next level of the organisation, the problem might occur in how 
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confident can the next user be in the validity/relevance/authority of the source 
information. 
• Lack of understanding of user information needs - This might lead to 
incorrect resources being supplied or an inappropriate level of resources being 
supplied. 
The problems causing information management failure can be grouped into multiple 
categories. However, these problems can be attributed not only to technical features of 
information systems but to non-technical sources as well. Keil et al. (1998) emphasised 
that most of these problems and risks of information management failure stem from 
organisational factors. Westrum (1992), a leading American industrial sociologist, has 
distinguished organisational cultures according to the way they deal with safety-related 
information. He identified three types of organisational culture handling safety 
information (pathological, bureaucratic and generative). Their principal characteristics 
are summarised in Table 3.1. Westrum suggested that organisations conducting 
potentially hazardous operations need 'requisite imagination', a diversity of thinking 
and imaging that matches the variety of possible failure scenarios. The possession of 
this 'requisite imagination' in the generative organisation can be complemented through 
adequate information management. 
Table 3.1 How different organisational cultures handle safety information 
Pathological culture Bureaucratic culture Generative cult ure 
Don't want to know. May not find out. Actively seek it. 
Messengers (whistle-blowers) Messengers are listened to if Messengers are traine dand 
are 'shot'. they arrive. rewarded. 
Responsibility is shirked. Responsibility is Responsibility is shar ed. 
compartmentalised. 
Failure is punished or Failures lead to local repairs. Failures lead to far-re aching 
concealed. reforms. 
New ideas are actively New ideas often present New ideas are welco med. discouraged. problems. 
In short, this preliminary failure review indicates that the information handling 
difficulties appear to be of mixed description. Some relate to the nature of the signals 
and information itself; some involve the characteristics of the people involved; some 
involve the context or environment; yet others relate to the process steps of information 
flow. This implies a need for an environmental scanning early warning approach to 
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support organisational intelligence and sense making (Choo, 1998). Moreover, 
combining these problems from multiple categories provides a platform from which we 
can identify the practical implications and questions for the relationship between 
information failures and accidents. 
3.3 Information failure and accidents 
A number of papers have been presented from a range of industries on the subject of 
poor safety information. These researches cite information failure as a significant 
contributing factor and precondition of organisational disasters and accidents (Turner, 
1978; Horton & Lewis, 1991; Vaughan, 1997; Reason, 1997; Toft & Reynolds, 1997; 
Wells, 1997; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997; HSE, 1998; King & Hirst, 1998; Maclntosh-
Murray & Choo, 2002). For instance, HSE (1998) agrees that poor management of 
safety information is a potential problem within the offshore industry. Turner (1978) 
summaries disaster as "disaster is a combination of misinformation and the release of 
some form of energy: chemical, kinetic, geophysical, or biologicaf' (Turner, 1978). 
King & Hirst (1998) support Turner's description of disaster but modify it into "disaster 
equals energy and/or toxic substances plus misinformation or rejection of information" 
to emphasise the importance of information problems in a developing disaster. 
The Turner's insightful observations about the origins of disasters provide the 
foundations for understanding the important role of information failure. Turner's model 
proposes multiple stages of disaster development that can unfold over a long period of 
time (see Table 3.2). The model suggests that disasters involve an element of great 
surprise for the majority of individuals affected because of the inaccurate beliefs in 
Stage I that: (1) adequate safety precautions are in place; (2) no untoward events are 
occurring; and (3) the appropriate individuals are fully aware of any information that 
would indicate otherwise. 
Turner emphasises that disasters can have a prolonged incubation period, during which 
events that are at odds with those existing beliefs begin to occur in the organisation. 
During the 'pre-discIosure' incubation period in Stage 11, the events may be ambiguous, 
known, or misunderstood, resulting in vague or ill-structured problem situations, replete 
with information difficulties. Post-disclosure, after a transfer of information, presents a 
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situation that appears to be quite different, and displays a well-structured, recognisable 
problem, with the benefit of hindsight vision. Hindsight bias can be a major problem 
during the efforts to piece together the events after the fact. In an ideal case, the 
transformation from the problematic pre-disclosure state to the well-structured post-disclosure 
state would be accomplished with the transfer of appropriate warning information. 
Table 3.2 The sequence of events associated with the development of a disaster 
(Turner & Pidgeon, 1997) 
Stage of development Probable events 
Stage I: • Initial culturally accepted beliefs about the world and its hazards. 
Notionally normal • Associated precautionary norms set out in laws, codes of practice, 
starting points mores and folkways. 
The accumulation of an unnoticed set of events which are at odds 
Stage 11: with accepted beliefs about hazards and the norms for their 
Incubation period avoidance. 
Stage Ill: Brings attention to itself and transforms general perceptions of 
Precipitating event Stage 11. 
Stage IV: The immediate consequences of the collapse of cultural precautions 
Onset become apparent. 
Stage V: First stage adjustment: the immediate post-collapse situation is recognised in ad hoc adjustments which permit the work of rescue 
Rescue and salvage and salvage to be started. 
Stage VI: Full cultural An inquiry or assessment is carried out and beliefs and precautionary norms are adjusted to fit the newly gained 
readjustment 
understanding of the world. 
In the many disasters reviewed, Turner identified common features and similarities 
which form the basis of the man-made disasters model, including: 
1. Rigidities in perception and pervasive beliefs in organisational setting which include 
cultural and institutional factors that bias members' knowledge and ignorance. 
2. Organisational exclusivity, which causes the organisation to ignore outsiders' warnings. 
3. Information difficulties: 
• Relevant information may be buried in a mass of irrelevant information. 
• Recipients may fail to attend to information because it is only presented at the 
moment of crisis. 
• Recipients may adopt a 'passive' mode of administrative response to an issue 
• Recipients may fail to put information together creatively. 
4. Failure to comply with existing regulations. 
5. Minimising emergency danger. 
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Turner's view of the information difficulties is particularly interesting and important. 
The information in Turner's description of disaster is some form of danger signs, 
signals, messages, warnings, or information about potentially hazardous energy sources; 
in general, information which could prevent a disaster. The information difficulties 
summarised in Table 3.3 can arise at any stage of the development of a disaster: during 
the pre-disclosure incubation phase, during the information transfer, and post-disclosure. 
Table 3.3 Information handling difficulties during stages of disaster development 
(Based on Turner & Pidgeon, 1997) 
Stage Information handling difficulty 
Pre-disclosure Danger signals/infonnation may not be perceived or available to anyone 
Danger signals/infonnation may be available to someone, but they may 
• Misinterpret them; not recognise the significance 
• Have a false sense of security; not be able to pass it along in time 
• May not know exactly where it is needed 
• Assume someone else will handle them 
• Overlook them because people are rushed and distracted 
The danger signals/infonnation may be 
• Ambiguous; buried in a mass of detail; a source of disagreement 
• Dispersed among several individuals or organisations 
• Outside prevailing wa)'s of understanding. 
Transfer Wrong or misleading infonnation may be sent 
Infonnation may be sent to the wrong people 
Too much reliance on infonnation networks 
Ambiguity as to what infonnation is to be transferred; roles; motives of actors 
Infonnation may be deliberately withheld 
Transfer inhibited due to poor relations between potential initiator and recipient 
Post-disclosure Relevant infonnation may be buried in mass of irrelevant infonnation 
(Once Recipient may be preoccupied with other matters 
information is Infonnation may only be presented at the moment of crisis 
received it may Recipient may adopt passive mode of administrative response 
not be used) 'FYI' label may not prompt action 
Failure to creatively assemble infonnation 
Failure to convince those in power of the validity of the infonnation 
Difficulty transmitting adequate infonnation about appropriate actions 
and precautions to the public/strangers 
Disasters result from a failure of foresight and an absence of some form of knowledge 
and information among the groups and individuals involved. Sense making can be 
complicated by a 'variable disjunction of information', which refers to 'a complex 
situation in which a number of parties handling a problem are unable to obtain precisely 
the same information about the problem, so that many differing interpretations of the 
situation exist'. Weick (1998) also points out the tendency of people to make with the 
information they have at hand and to simplify interpretations creating collective blind 
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spots which obscure problems which may be brewing. In the development of a disaster, 
King & Hirst (1998) summarises that the 'misinformation' in Turner's equation may 
have four causes as follows: 
1. The information is completely unknown at the time. 
2. The information is known to some people, but not known to or properly 
appreciated by those in need of it at the time. The dissemination of this 
information may be inhibited if the senior management have misconceptions 
about it. These are then termed 'organisational misconceptions'. 
3. The information needed is about fast-moving events as they unfold. 
4. Information is misunderstood. 
In studying the origins of disasters, Turner's model implies that it is important to pay 
attention, not just to the aggregate amount of information which is available before a 
disaster, but also to the distribution of this information, to the structures and 
communication networks within which it is located, and to the nature and extent of the 
boundaries which impede the flow of this information. Of particular importance are 
those boundaries which, by inhibiting the flow of this information, may permit disasters 
to occur (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). 
Moreover, Horton & Lewis (1991) introduced the 'information disaster' as a result of a 
lack of effective communication and a calamitous misunderstanding of key messages. 
An information disaster might develop if it results in human misery, political 
misfortune, or business failure. They consider 'dysfunctional information attitudes and 
behaviours' are key factors leading to 'information disaster'. These 'dysfunctional 
information attitudes and behaviours' imply that information has been mismanaged 
somehow, somewhere, by someone, at some time, and often with disastrous 
consequences. In their study, four types of dysfunctional information attitudes and 
behaviours are identified: 
I. people are uninformed, and may not even know that they are uninformed. 
Il. people are misinformed. 
Ill. people are disinformed deliberately by others. 
IV. people are informed, but deliberately disregard or deny available information. 
Another term related to information failure is 'information barriers'. Middleton (2002) 
states that information, proper tools, knowledge, capacity and incentives are the five 
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major barriers to human performance. When people are not informed of what is 
expected of them, when they are not told how well they are performing, or when they 
are not given any guidance or clear direction on how to accomplish a task, an 
information barrier is present. The lack of consist and practical operating procedures or 
feedback creates situations where people respond according to their own judgements of 
how things should be done. Often the behaviour is incompatible with other aspects of 
the operation. To determine if there was an information barrier, the question is asked: 
'were the people given direction and guidance on how to do the job'. Direction and 
guidance are used as key words in the question since they cover both expected 
performance and feedback for performance. Guidance and direction can come from a 
variety of sources. Written plans, policies, and procedures can direct and guide 
behaviour. Verbal direction and guidance from supervisors and co-workers provide 
other information. However, whatever the source, direction and guidance that is not 
clear, consistent, or accurate can be an even greater barrier to human performance than 
no information at all. 
3.4 Accident review from SIM viewpoint 
There have been many experiences that accidents result from a failure of foresight and 
an absence of some form of information (CCPS, 1995). This section discusses the work 
of three previous researchers and analyses two accident databases in order to provide 
evidence to support this phenomenon. 
Wells (1997) has adopted a sociotechnical approach to analyse the root cause of 
accidents. This sociotechnical approach emphasises the individual, organisational 
management and technical aspects which affect a system's performance. Figure 3.2 
shows the framework adopted by Wells. It is a representation of the various subsystems 
which affect the performance of the sociotechnical system. It is drawn as shown to 
indicate the interrelationship between ten subsystems. Both the non-technical and 
technical aspects are influenced by the organisational structure, the forms of 
management control and the way in which operators perform their tasks. The 
'communication and information' subsystem is particular interesting because it supports 
the view that inadequate SIM can lead to an industrial accident. 
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System climate Organisation and External systems 
management 
Procedures and 
Communication 
Management control 
practices 
and information 
Site and plant 
Operator facilities 
Work environment performance 
Equipment integrity 
Figure 3.2 Subsystems within a sociotechnical system 
In Well's model each subsystem can be treated as one root cause. Each category of root 
cause given in Figure 3.2 is amplified by keywords. They have been further expanded 
by a representative selection of preconditions for failure which represent the root causes 
of incidents. Here, since we have emphasised the 'Safety Information Management' 
issue, Table 3.4 only shows the keywords and preconditions of the root cause 
'communication and information'. 
Table 3.4 keywords and preconditions of 'Communication and information' 
Root cause category Keywords Preconditions for failure 
Communication and Information quality Inadequate verbal communications 
information No communication or not timely 
Inadequate or wrong information 
Failure to obtain information 
Information not available 
Faulty information processing by personnel 
Faulty information processing by machine 
Safety information Inadequate data on system constraints 
Inadequate data on materials 
Inadequate model of incident scenarios 
Inadequate assessment of damage and injury 
Inadequate safety documentation 
Inadequate update of information 
Channels Absence of communication channels 
Lack of feedforward and feedback 
Inadequate monitoring, data collection and supply 
Incorrect or improper performance feedback 
Media Loss of meaning on communication 
interface! exchange Inadequate display and access to information 
Incorrect response to information 
Inadequate human and system interfaces 
Emergency Inadequate control centre 
response Inadequate emergency procedures manual 
information Inadequate knowledge of models of release 
Inadequate information for response 
Emergency Absence of emergency communication channels 
communication Overload of facilities 
Inadequate communication channels to outside 
bodies 
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Wells adopted this sociotechnical approach to analyse the root causes of nine major 
accidents which are King's Lynn, Chemstar, Bhopal, Herald of Free Enterprise, 
Challenger, Chernobyl, King's Cross, Grangemouth and Pipe Alpha. He summaries 23 
preconditions for failure (see Table 3.5) found to be applicable to the nine accidents 
analysed. From Table 3.5 it can be identified that No 1,2,5,6, 9,15 and 16 are directly 
related to SIM. These are approximately 21 % of all the preconditions for failure. This 
reflects that inadequate SIM is one of the most common root causes of accidents. 
Table 3.5 Most common 'preconditions for failure' found in the study 
NO Preconditions for failure 
1* The process system had inadequate display and access to information 
2* Inadequate monitoring, data collection/supply and documentation of the process 
3 Inadequate use of codes of practices 
4 Lack of technical or operational experience of personnel involved in the accident 
5* Inadequate standards, specification and/or design criteria 
6* Inadequate update of standards 
7 Inadequate management of change 
8 Procedures not used, inadequate or faulty 
9* Inadequate communications 
10 Inadequate emergency plans 
11 Failure to carry out adequate hazard analysis 
12 Failure to identify problems in advance 
13 Safety management system inadequate 
14 Poor emergency response training and rehearsal 
15* Inadequate organisational learning from previous accidents 
16* Low awareness of hazards 
17 Inadequate modelling of possible incident scenarios 
18 Inadequate review of previous minor incidents 
19 Inadequate assessment of loss exposure 
20 Inadequate auditing, appraisal and assessment 
21 Inadequate health and safety consideration 
22 Inadequate workplace norms as regards safety 
23 Inadequate compliance or deliberate violations of legislation or regulations 
The research of Toft and Reynolds (1997) analysed recommendations in accident 
reports. They identified that 'information' was one of five main recommendation groups 
after analysing nineteen public inquiries into disasters that occurred in the UK between 
1965 and 1978. The five groups of recommendations identified were technical, 
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authority, information, personnel, and attempted foresight. For the information group, 
Toft and Reynolds (1997) suggested it consists often recommendation types: 
1. improve communication 
2. consultations should be held between interested parties 
3. increase hazard awareness to public, employees and others 
4. review rules and existing regulations 
5. revise or change existing work practices 
6. review existing emergency procedures 
7. administrative- record of events 
8. administrative- letters and documents 
9. the giving of advice from experts 
10. demarcation of lines of responsibility 
The analysis of nineteen public inquiries into disasters conducted by Toft and Reynolds 
(1997) showed a distribution of recommendation group types as in Table 3.6. The 
results imply that the underlying causes of accidents may be similar in nature with the 
information group being identified as one of the important and unavoidable groups. 
Actually, Toft and Reynolds state that these information based recommendations aim to 
prevent future failures by the use of a posteriori precautions. 
Table 3.6 Distribution of recommendation group 
Recommendation group type Disasters with type (%) 
Information 100 
Technical 100 
Attempted 85 
Personnel 85 
Authority 60 
Another similar analysis is conducted by the V.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) on 
investigating chemical incidents and hazards in America. The study is up-to-date and 
focuses on determining root causes and issuing safety recommendations to government 
agencies as well as companies, labour unions, trade associations, and other organisations. 
The CSB believes that the effective development and tracking of recommendations is a 
key element in how the CSB achieves change in the chemical industry. 
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Based on findings and conclusions from investigations and hazard studies, the CSB 
develops recommendations to prevent future incidents. The recommendations are then 
assigned to appropriate recipients and tracked to completion. According to its 20 
completed investigations till the end of 2004 the CSB has issued 198 recommendations 
(see Table 3.7). 
Table 3.7 Recommendation from CSB (CSB, 2005) 
CSB recommendation Frequency % CSB recommendation Frequency % 
Barriers to Communication 2 1.01% Materials Identification 2 1.01% 
Codes, Standards, and 19 9.60% Mechanical Integrity 6 3.03% Regulations Program 
Communication of Incident 50 25.25% Non-Routine Work 1 0.51% 
Contractor Safety 1 0.51% Problem Resolution System 2 1.01% 
Corporate Oversight 5 2.53% Procedures 14 7.07% 
Decommissioning Procedures 1 0.51% Process Parameter 1 0.51% Monitoring 
Emergency Response and 9 4.55% Process Safety Information 8 4.04% Planning 
Equipment Design 3 1.52% Quality Control 1 0.51% 
Facility Layout 2 1.01% Reactive Chemicals 7 3.54% Program 
Facility Oversight 2 1.01% Recognition, Evaluation, 15 7.58% 
and Control of Hazards 
Fire Suppression and Control 10 5.05% Regulatory Oversight 13 6.57% 
Human Factors 0 0.00% Safety Procedures 6 3.03% 
Incident InvestigationlNear 2 1.01% Safety Systems/Equipment 6 3.03% Miss Reporting System 
Instrumentation/Logic 0 0.00% Startup Procedures 0 0.00% 
Maintenance procedures 1 0.51% Training 4 2.02% 
Management Accountability 0 0.00% Waste Acceptance Plan 0 0.00% 
Management of Change 4 2.02% Work Authorization 1 0.51% Program 
From Table 3.7 it can be identified that 'Communication of Incident' and 'Process 
Safety Information' are two recommendations directly related to SIM's issue. It shows 
at least 29.3% of all recommendations focus on improving SIM. Moreover, 
recommendations such as 'Procedures', 'Codes, Standards, and Regulations', 
'Decommissioning Procedures', 'Maintenance procedures', 'Regulation oversight', and 
'Safety Procedures' are more or less associated with SIM. This indicates that inadequate 
SIM is one of major root causes of accidents and applying these recommendations 
related to SIM is urgent. 
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Researches of Wells (1996), Toft and Reynolds (1997), and CSB (2005) were based on 
case studies and only focused on a limited number of major accidents. This implies that 
their findings would be subjected to bias. Their studies might not provide a generally 
agreed account of the nature of SIM system failure for the process industry. Therefore, 
the IChemE accident database and the MARS database, both of which are functional 
accident databases for searching causes of industrial incidents, have been utilised to try 
to recognise the features of inadequate SIM not only from limited major accidents but 
also from numerous general accidents. 
The IChemE accident database developed by the Institution of Chemical Engineers 
contains over 13,000 accidents, incidents and near misses, 30% of which include 
lessons learned. The database can be used in several ways from hazard identification, to 
design and training (IChemE, 2003). However, after trying to track the root causes of 
each case, it was found that identifying the aspect of safety information from the 
database was unsuccessful because each accident is not covered in sufficient depth 
through root causes. Even when using key words like 'information', 'message', 'safety 
information' and 'information management' to search the database, the results were 
insufficient to make further study. 
On the other hand, the Major Accident Reporting System (MARS) database is 
established to handle the information on all 'major accidents' submitted by member 
states of the European Union to the European Commission in accordance with the 
provisions of the 'Seveso 11 Directive'. Currently, the MARS database holds data on 
more than 460 major accident events (JRC, 2004). In the database two reporting forms 
have been established: the 'short report' is intended for use for immediate notification 
of an accident, and the 'full report' is prepared when the accident has been fully 
investigated, and the causes, the evolution of the accident, and the consequences, are 
fully understood. The 'full reports' in the MARS database are confidential but the 
database maintainer provides services on providing statistical data. According to the 
data gained from the MARS database, the main results are: 
• 75% (398/528) of major accidents in MARS are related to the process industry 
and 265 out of the 398 cases have a 'full report'. 
• 34% (92/265) of 'full report' cases have the root cause 'organised procedure is 
none, inadequate, inappropriate or unclear' which is the highest of all root causes 
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in organisation issue. 
• 16% (43/265) of 'full report' cases have the root cause 'training/instruction is 
none, inadequate or inappropriate' which is the forth highest of all root causes in 
organisation issue. 
• The above two trends indicate safety information/procedure is an important root 
cause of accidents. 
3.5 Major accidents in relation to inadequate SIM 
There have been too many experiences from accidents in which even simple data were 
not noted because they were relatively hard to find. Incidents can still occur even where 
safety management systems exist and the probabilities of such occurrences are increased 
if documentation is deficient. CCPS (1995) has illustrated some examples of incidents 
that might have been avoided if satisfactory safety information had existed and had been 
effectively used. In order to understand the effects of inadequate SIM in accidents, four 
well-known major accidents and criticisms of these accidents contained in the existing 
literature have been reviewed. These four major accidents have been reviewed in-depth 
in order to identify preconditions related to SIM through accident event sequences. 
These preconditions were then categorised by the types of 'dysfunctional information 
attitudes and behaviours' of 'information disaster' which has been mentioned in Section 3.3. 
3.5.1 Three Mile Island 
The Three Mile Island power station is near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in USA. It had 
two pressurised water reactors. Unit 1 entered service in 1974 and Unit 2 was almost 
brand-new. The accident to Unit 2 happened at 4 am on 28 March 1979 when the 
reactor was operating at 97% power. It involved a relatively minor malfunction in the 
secondary cooling circuit which caused the temperature in the primary coolant to rise. 
This in turn caused the reactor to shut down automatically. Shut down took about one 
second. At this point a pilot-operated relief valve (pORV) failed to close, but instrumentation 
did not reveal the fact, and primary coolant drained away to the extent that the residual 
decay heat in the reactor core was not removed. The core suffered severe damage as a result. 
The operators were unable to diagnose or respond properly to the unplanned automatic 
shutdown of the reactor. Deficient control room instrumentation and inadequate emergency 
response training proved to be root causes of the accident (pCA TMI, 1979). 
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In this accident, certainly there were engineering, technical and management failures of 
considerable impact, but there was also an information management failure. Burns 
(1991) described the accident as 'the information meltdown' because: 
"Early information about the potential for an accident had been ignored. 
When the accident began, the critical data were impossible to interpret. 
Information technology failed. Effects to bring relevant knowledge and 
experience to bear were frustrated by organisational communication 
breakdowns. Misunderstanding leads to misjudgement; the organisations 
responsible for public safety at first deliberately understated the seriousness of 
the situation and then stumbled into a mistaken call for evaluation". 
Burns (1991) also stated that the accident could have been avoided if the planners of 
Three Mile Island had considered how people actually interpret, process and apply 
information. 
Based on two major investigation publications (PCATMI, 1979; Rogovin & Frampton, 
1980), the Three Mile Island accident has been reviewed in Figure 3.3. Three particular 
important warnings before the accident can be summarised as follows: 
1. In November 1974, two and half years before the accident, after serious internal 
examination and debate, two engineers of contractor companies sent a formal 
memorandum to their management expressing concern that the PORV had had a 
tendency to stick open under circumstances that might uncover the reactor core 
and cause an uncontrolled nuclear reaction or 'meltdown'. But the warning was 
submitted on the wrong form, misdirected and subsequently ignored, even though 
the two engineers repeatedly urged the company to take action. 
2. In December 1974, Aerospace Corporation reported to the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission that the control room was very poorly engineered. However, the 
report was stamped 'for future resolution', and forgotten. 
3. In May 1978, the shift supervisor sent a strongly worded note to his supervisors, 
saying that the feed water system was subject to failure that might precipitate 
very significant damage. He suggested remedies and urged immediate action, but 
his memo was ignored. 
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Time 
1972 
1974 
Event 
Decision to Build 
Pressurised Water 
Reactor 
1 
Unit 1 in service 
" 
Information Failure and Accidents 
Precondition related to inadequate SIM 
• Less attention given to design of ancillaries than of main items. (1)* 
• In December 1974, Aerospace Corporation reported to the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission that the control room was very poorly 
engineered. However, the report was stamped 'for future resolution, 
and forgotten. (I) 
• Ignored the warning issued two years before the accident by two 
engineers of contractor companies who sent a formal memorandum to 
their management, expressing concern that the PORv+ had had a 
tendency to stick open under circumstances. (IV) 
1978 Unit 2 in service 
27 March 
1979 
4.00am 28 
March 1979 
5.14am 28 
March 1979 
7.00am 28 
March 1979 
-
;: There had previous incidents in which a PORV had stuck in the open 
position, but the plant had no systematic approach to learning from 
such incidents. (I) 
• Ignored the information that two days prior to the incident, routine 
testing had been done on the valves of the feedwater pumps. Two of 
the values had inadvertently been left shut. (IV) 
,'--------------------------' 
• Failed to recognise the results of using instrument for line blowing. (11) 
Resin polisher unit • Failed to identify the turbine tripped. (I) 
choked • The air used to unblock the condensate polishing system was 
1- instrument air. It is bad practice to connect instrument air to the orocess. (II) /. PORV stuck open but indicator light indicated that it was shut. (11) 
• Operators thought the PORV was shut, therefore, they shut down the 
water pumps. (I) Primary water boiled 
and PORV stuck open 
t-
Operator shut down 
water pumps leading 
to damage to core 
t" 
Site emergency 
• Operators believed indicator light and ignored other readings. (11) 
• Inadequate displays and alarms in which these had been compounded 
by information overload. (IV) 
" 
• Failed to identify the message that the water level had fallen. (11) 
• Temperature in outlet ducts high enough to show presence of 
superheated steam- significance not recognised (IV) 
deC!r_e.d------1 • Inadequately provide information to the public. (I) 
• Inadequate emergency response plan lead to people around the plant 
scared and evacuated. (I) 
Evacuation 
+ PORV= Pilot-Operated Relief Value 
• The Roman numerals in () represents the type of dysfunctional information attitudes and behaviours (see page 39). 
Figure 3.3 The Three Mile Island accident 
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3.5.2 Bhopal 
The Bhopal disaster killed thousands of people in the Indian city of Bhopal in Madhya 
Pradesh. It was caused by the accidental release of forty tons of methyl isocyanate (MIC) 
from a Union Carbide pesticide plant located in the heart of the city. This event remains 
the worst industrial disaster in history, with significant injuries to at least 50,000 people. 
The MIC leak began shortly after midnight on December 3, 1984. The vapours killed 
more than 2,000 people outright and injured from 150,000 to 600,000 others, some 
6,000 of whom later died from their injuries. 
Based on two Bhopal accident investigation publications (lCFTU, 1985; Shrivastava 
1987), the Bhopal accident has been reviewed in Figure 3.4. The Bhopal accident 
review also provides evidence of inadequate SIM in the incubation period of disasters, 
during which time action could have been taken to prevent the disaster. For example, 
the company did not understand that it would be unsafe to build a plant storing large 
quantities of very toxic gases close to a densely populated area. This seems to have 
arisen about ten years before the disaster. Another example is that the risk of a 
refrigeration system shut down was ignored, which happened 5 to 6 months before the 
disaster (King & Hirst, 1998). 
Kletz (2001) argues that the route by which the water entered the methyl isocyanate 
(MIC) tank hardly matters. Since it is well-known that water reacts violently with MIC, 
no water should have been allowed anywhere near the equipment, for washing out lines 
or be added deliberately. 
Lees (1996) also argues that one of the lessons ofBhopal is related to safety information 
issues. He writes that full information on the substances on site was not provided to the 
authorities, emergency services, workers or members of the public exposed to the 
hazards. Also, many workers interviewed said that they had received no information or 
training about the chemicals at the plant. Moreover, Santamarfa Ramiro & Brana Alsa 
(1998) state one of the root causes of the Bhopal disaster was inadequate information 
management because the audits of the Bhopal plant showed that the plant had 
undergone other similar occurrences. This indicated that the existing protection systems 
were not sufficient to lower the risk to an acceptable level but the company did not cope 
with the audit result properly. 
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Time 
1975 
1979 
1980 
1982 
1983 
Qct 1984 
Event Precondition related to inadequate SIM 
1 ...... -----[. The 1975 Bhopal Development plan was ignored by VCC_a_(_I)_* __ ---' 
Decision to 
manufacture t ... • Overlook recommendation of small MIC· containers at preliminary design (IV) 
Decision to use MIC 
route • VCC insisted upon large MIC storage vessels (II,IV) 
I~ _______ I. Employees had been given little MIC hazard information (I) 
D 
.. W" =======:: 
oe;~:lr80\o~\~e • Insufficient action following the 1982 corporate inspection (I, IV) 
'1 t.... fi Fa! ure to mamtam sa ety 
devices 
• Supervisors allowed the vent gas scrubber to be turned off for a long time (11, 
IV) 
• Supervisors allowed the flare to remain out of service for a long time (lI,IV) 
~ The message about the 1982 corporate inspection that VCC sent to 
VCIL b was at best confusing (11) 
-.. -----~I . Workers were often assigned to jobs for which they were not qualified (I,IV) 
, 
Decision to operate 
unsafelv 
1-" 
MIC tanl~ses P'''''''' 
• All signs and operating procedures were written in English only (I, 11) 
• The production supervisor on duty was new and not fully familiar with 
" operating procedures (I) 
• VCC never sent a follow-up team after the 1982 corporate inspection (V) 
• Manual information on storage limit (50% capacity) in each tank was 
ignored (IV) 
• A backup flare tower system was disconnected to save money (IV) 
• Operators were not sure how much MIC was in the tanks (I) 
• Lesson learned from at least five chemical accidents between 1981 and 
1984, including 2 cases of MIC leaks was ignored (I, IV) 
• Supervisors allowed the 30~ton refrigeration to shutdown on June2004. 
This was in violation of established procedures (I, IV) 
~================= 
• The signal and hazard oftank loss in pressure was ignored (I) 
• The second tank losing pressure on 2 Dec. 11 pm was ignored (I, IV) 
• The message of pipe washing problems on 3 Dec lam was ignored (IV) 
3 Dec 1984 Allow runaway • Without a disaster plan for warning and evacuating (I) 
4 Dec 1984 
reaction and MIC leak 
t .. 
Em"1l1': re'ponse 
Over 2000 people 
killed 
• VCIL did not provide complete information about hazardous 
chemicals used in the plant to government authorities or community 
residents (I) 
• No emergency procedure/plan to follow (I) 
• Failure to inform workers and the public during the accident (I, 11) 
• VCC and VCIL failed to provide adequate information on MIC to 
hospital and medical authorities (I) 
• The Roman numerals in () represents the type of dysfunctional information attitudes and behaviours (see page 39) . 
• Union Carbide Corporation (UCC); b Union Carbide India Ltd (UCIL); 'methyl isocyanate (MIC) 
Figure 3.4 The Bhopal accident 
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3.5.3 Challenger 
January 28, 1986 at 11 :39 A.M., just one minute after lift-off, the U.S. Space Shuttle 
Challenger and its crew were destroyed in an explosion. All seven crew members and 
three billion dollars in government property were lost. After the investigation of the 
explosion, two immediate causes were identified: faulty design of solid rocket booster 
field joints and inefficient communication between engineers and managers. The failure 
of the solid rocket booster field joints was attributed to several separate causes. First, 
poor low temperature resilience of the O-ring seal due to the material properties of the 
O-ring, allowed leakage past the seal during low temperature operating conditions. 
Second, blow holes formed in the putty, failing to protect the 0- ring seal from the 
extreme exhaust temperatures and pressures. Finally, faulty mechanical design of the 
joints allowed gap formation during initial pressurisation (large pressure forces occur 
during ignition causing separation in the solid rocket booster field joints). 
Testing of the Challenger's joint design showed that all three problems would have to 
occur simultaneously to cause catastrophic failure (Blumenthal et al., 1989). Although 
engineers realised the possibility of these problems occurring, they had difficulty 
communicating these problems to managers who were responsible for approving the 
launch. Engineers at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) could 
communicate any problems to their immediate supervisor, who could then either accept, 
modify or reject the request to correct problems. This method of communication often 
distorted or silenced design problems that were identified as hazardous by engineers. 
Managers were continually bombarded with concerns from engineers about problems 
with shuttle components. Generally these problems did not lead to significant 
component failure during shuttle flight, so managers began to feel that engineers were 
"crying wolf' (Bell & Esch, 1987). As a result, managers often underestimated the 
danger that problems in shuttle design actually posed. 
Based on The Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident 
Report (PCSSC, 1986) the accident has been reviewed in Figure 3.5. In short, the 
preconditions related to SIM of this accident are: 
• Ignored the potential risk of O-ring problem although the problem appeared in 
1977 and had a well-documented history since 1980. 
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Time 
1973 
1977 
• The critical information on the O-ring problem had not been forwarded up by 
NASA middle managers. 
• NASA ignored the message that on the eve of the Challenger launch, the 
contractor for the Rocket Boosters had argued against launch. 
Event 
Chose solid rocket 
boosters 
~ 
TestIg firings 
Precondition related to inadequate SIM 
• The problem of the casing joints in segmented rockets expanding 
unexpectedly has been discovered. The O-rings were designed to back 
up the joints but it was claimed that they often been unseated. (IV)'" 
• One had a design the prevented the O-ring from becoming unseated but 
the unmodified designed was continually to use for its boosters. (11) 
Nov.1981 A shuttle launch • It was noted that scorching of one of the six O-rings had occurred in 
the launch. (IV) 
1-------1 . The criticality rating of the joints had been raised in 1982 and NASA engineers proposed modifYing the design, but no immediate action was taken. (IV) 
• Ignore the message in January 1985 from a shuttle which was 
Improved booster 
casings were ordered 
launched in temperatures below W'C and breaches were found on 
four of the booster joints. (IV) 
,'----------------------------------------------' 
"= NASA Booster project Manager placed launch restraint on the entire 
1-.. ---- shuttle system- no launch was to occur ifthere was doubt about any 
'criticality l' item. But it was violated later. (Ill) 
July 1985 
\I 
27 Jan. Prepared the launch 
1986 
11:38am 
28 Jan. 1986 
11:39am 
28 Jan. 1986 
\I 
Launched the 
Challenger 
t 
Explosion and 
7 fatalities 
• Ignored the warning of the risk of flying with present boosters which 
were voiced by an engineer of the booster contractor. (11) 
• Inadequate monitoring and data collection. (I) 
• Warning and testing results ignored. (IV) 
< The booster contractor proposed that the minimum temperature for a 
launch should be 10'C but it was overruled. (Ill) 
• The shuttle was heavily iced up on the morning of28 January. From 
previous launches the temperature criterion was not identified 
explicitly. (IV) 
• Inadequate procedure for delaying launch. (I) 
• Communication problems between NASA middle managers and 
director. (11) 
• The Roman numerals in () represents the type of dysfunctional information attitudes and behaviours (see page 39). 
Figure 3.5 The Challenger accident 
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3.5.4 Piper Alpha 
This accident was an explosion followed by a huge fire that engulfed the Pipe Alpha oil 
platform in the North Sea on the night of 6 July 1988. There were 229 men aboard and 
in this, the world's worst oilrig disaster, 167 men died. The initial explosion was 
followed by a fierce fire that, in turn, triggered off a further series of explosions. 
King & Hirst (1998) describes two major instances of misinformation that lay at the 
root of the disaster. Firstly, the basic error was failure to hand over either the permit or 
the relevant information at the shift change. This concerned on an isolating valve of a 
spare pump which was shut but not locked off or tagged. Exactly the same errors had 
resulted in a death 10 months before the disaster. Secondly, although adequate 
procedures were provided in Occidental's Work Permit Booklet issued in 1985, and in a 
Safety Procedures Manual of 1987, the operating staff had no commitment to working 
with the written procedures; and the procedures were knowingly and flagrantly 
disregarded. 
Kletz (2001) argues that the hazard presented by the gas inventory was well understood 
by the operating management. It had been highlighted just 12 months earlier in a report 
which considered the possible types of fires that could occur on Piper Alpha and their 
consequences. Nevertheless, no specific provision was made to protect the pipeline end 
terminals. Also, an audit undertaken a few years earlier had picked up the practice of 
putting the diesel driven fire pump on manual and recommended that this should only 
be done when divers were working near the pump intakes. However, the 
recommendation had never been implemented, nor had the audit team followed up to 
check that it had been. 
Based on two Piper Alpha accident investigation publications (Cullen, 1990; Lee, 1996), 
the accident has been reviewed in Figure 3.6. In short, the main preconditions related to 
SIM ofthis accident are: 
• Ignored an audit result a few years earlier which warned the diesel driven fire 
pump should only be operated manually on specific situation. 
• Ignored the hazard of the gas inventory which had been highlighted 12 month earlier. 
• Failed to hand over either the permit or the relevant information at the shift change. 
• The operating staff had no commitment to working with written procedures. 
53 
:!.<C!!!ha#P~te",-r-"-3 _____________________ ----,l.!!onfi.",,o!...!.rm!!.!a"-!.tion Failure and Accidents 
Time 
1980 
1981 
June 1987 
6 July 1988 
4.50M 
6 July 1988 
10PM 
6 July 1988 
7 July 1988 
Event Precondition related to inadequate SIM 
~I"l'''------I(. Ignored ofthe information that it has been judged that a fire could 
occur to a loss of containment. (IV) 
Design the platform 
Star operating 
the platform 
\I 
Inspection carried out 
bvDen 
.. 
PTWs issued for 
repair of Pump and 
removal of relief 
1 
Shift l~geover 
First explosion 
t 
Emergency 
• Without the information of setting explosion walls either side of the 
condensate area. (I) 
• Inadequate information on the risk of smoke to the accommodation 
area. (II) 
o Ignored a safety audit result which had picked up the practice of 
putting the driven fire pump on manual start. (IV) 
• PTW+ system operated casually. (11) 
• The requirements of the emergency procedures manual were 
disregarded. (IV) 
/' 
• Failed to discover the inadequacy of requirement of the emergency 
procedures manual in the inspections in June 1987 and June 1988. (11) 
• Failed to hand over PTW information at the shift change resulted a 
death 10 months before the disaster. (11) 
• Since 6 months before the disaster, compliance with the PTW 
procedure was monitored each day but no deficiencies were reported. 
\... (11) 
o PTW for overhaul signed off but process team did not record that 
relief value was removed. (I) 
o Neither the PTW nor the information of that relief value had been 
removed were passed on the night shift. (I) 
--------_-/ 
• Ignored the relief valve had been removed and the open end loosely 
blanked. (I) 
o New shift stated up pump not knowing relief value was removed. (I) 
• Failed to report the condensate leaks from loose flange. (I) 
• Misunderstood the consequences of explosion and fire. (11) 
• No message came to the accommodation area and many men did not 
know what they should do. (I) 
responses • Inadequate emergency control centre. (IV) 
11-. ____ -10 Inadequate emergency procedures manual. (IV) 
~ 0 Failed to communicate with other platforms. (I) 
167 killed 
• The Roman numerals in () represents the type of dysfunctional information attitudes and behaviours (see page 39). 
• PTW = Permit To Work 
Figure 3.6 The Piper Alpha accident 
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3.6 Lessons learned from accidents 
From accident literature reviews, accident database analysis and major accident reviews 
presented in this chapter, critical lessons can be learned as follows: 
1. Inadequate safety information and its mismanagement is one of the root causes of 
major accidents and also of general accidents and incidents. Most accident cases 
reveal that the companies and authorities did not have systematic mechanisms to 
collect, analyse and disseminate information from accidents and near misses, nor 
from the regular proactive checks on the plant's vital signs. This also indicates the 
importance but difficulty an organisation finds in handling information about 
errors and failures effectively. 
2. When considering SIM failures, not only could safety information be inadequate, 
but also the user, information system, information technology, and information 
strategy could be deficient. Especially in the absence of major events, the best)way 
to induce and then sustain a state of respectful wariness is to gather the right kinds 
of data. This means creating a SIM programme that can collect, analyse and 
disseminate information from incident and near misses, as well as from proactive 
measurement on the safety management. All of these activities can be said to 
make up an information culture for safety - one in which those who manage and 
are involved in the SIM programme have current knowledge about the user, 
technical, organisational environmental factors that determine the function of SIM 
as a whole. 
3. Whilst focusing on the four types of 'dysfunctional information attitudes and 
behaviours' introduced by Horton and Lewis (1991), the four major accidents in 
Section 3.5 contain many 'dysfunctional information attitudes and behaviours' 
and majority of them are of type I and IV. In general, type I (people are 
uninformed, and may not even know that they are uninformed) can be avoided 
nowadays by adopting efficient safety information systems that are available due 
to the progress of information science. However, type IV (people are informed, 
but deliberately disregard or deny available information) is much more difficult to 
avoid, because it concerns the nature of human attitude and organisation culture. 
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One possible solution is to provide a robust performance measurement system to 
evaluate, correct and follow-up the failure. 
4. An organisation's safety culture decides what constitutes valid information, how 
the information should be interpreted, and transmitted. Toft and Reynolds (1997) 
refer to safety culture as the appropriate environment to facilitate the necessary 
information flow for learning from adverse events. Therefore, the safety culture of 
an organisation will govern what will count as safety information. If an 
organisation focuses on the actual event itself and the immediate response is to 
find responsible culprits to blame, then that ('the blame') will hinder information 
flow in a variety of ways. Because the prevailing values and practices lean 
towards holding individuals accountable and placing blame, then a mistake may 
be seen as an occasion for fear and far less open communication. 
5. Basic types of SIM failure have been reviewed in this chapter. These failure 
categories and types can be used as possible indicators to assess the performance 
of SIM. Therefore, the results and lessons of accident review and analysis in this 
chapter were used to develop the open-end question for plant investigation and the 
questionnaires for SIM performance surveys presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 4 - Investigation of Current Status of SIM in the 
Process Industry 
4.1 General remarks 
One key element of successful business operation is undisturbed production and 
delivery of goods. Especially in the process industry, accidents and malfunctions can 
result in severe consequences to the plant, as well as to subsidiaries and other 
stakeholders. Only a safety-oriented organisation can be a successful, well-developed 
organisation in the long run. Therefore, the importance of risk and safety management is 
significant. The Safety Information Management (SIM) is an inseparable part of 
information management and a plant's safety management so that the need for efficient 
SIM is clear. 
The relationship between information failure and accidents has been presented in 
Chapter 3 based on literature reviews and accident reviews. In an accident analysis by 
the author in 2002 (Tzou et al., 2002), one of the main problems faced by the Taiwanese 
process industry in the utilisation of safety information is that such information is hard 
to find. Another aspect is that in many cases employees do not even know that such 
information exists. However, existing literature did not reveal much information of 
current SIM practices in the process industry. The main reason is that the progress of 
Information Technology (IT) and Information Management (IM) and global 
competition have forced the process industry to be more conservative on information 
sharing to the public. Therefore, for the research, an investigation of current SIM 
practice is needed. Six plants were investigated in order to understand the status of SIM 
in the Taiwanese process industry. The following sections provide the approach, 
processes and results of this investigation. 
4.2 Investigation approach 
The perceptions and practices of SIM were examined through an exploratory case 
analysis of six process plants in Taiwan. The aim of this investigation was to create an 
insight of SIM in Taiwanese process industry and to determine what safety information 
is in practice and how it is collected and utilised in process plant today. Therefore, the 
major investigation questions were: 
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• How were safety information systems and SIM activities used currently and what 
are the major problems in them? 
• How did the implementation of SI M issues affect the plant's safety management? 
• How did the plant measure up to the requirement of best SIM practice and its goals? 
Yin (1994) suggests that the choices of research approach should be governed by the 
nature of the research questions. In particular, survey research is the best approach by 
addressing who, what, where, how many and how much questions, while case study 
research is appropriate when addressing how and why questions. Case studies are useful 
for revealing the details of a phenomenon. Therefore, this investigation adopted case 
study approach, using a combination of interviews and document analysis, to evaluate 
how SIM performance is for everyday safety work. Six main plants from the process 
industry in Taiwan were chosen to provide six different organisational settings for the 
investigation and also to limit sector bias. A multi-site method was used in order to 
understand the nature and complexity of the processes taking place as suggested by 
Benbasat et al. (1987). These six plants represented different types and scale of sectors. 
For the businesses security reason, these six plants remain anonymous. The general 
information of these six plants is detailed in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Investigated plants 
Plant PI P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
Main Petrol, Ti02 Petrol, LPG, Methyl, Polyester Purified 
productions Ethylene Ethylene Methacrylate polyol Terephthalic 
propylene propylene mono mer Acid (PTA) 
Employees 2086 280 1996 132 161 237 
International No Company no yes no yes yes 
Safety related ISO 9000 & ISO 9000, ISO 9000, ISO 9000, ISO 9000, ISO 14000, 
certification 14000, RC ISO 14000, ISO 14000 OHSAS 
OHSAS 18000 OHSAS 18000 18000 
Interviewee 7 4 7 4 4 5 
Location Northern Northern Central Southern Southern Southern Taiwan Taiwan Taiwan Taiwan Taiwan Taiwan 
Qualitative (Structured open-ended interview) techniques were used with multiple 
respondents in each plant to achieve triangulation data and insights. Structured open-
ended interview is a systematic procedure to gather spoken ideas, information, and 
opinions from participants through interview. Although some closed-ended questions 
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may be used to record basic data, the focus of this type of interview is the obtaining of 
rich and informative explanations offered to an open-ended query. Plant documents (for 
instance, forms, internal report, computer databases) were also studied and analysed. A 
recording form for the interview (see Appendix B) has been created before the 
investigation was carried out. This form is created from the results of literature reviews 
in Chapter 2 and accident reviews in Chapter 3. This form was used not only to record 
the interview results and to guide the interviews and focus groups, but also to identify 
document activities and events observed by the interviewer. 
The investigation was carried out by interviewing employees from most organisational 
levels. The investigation focused on the real actions taken and on the evidence of paper 
as well as the SIM system. The interviewees were selected so that they represented the 
organisation and working tasks most effectively. Thus, each plant had a minimum of 
four participants, some were interviewed more than once. The interviewees worked as 
operators and their line supervisors in production and maintenance, safety personnel, 
and IT staff. Also the representatives of subcontractors were interviewed. In six plants, 
a totally 31 persons were interviewed. 
4.3 Current practices 
In this investigation, safety information was identified as safety related data, message, 
information on process and work related hazards, their causes, possible consequences, 
and prevention interventions. In the six plants, safety information appeared as safety 
instructions and documents, and experience-based information of the work and working 
environment related hazards and risks. Safety information was based on existing data 
and information of the processes and their characteristics, structures and possible 
abnormal situations. The organisation's structure and its way of working gave a wider 
perspective for SIM in the organisation. 
Although the Taiwanese process industry is highly computerised, all these six plants 
applied part manual and part computerised SIM systems. This implies that there is room 
for progress in SIM in the process industry, especially in the application of IT and IM 
techniques. It has been identified that five of these six plants adopt Intranet as their IT 
infrastructure in which safety information can be stored and disseminated for internal 
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and external users. A plant's Intranet is illustrated in Figure 4.1. An Intranet is made up 
of two parts: the applications (software) and the network infrastructure on which the 
applications run. Applications, the visible part of an Intranet, provide the functionality 
to improve productivity, efficiency and lower costs. The network infrastructure includes 
the hardware- network interface cards, hubs, routers, switches, and servers- over which 
the applications run. 
Intrane ENTERP RISE 
Figure 4.1: Intranet outlook 
Intranet is designed to be open, but secure, internal networks whose web browsing 
software provides easy point-and-click access by end users to multimedia information 
on internal websites. Therefore, most safety information and management activities 
controlled by application software or stored in databases can be provided through a 
plant's Intranet. One of the most significant benefits of applying Intranet is the 
reduction in time and cost of system implementation. This single 'networked' 
application is the multi-site consistency and comparability of site-specific management 
systems data. 
One of the plants adopts Local Area Networks (LAN) as its IT infrastructure. LAN 
connects computers and other information processing devices within a limited physical 
area, such as an office, a building, a manufacturing plant or a work site. LAN uses a 
network server to distribute copies of common data files and software packages to other 
computers in the network and to control access to shared network peripherals. Due to its 
privacy, some process plants prefer to keep their SIM system in LAN but not integrate it 
with Intranet and/or Internet. 
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These six plants have already established their own IT infrastructures (Intranet or LAN). 
However, in all six plants, much safety information was still created and stored 
manually or in Personnel Computers (PCs) but not available online by means of the 
plant's Intranet or LAN system. Under IT system, safety information was stored and 
handled in different ways such as PC, database, special software and web pages through 
the plant's Intranet or LAN. These different ways of handling safety information are 
described as follows: 
1. Manual: safety information is created as written manuals and education material 
etc. in paper-form. This information is also distributed manually. Manual is the 
traditional way of trying to convert the individual information and knowledge 
into organisation information. Again, the aim is to share the information in the 
organisation so that it can grow and other people can benefit from it. It also 
makes the organisation less vulnerable to employees leaving the organisation 
and taking the information and knowledge with them. To make manuals and 
other material have the same purpose as making databases, even though it is not 
using IT as the tool for sharing the information. 
2. PC: safety information is created by Personnel Computer (PC) and is stored in 
the PC only. The type of safety information can be printed out and distributed 
manually or disseminated through e-mail if the PC has been connected with the 
IntranetILAN. 
3. Database: when building databases, companies create a medium where 
information can be carefully codified and stored and where it can be accessed 
and easily used by anyone in the company. The purpose is to extract the 
information from the person that developed it and to make it independent of that 
person so it can be reused for various purposes (Hansen et al., 1999). This 
method naturally requires more advanced IT solutions, but allows many people 
to search for and retrieve codified information without having to contact the 
person that originally developed it. An advantage with this method is that when 
the information has been codified and entered in the database, it can be used by 
anyone in the organisation the same day. 
4. Special software: Not like databases which generally focus on inputting and 
sorting information in standard format, some safety software packages are 
designed for specific purposes. For instance, Process Control Systems (PCS), 
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Fault Tree and Event Tree analysis systems, deviation analysis systems, alarm 
control systems et al. 
5. Web pages: organisations might have web sites to provide information without 
restrictions on access. Therefore, general and open information such as safety 
policy, safety instruction and safety news may be stored and provided at the 
company's web sites. 
Using the methods mentioned above, although each plant has its own view to organise 
its safety information, the general SIM structure of these six plants can be illustrated as 
in Figure 4.2. It should be noted that all six plants adopted part manual and part 
computerised SIM system. 
Database 
e.g. 
ISO &OHSIS 
systems 
Regulation & 
Standard 
Contractor Issue 
MSDS 
Emergency 
responses 
Audit system 
Incident database 
Computerised 
way 
SIM system 
Web Page PCs 
e.g. 
Safety policy & 
plan 
Safety activities 
Safety news 
Community news 
e.g. 
Equipment 
Inspection 
Maintenance 
database 
Work permit 
system 
Ps: --+ SIM structure line; ---- information disseminating routes 
,Special software 
fe.g. 
f PCS 
Deviation 
analysis 
Alarm systems 
Hazard analysis 
Figure 4.2 The general SIM structure of the investigated plants 
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It is normal for process plant to apply specific methods to suit various types of safety 
information. In the investigation safety information has been categorised into 15 types 
based on CCPS's guidelines (CCPS, 1995) which has been introduced in Chapter 2. 
Following CCPS's category the methods adopted for each type of safety information 
can be identified. The information dissemination routes, information sharing methods, 
external communication methods and SIM evaluation approach also have been surveyed 
in the interviews. Table 4.2 provides the summary of the interviews in these six plants, 
in which the methods applied to handle each type of safety information are given. 
Table 4.2 Methods adopted for handling safety information in these six plants 
~ SIM item PI P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
.:. Safety information 
Process knowledge Database, Database, Database, Manual Database, Manual, Manual Manual Manual Manual PC 
Process hazard analysis Database, Database Database, Database Database Manual, Manual Manual PC 
Process equipment Database, Database, PC, Manual Database Manual, integrity Manual Manual Manual PC 
Human factors PC Special PC PC PC Manual 
software 
Management of change PC,Manual Special Manual Manual Special Manual 
software software 
Operating procedures Database, Database, Database, Manual Manual Database, Manual Manual Manual Manual 
Permit to work Database Database Manual Manual Manual Manual 
Training Database Database PC PC PC Database 
Emergency response Database, Database Database, Manual PC PC Manual Manual 
Auditing Database, Database Database Database PC, Manual, Manual Manual PC 
Incident investigation Database Database PC,Manual Database Database Manual, PC 
Standards, codes, External web External External web External External 
regulations sites, web sites, sites, Manual web sites, web sites, 
Database Database Manual Manual Manual 
Contractor issues Database Database, Database, PC PC Manual Manual Manual 
Safety work practices Database, Database, Database, Database, Database, Database, 
Manual Manual Manual Manual Manual Manual 
Process operation Special software Special Special Special Special Special 
record software software software software software 
.:. Information management activities 
SIM policy & plan NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Dissemination routes Intranet, Manual Intranet, Intranet, Intranet, Intranet, LAN, Manual Manual Manual Manual Manual 
Information sharing Database, Database, Database, Database, Database, Database, 
methods Email, Email, Email, Email, Email, Email, Publication, E-board Publication, E-board E-board E-board E-board 
External communication Meeting, Meeting Meeting, Meeting Meeting Meeting publication, Web site 
SIM evaluation Document Check Document Document Not specific Not specific Document Check Check Check 
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In order to identify the basic status of SIM in these six plants, an analysis was carried 
out to study the results of the investigation. Figure 4.3 illustrates that the six plants are 
highly computerised on safety information. All six plants had over 50% of their safety 
information computerised and plants P2 and P5 were reaching 80%. 
100% ,------------------, 
80% +-----
60% 
40% I!lManual 
• Computerised 
20% 
0% 
P1 P2 P3 P4 PS P6 
plant 
Figure 4.3 Safety information status 
As can be seen in Figure 4.4, there is a great deal of difference between the plants on 
the methods adopted for handling safety information. For instance, with a similar 
computerised percentage of 80%, in plants P2 and P5, over 60% of the safety 
information were handled using databases in plant P2, but less than 30% in plant P5. 
80.0% 
60.0% 
40.0% 
20.0% 
0.0% ~ l 
P1 P2 
§I. ~ l 
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-
l 
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Figure 4.4 Methods of handling safety information in each plant 
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Figure 4.5 illustrates the percentage of safety information handled by the five methods 
adopted in the six plants. The most popular method was database being used to handle 
36% of all safety information. Databases were generally used for operation procedures, 
incident investigation, and safety work practices. There was 33% of safety information 
managed manually. The PC method was used to create or maintain 18% of the safety 
information. However, it should be noted that safety information handled using the PC 
method cannot be obtained by other users through a plant's IT infrastructure. 
Special 
Manual 
33% 
Figure 4.5 Methods for handling safety information 
The aim of safety work in these six plants was to implement safety into normal, 
everyday practices. Best results were observed, when safety information was included 
in all work and operating instructions and process descriptions. In all six plants, there 
was a work permit system for maintenance work, but the structure and the level of 
implementation varied. There were also instructions e.g. to check out working places 
with subcontractors before starting the work, but it was a working habit only in plants 
PI, P2, and P4. 
In these six plants, there were several good examples of how to improve SIM. Common 
solutions were starting all meetings with safety issues, publishing a well-defined safety 
leaflet regularly, attaching safety message on plant's IT infrastructure, and automatic 
information sharing through e-mail groups. Also toolbox meetings and safety walks by 
managers in everyday work were viable solutions to provide information and share· 
information orally. 
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4.4 Main problems finding in the investigation 
Based on the findings from the investigation, the main problems of SIM practices were 
recognised. The problems came from four areas: 1) SIM policy; 2) internal business; 3) 
user and culture; and 4) technology and system. These four problem areas of SIM are 
described below . 
• SIM policy 
The ability to develop a coherent and sustainable SIM policy appears to be lacking. 
Only plant P2 had a specific SIM plan in its safety management policy. In plants PI, 
P2, P4, and P6, although the importance of efficient information management was 
acknowledged, no attempt has been made by any of the companies to formulate one 
to initiate change. On the other hand, plant PS illustrates a situation where the 
problems of SIM are accepted but the attempt to develop a corporate strategy lack 
focus. Interviews with senior managers suggested that the dilemma is whether their 
prime concern should be adding improvement to the current method of handling safety 
information or applying new technology and systems to work in an entirely new way. 
Experience in the field of SIM in the Taiwanese process industry has been lacking. 
Consequently, each plant appears to be concentrating on tackling the result of poor 
information management practices rather than undertaking a fundamental 
reassessment of the value ofinformation as an asset. 
• Internal business 
Although in most plants safety managers and site supervisors acknowledged that in 
general the processes related to safety information flow were slow, labour intensive 
and that information was generally inaccessible, changes to the business process or 
information flow route had not been seriously considered. In plant P3, the 
recognition of the high cost of maintaining manual processes has led to the 
development of a database system using the Microsoft Access tool, with limited 
success. 
Even though most respondents had some knowledge of techniques such as safety 
performance and information audit, few were prepared to use the concept to reassess 
their operation processes. When the key steps in the concept of SIM performance 
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measurement were explained at interviews afterwards, most accepted that it will 
offer a systematic way to document process changes and identify missing 
information. All, however, accepted that the reassessment or reengineering of 
business processes should include consideration of possible levels of automation in 
sharing and routing plant information as a means of establishing best practices . 
• User and culture 
The success or failure of SIM systems ultimately boils down to whether the end-
users will fully adopt them. If the technical personnel misunderstands and 
misinterprets the demands and requests of end-users, the SIM systems will not be 
able to meet the needs of end-users. One way of reducing miscommunication 
between end-users and technical personnel is to get end-users directly involved in 
the SIM systems development process. In this way, their ideas and opinions will be 
incorporated into the final design of the information system. However, none of the 
six plants could prove that their users had been involved in the development process. 
Moreover, SIM activities can fail if the hearts ofthe end-users are not won over. 
An organisation's cultures decide what constitutes valid information, how it should 
be interpreted, and transmitted. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Westrum (1992) 
characterises organisations as pathological, bureaucratic, or generative, according to 
how well they notice safety information. Taking this view, one might anticipate that 
a pathological information organisation may show evidence of inadequate sharing, 
overwhelming information overload, and inability to constructively reconcile 
multiple meanings of ambiguous hazard signals . 
• Technology and system 
The six plants show that the efficiency of any communication process depends on 
the nature of the medium used. Only in one case (plant P2) is management 
attempting to initiate policy to fully computerise safety information by using IT. 
This study confirms what Bjork et al. (1994) mentioned, that 'handling of physical 
documents such as drawings has remained a major constraint on project information 
exchange.' Overall, there is little re-use of documents and limited amounts of 
information pass from design or construction to operations. In plants P3, P4 and P6, 
software applications are used routinely to generate documents, but for legal and 
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cultural reasons paper is still the sole medium of information exchange, even within 
the same organisation. 
Information technology is constantly changing, but in all six plants most 
respondents were unsure of the real opportunities presented by IT systems. Few 
were aware or willing to consider the range of collaborative software and tools 
available to resolve interface problems that are widely blamed for delays and 
misunderstandings in operation and hazard analysis. One reason can be cited for this 
is that the culture of the industry often dictates that each function maintains total 
independence in all aspects including information retrieval and exchange. The result, 
as these plant interviews illustrate, is that experience of implementing corporate IT 
systems is lacking and it is clearly affecting their ability to examine the potential of 
emerging IT to appraise current infrastructure. 
From these four main problem areas, many symptoms of SIM problems were 
discovered in the investigation. In general, these symptoms fall into nine types: 1) 
information overload; 2) accessibility problem; 3) information flow break; 4) non 
compatible information; 5) transparent problem; 6) accuracy problem; 7) fragmentation 
problem; 8)100sing information; 9) evaluation problem as follows. Figure 4.6 depicts 
the sources and symptoms of SIM problems and how these problems can affect 
individuals and the plant. 
Problem areas Symptoms o/problems Intensification Consequence 
On individual 
• Duplication of duties 
1. Information overload • Stress 
2. Accessibility problem • Irritability Injury 
1. Information 3. Information flow break ,. • Resistance to change ~ Illness 
4. Non compatible • Lack of innovation Death management 
• Ignore procedures 
policy Case PI, P2, information • Misinformation 
2. Internal business f-+ P3, P4, PS, 1---+ 5. Transparent problem 
3. User and culture P6 6. Accuracy problem 
4. Technology and L----- 7. Fragmentation problem On organisation 
system 8. Loosing information 4 
• Duplication of Loss profit 
documents Accident 9. Evaluation problem • Increase in labour ~ Disaster 
• Unstandard documents 
• Disputes 
• Delays 
• Management costs 
• Near misses 
Figure 4.6 Areas and symptoms of problems affecting the industry and individuals 
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• Information overload 
In the investigation, it was noticed that safety was understood wider than just 
health and safety at work. Environmental factors such as leaks and exposure levels, 
are seen as safety objectives. In the production process in particular, safety 
information is considered to include everyday health, safety and environmental 
issues as well as waste management. 
The amount of safety information in these six plants was huge, but it was not 
sufficiently processed and systematically utilised. The safety information was very 
heterogeneous, and the practices to analyse and interconnect safety data were 
inadequate. Most of the site supervisors and safety managers in the interviews 
claimed that they spent more than half of their time gathering, analysing, storing 
or sharing safety information and little of this time contributed to improving safety 
due to the lack of an adequate SIM system. 
Moreover, there is an increasing trend to use more subcontractors and other 
partners. This creates new demands and expectations for a plant's safety 
management. A critical task is to ensure the flow of safety information between 
subcontractors, other partners and industry. Similarly, there is a trend towards 
automation in process control and safety management in the process industry. 
There are more and more IT devices and software packages applied in each plant. 
This also creates new demands and expectations for a plant's safety management. 
The main issue must be to merge the flow of safety information created from new 
devices and software packages into existing SIM system. 
• Accessibility problem 
Most interviewees said their plants face schedule delays in plant projects, PHAs, 
audits, etc. due to waiting for necessary information. It was identified that a huge 
amount of safety data, safety documents and even safety knowledge were 
embodied in only few persons. Accessibility of safety information means easy and 
quick access to data and information such as equipment/instruction data, operation 
procedures, MSDS, process data, for all stakeholders. It is clear that each of these 
six plants has applied several IT devices and software packages for SIM. 
Considering the variety of sources identified in the plants and the range of access 
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devices, the communication routes (see Figure 4.7) are vast and have potential risk 
on information accuracy and security. Therefore, adopting a uniform access layer 
as shown in Figure 4.8 will greatly reduce the communication channels and the 
risk (Selby & Moran, 2003). This uniform access layer enables a wide range of 
devices and products (software packages) to communicate within SIM systems. It 
also greatly simplifies the problem of numerous devices accessing information in 
numerous different formats. However, creating a Uniform Access Layer is a need 
for a simple well-defined interface (Selby & Moran, 2003). 
Figure 4.7 Current SIM communication routes (Selby& Moran, 2003) 
Figure 4.8 A uniform access layer (Selby& Moran, 2003) 
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• Information flow break 
One of most common everyday problems in safety management was a break in 
safety information flow. This means, for example, that an employee did not get 
vital safety information. It also appears that information channels and practices 
varied, or the flow of the safety information was not continuous within a whole 
organisation. But it was understood in the plants that updating safety information 
could cause risky situations, if new practices were not adopted. It the worst case, 
employees are working together but following different instructions. In general, 
the follow-up of safety instructions should be supervised more thoroughly. 
• Non compatible problem 
Non compatibility of safety information occurs for example in risk analyses, 
accident and near miss reports, workplace inspections, operation and safety 
instructions, chemical reports, and the fault-diagnosis systems and instructions for 
maintenance. SIM systems in these six plants, also in the Taiwanese process 
industry, have been developed for certain, unique needs, such as for the 
authorities' demands. Thus they are not compatible with each other. This has led 
to a situation where the same information has been saved into several systems, 
while some useful information is not collected at all. To improve safety efficiently, 
safety information from different sources needs to be interconnected and analysed 
simultaneously. By combining safety information, safety actions and investments 
can put into right direction and their efficiency can be better evaluated. 
• Transparent problem 
It is a challenge to motivate employees towards safety work at all organisational 
levels. In this investigation, it was noticed that an important tool for motivation 
was quick transparent handling of initiatives such as hazard and near-miss reports. 
It was critical that employees believed that they could improve their own safety. If 
employees did not see any actions or improvements, they lost faith in the 
management and its commitment to safety work. Based on the interviews, 
foremen's motivation and following of safety instructions varied considerably. 
Currently, an important challenge for the leadership is to motivate line supervisors 
and increase their resources for the safety work. The line supervisor's main role is 
to act as an example in promoting safety culture. Besides adhering to safety rules, 
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they need to intervene in unsafe behaviour and contribute to changes and 
improvements when necessary. 
• Accuracy problem 
The problem of information accuracy can occur due to inadequate Management of 
Change in which MOC programmes have not proven effective in keeping the 
information updated. Many plants have run into the hundreds of MOC backlogs. 
At best, the plant incurs costs to verify information prior to a project (such as an 
outdated relief system design basis). At worst, a serious incident could be the 
result of inaccurate information, such as an outdated maintenance procedure. 
• Fragmentation problem 
Four of the six plants investigated are unable to utilise resources expended in 
previous initiatives and historical engineering, operating, safety data to improve 
safety and reliability, and overall financial performance. This kind of problem has 
been cailed 'fragmentation' in the Information Science. Fragmentation means 
information management systems largely operate in functional sites (engineering, 
maintenance, safety etc.) and are incapable of leveraging the knowledge stored in 
them beyond their inherent functions. 
• Risk of loosing information 
In all plants, a risk of loosing critical safety information arises as a result of the 
elements of critical safety information not being recognised within the plant. Vital 
information could be permanently lost due to employee turnover or retirement. 
Much safety information was embodied in the safety organisation or even in one 
or two persons, but there were no plans to ensure the retaining of safety 
information in the organisation. Many times, the consequences of losing safety 
information was realised for the first time during these interviews. In some plants, 
the risk and its extent had been identified by a few people, but the management 
had not seen any reasons for action. Such devaluation of the importance of safety 
issues also decreases the motivation of others in everyday safety work. 
Risks arising from the lack of documentation were also identified. Information 
systems are vulnerable to electricity breakdown, programming faults, and viruses. 
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But updating paper documentation is also hard. At the same time, safety critical 
information is passed undocumented in general conversation around, for example, 
coffee tables. In all plants, it was also noticed that distribution of a huge amount of 
unorganised safety information lowered the employees motivation to familiarise 
themselves with it. At the same time, some very important safety messages were 
not recognised at all. 
• Evaluation problem 
All of the six investigated plants are unable to systematically recognise problems 
in safety information management. Failure and complaint were collected and 
solved on a case by case basis, or even just ignored. There was no proper 
evaluation approach on the performance of safety information. Although most 
interviewees agreed the importance of SIM, they did not pay attention to the 
evaluation of SIM performance. 
4.5 Summary 
An investigation aimed at obtaining an insight into SIM in the Taiwanese process 
industry has been accomplished by interview in six plants. As a result it was noticed 
that similar development demands were identified in these plants. Several examples of 
current SIM practices were also identified. Although combination of Intranet and 
computerised safety information systems are the main infrastructure of SIM in the 
Taiwanese process industry, hard copy of safety information is still kept. Four main 
problem areas and nine important symptoms of SIM had also been identified. One 
critical risk to SIM is the embodiment of safety information into one or a small number 
of people, which creates the risk of loosing it with employee turnover or retirement. 
Besides development of more efficient information -systems, plants must learn to 
understand the value of their safety data, information and knowledge. They must also 
learn to identify safety information and to collect and distribute it within the 
organisation in a systematic way. 
As the process industry in Taiwan has progressed over the years, they have relied on 
increased amounts of automation to reduce operating overheads. There is financial and 
commercial pressure to adopt network technologies into their automation and control 
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processes, increasing the ability to share and communicate information but at same time 
giving rise to vulnerabilities that potentially affect safety. When the whole organisation 
is integrated into a single network it means the corporate network (that already supports 
office applications) is linked with automation and control systems. The load on the 
network from office work may interfere with the need of the automation and control 
systems for timely responses. Another aspect is that if the office system picks up a virus 
that floods the network with email, and then any other services using the network will 
be downgraded potentially resulting in an accident. Therefore, it is suggested that the 
network should be split, and smart routers used to separate industrial command 
packages from the more mundane communications (Mintchell, 2000). 
This investigation demonstrated that there is huge amount of safety related information 
in each plant, but the utilisation and internalisation needs development. These plants 
need to prioritise their safety actions and objectives, and concentrate on adopting a few 
of them at a time. Ensuring supports from management and leadership is the first step to 
implement SIM. The next step must be to insure the results of implementing SIM. This 
needs a well-defined method. This investigation also demonstrated a lack of evaluation 
of SIM in all six plants. Without efficient evaluation approach the plant cannot 
understand and identify SIM problems adequately. 
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Chapter 5--Developiog a SIM Perfonnance Measurement Framework 
5.1 General remarks 
Measurement is the essential prerequisite for control and prediction of future events and 
is defined by Tarrants (1980) as the 'process of assigning numerals to objects according 
to rules'. Tarrants continues to state that measurement is essentially a decision-making 
activity, and its usefulness should be evaluated in terms of its ability to provide 
information that will improve both accuracy and validity in forming a decision. The 
importance of measurement is reflected in Ducker's statement that 'what gets measured 
gets done' (Hubler, 1995). In industry, measurement has been the principle indicator 
and stimulus of progress in all fields of scientific endeavour and indeed forms the 
backbone to any scientific approach towards problem definition and solution. Therefore, 
measurement is a necessary prerequisite to management. This is the reason why Kaplan 
& Norton (1996) suggest that 'if you can't measure it, you can't manage it'. 
Practically, performance measurement can be defined as the application of a 
measure/indicator or a set of measures/indicators to the decision-making and/or 
operations of an organisation to assess achievement of mission goals and priorities 
(DoD, 1996). The process industry, like all executive agencies, is functioning today in 
an atmosphere of increased accountability for performance in terms of measurable 
results. To improve mission accomplishments and reduce costs effectively, performance 
measurement must be applied as part of an overall management system focused on 
performance. 
Building upon the viewpoint of measurement, the primary purpose of this chapter is to 
develop a performance measurement framework for SIM. This chapter is divided into 
three parts. The first part of the chapter outlines the definition and key factors of 
performance measurement. The second part provides the status of IS, IM and safety 
performance measurement undertaken in industry. In the second part, the limitation and 
deficiencies of existing frameworks are assessed, along with the justification of the 
development for the proposed SIM performance measurement framework. The third 
part illustrates the developing process, general layout and structure of the proposed 
conceptual framework for SIM performance. 
75 
Chapter 5 Developing a SIM Performance Measurement Framework 
5.2 Performance measurement 
The early models for performance measurement focused solely on financial results. It is 
apparent that continued development of performance measurement is necessary for any 
improvement in such areas as safety, quality, reliability, and technology. One view is that 
traditional financial measures are incompatible with an organisational strategy that 
emphasises safety, health and environment (EPSC, 1996). It is also important that strategy, 
actions and measures are mutually consistent- a requirement much easier to meet with 
non-financial measures than with financial ones. The reason is that non-financial 
measures are directly relevant to the actual operations, so that operating personnel find it 
easier to put their own work situation in a strategic context (Stewart, 2003). 
The performance measurement revolution started in the late 1970s and early 1980s with 
the dissatisfaction of traditional backward looking accounting systems. Since then, there 
has been constant development in designing performance measurement. In addition, 
implementation and use of performance measurement has received considerable attention 
in recent years (Kennerly & Neely 2003; Bourne et al., 2000; Nudurupati & Bititci, 2003). 
In answering the question, 'what is performance measurement?' it is useful to start with 
definitions which have been used in the literature. Neely et al. (1995) state 
"performance measurement is a topic often discussed but rarely defined". Following 
their comment concerning definitions, Neely et al. went on to propose definitions of 
performance measurement, a performance measure and a performance measurement 
system. These were: 
"Performance measurement can be defined as the process of quantifying the 
efficiency and effectiveness of action" 
"A performance measure can be defined as a metric used to quantify the 
efficiency and/or effectiveness of action" 
"A performance measurement system can be defined as the set of metrics used to 
quantify both efficiency and effectiveness of actions" 
These definitions are precise, but their very precision means that they do not convey 
what is now being labelled in the literature and in practices as 'performance 
measurement' (Neely, 1998). For example, performance measurement refers to use of a 
multi-dimensional set of performance measures. Performance measurement cannot be 
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done in isolation but should be developed from strategy. Performance measurement is 
an integral part of the management planning and control system of the organisation 
being measured. Therefore, although the Neely et al. definitions are still valid, the 
concept of performance measurement used in this thesis refers to the use of a multi-
dimensional set of performance measures for planning and managing the safety related 
information of a process plant. 
Top leadership is to be responsible and accountable for a performance framework for 
information management that begins with the establishment of program goals, 
objectives, and priorities, as determined first by top leadership and then by the key 
stakeholders at all organisational levels. Next, performance measures should be selected, 
controlled, and evaluated. Finally, the performance measures should be integrated into 
the organisation's major management controls. 
As performance measures are established and selected, they should be incorporated into 
the organisation's management controls. In this regard, DoD (1996) suggests three 
performance measurement phases for information management, which are select phase, 
control phase and evaluation phase. For proposing a performance measurement 
framework for SIM, the three performance measurement phases should include specific 
steps: 
• Select phase: Identify program goals, define and choose specific performance 
measures, design a data collection strategy for the performance measures, define 
workforce training requirements for understanding and using the performance 
measures, and develop an implementation plan for using the performance 
measures. 
• Control phase: Apply the performance measures to programs; incorporate the 
measures into the life cycle management and similar management controls; 
conduct pilot projects to test the use of performance measures; and communicate 
measures and their program results to the organisation's internal and external 
constituents. 
• Evaluation phase: Assess and refine measures, apply lessons learned, and adjust 
program goals. User/customer feedback plays a critical role throughout the entire 
performance measurement process. 
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In addition, there are several key factors that must be considered when developing a 
performance measurement framework. These include leadership, business process 
reengineering, workforce training in performance measurement, and evaluation criteria: 
• Leadership and Accountability: Top leadership of an organisation must support the 
establishment and implementation of a performance framework and ensure that all 
departments and staff are fully engaged in this process. Performance measures for 
information management and their integration into the department's management 
control processes cannot be the responsibility of a single department alone. An 
organisation needs top leadership to hold the functional areas, services, and all 
departments accountable for IM performance in their areas and, in addition, needs 
to ensure that performance indicators are integrated into the main management 
control mechanisms ofthe department. 
• Business process reengineering: Business process reengineering is a methodology 
that enables an organisation's mission, products, and services within the political, 
social, and economic environment to be examined, rethought, and redesigned. 
Improving critical organisation-wide functional processes through the use of 
business process reengineering methods and tools is a sound first step before 
performance measures are implemented for a program or functional area. The 
reason for this is that improved processes can provide the data (current baseline vs. 
future results) to formulate performance indicators. 
• Workforce training in performance measurement: the workforce in an organisation 
needs to become more knowledgeable in the concepts and applications of 
performance measurement in general and its specific application in the information 
management area. The organisation must ensure that adequate training is provided, 
including training in the development and use of performance measurement and its 
integration into organisation management controls. 
• Evaluation criteria for performance indicators: To be valid and useful, performance 
indicators should meet a number of criteria. DoD (1996) suggests three main 
considerations of key evaluation criteria, these are: are we measuring the right 
thing? do we have the right measures? and are the measures used in the right ways? 
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5.3 Do existing safety performance assessments fit the need of SIM? 
The problem of safety performance has existed since the very beginning of organised 
attempts to control accidents and their consequences. The level of safety performance 
within an organisation reflects the loss that an organisation will face. This loss may be 
due to either an accident or incident resulting in injury or property damage each time it 
occurs. Young (1996) states that accident prevention forms good business practice in 
that a safe operation is usually an efficient one. In order to reduce the accident or 
incident level and therefore cut loss, it is important to ensure that safe-working practice 
is being observed. The only way of knowing if safety really exists is to measure it. 
Measurement is a prerequisite to identifying the factors that need control and that 
contribute to accident potential. Moreover, measurement is a key step in any 
management process and forms the basis of continual improvement. If measurement is 
not carried out correctly, the effectiveness of the health and safety management system 
is undermined and there is no reliable information to inform managers how well the 
health and safety risks are controlled (HSE, 2001). 
There are two main kinds of safety measurement, reactive and proactive ones. Reactive 
measures rely on both the reporting of accidents and the efficiency of reporting to look 
at injury, ill health and incidents. Unlike reactive measures, proactive ones deal with 
data from current safety situations. Lindsay (1992) states that proactive measures 
provide essential feedback on performance before injury or incidents occur and involve 
compliance with standards and objectives. However, the current reactive approach 
adopted in most process industry does not reveal, either how effectively the safety 
information is being managed on site, or even what is SIM. Moreover, merely relying 
on post-accident data will not reveal sufficient evidence in order to improve the 
effectiveness of SIM as well as the safety practices. 
In order to understand the suitability of applying safety performance measurement in 
the assessment of the effectiveness of SIM, a reviewing of the literature on existing 
proactive safety measurement tools has been undertaken. The results are shown in 
Appendix A. Although there are many methods and products available on safety 
performance measurement, generally, there is little which looks specifically at SIM and 
no previous research has focused on SIM audit for the process industry which 
organisations can apply to their own circumstance. Based on the above there proves to 
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be a need to develop a measurement technique for SIM issue for the process industry. 
By creating a measurement tool, a benchmark towards measuring the effectiveness of 
SIM can be formed and improvements in safety can be assessed. Jacobs (1970) agrees 
that the benefit of having a single measurement is that it must be able to evaluate the 
magnitude of changes over time or a comparative evaluation of two similar situations. 
Therefore, the development of a single measurement tool for SIM must be able to: 
• Reveal SIM performance level. 
• Measure SIM effectiveness that will enable identification of misinformation and 
associated incident problems. 
• Provide continuous information concerning change in the SIM state within an 
organisation. 
• Be sensitive to the fundamental behaviour and condition malfunctions. 
• Define where remedial actions are required. 
• Continuously generate observable improvement in the way people communication 
and thus will lead to a good information culture. 
5.4 ISIIM performance measurement models 
The difficulties of effectively evaluating the impact of an Information System (IS) are 
widely acknowledged in the IS literature (DeLone & McLean, 1992; Willcocks, 1994; 
1996). This is particular so when attempting to evaluating the impact of the system on 
the organisation as a whole rather than looking at quality of the system, user satisfaction, 
or by looking at a narrow financial perspective of the evaluation (Kennerley & Neely, 
1998). 
For evaluating the overall Information Management (IM) function, consideration of 
information management in its entirety is problematical. The factor of user perception 
of services can be tested, but there is also a need to determine how improving 
information management leads to improved business processes through such factors as 
better decision making. There are different ways in which this may be tacklegfone 
might evaluate a service that is provided as a result of the combination of 'arious 
internal systems, or one might take a holistic view of information management in an 
enterprise and consider the overall effectiveness and efficiency of all services and 
systems, computer-based or otherwise, in servicing the organisation. 
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Middleton (2002) argues that there are generic applications of evaluation to overall 
information services and management. Complementary to the approaches articulated 
specifically for information services or management, one can consider evaluation using 
approaches such as benchmarking, normative values or utility (Boyce, Meadow & Kraft 
1994). 
• Benchmarking: In a narrow sense, benchmarking is the pursuit of best practice 
by evaluation of system performance. This may be undertaken by examination 
of its performance under conditions of intended use, or comparison with an 
equivalent system in use that is known to represent industry best practice. A 
more generic approach to benchmarking is the continuous reviewing of best 
practice elsewhere in order to improve upon it for competitive advantage. 
• Normative Value: In contrast to economic values, which depend upon scarcity 
and allocation to determine value-in-use, normative values are used to set goals 
based upon standards of worth. Because they may involve intangibles such as 
aesthetics and beliefs, or perceived effective practice in a working environment, 
they may be established from social consensus, consensus within an enterprise 
or professional group consensus. 
• Utility: A service that is providing benefit or advantage has a degree of utility. If 
a choice between similar services is made in the market, then what an individual 
or an enterprise is prepared to pay for information service is an evaluation 
criterion. 
Currently, there exist a large number of information systems and information 
management success measures from which a researcher may choose. This has tended to 
create some confusion, as many researchers and practitioners have had little guidance in 
identifying success constructs and measures (Garrity & Sanders, 1998). Adding to the 
confusion is the poor theoretical grounding of success instruments for information 
system and information management (Garrity & Sanders, 1998). As noted by Shirani et 
al. (1994), most of the existing instruments were developed through interviews and 
questionnaires and from scales derived from other scales. They note that though this 
approach has intuitive appeal, a sound theoretical basis for their inclusion is often 
missing. Three popular models are illustrated below in order to understand the existing 
instruments and methods adopted in the evaluation oflS and IM. 
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5.4.1 Information systems success model 
DeLone & McLean (1992) point out that there are many ways in which IS may be 
viewed, which in turn leads to many success measures. They reviewed a large number 
of empirical studies which had attempted to measure some aspects of IS success and 
covered most of the performance IS evaluation techniques developed between 1981 and 
1987. While the research covered the academic, defence, finance, banking, municipal, 
oil, human resources, accounting, manufacturing and marking industries, there was a 
noticeable lack of input from safety related information systems. Their review led 
DeLone and McLean to define a popular and prevalent model of IS success (see Figure 
5.1). Their model argues there are six major interrelated and independent constructs that, 
in combination, define IS success. These six constructs are information and system 
quality; use; user satisfaction; individual impact; and organisational impact. 
System 
Quality 
Information 
Quality 
Use 
Satisfaction 
Individual 
Impact 
L-___ ----l c) Organisational Impact 
Figure 5.1 Information systems success model (DeLone & McLean, 1992) 
This model provides a most helpful evaluation framework, as it offers a scheme of 
classifying the multitude of IS success measures proposed by the literature into six 
categories and suggests a model of interdependencies between these categories (Seddon 
& Kiew, 1996). This model is accepted as one of the more complete and better-known 
models that have been widely used as a basis of empirical research. Despite being the 
most widely accepted model, some authors have highlighted shortcomings in it. These 
mainly relate to the extraneous variables, both internal and external to the organisation, 
that also affect the dimensions of the model at each stage (Ballantine et al., 1996; 
Seddon, 1997). DeLone & McLean (1992) do not claim that their model is definitive, 
and indeed invite further validation. They also accept that there is a need to consider 
such things as the organisation's strategy, its environment and the characteristics of the 
system when using the model (Kennerley & Neely, 1998). Ballantine et al. (1998) 
criticise the principles of the model that has been presented without significant 
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discussion of its underlying theory and logic, and the model is limited in a number of 
respects, particularly in presenting a too narrow view of the scope and impact of an 
information system, and neglecting the other factors which interact with any business 
change. Clearly there will be extraneous variables at each stage of the model, it is 
important that the identification and evaluation of such variables is included. In addition 
the exact definitions of the terms within the model and the degree of causality between 
the model's elements are also questioned. 
5.4.2 COBIT model 
The Information Systems Audit and Control Association, Inc (lSACA) proposes a 
generally applicable and accepted standard called COBIT (Control Objectives for 
Information and relrated Technology) for good information control practices. COB IT, 
now in its 3rd edition, helps meet the multiple needs of management by bridging the 
gaps between business risks, control needs, and technical issues on IT. It provides good 
practices across a domain and process framework and presents activities in a 
manageable and logical structure (ISACA, 2001). The primary purpose of COB IT is to 
provide clear policy and good practice for Information Technology (IT) governance 
throughout organisations worldwide to help management understand and manage the 
risks associated with IT. COBIT is an open standard for control over information 
technology. Its conceptual framework can be approached from three vantage points: (1) 
information criteria, (2) IT resource and (3) IT processes. These three vantage points are 
depicted in the COBIT Cube (see Figure 5.2). The COBIT identifies 34 information 
technology processes in four domains, which are planning & organisation, acquisition & 
implementation, delivery & support and monitoring, a high-level approach to control 
over these processes, as well as 318 detailed control objectives and audit guidelines to 
assess the 34 IT processes. COBIT delivers a significantly improved framework 
responding to management's need for control and measurability of IT by providing 
management with tools to assess and measure their organisation's ITIIS environment. 
Although the COBIT model focuses on IT more than IM, its framework provides a good 
structure to consider not only IT but also IS and IM. However, this model is too 
complicated with too many indicators and measures. It would take long to complete a 
SIM performance measurement ifthis model were to be adopted. 
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Figure 5.2 COBIT Cube (lSACA, 2001) 
5.4.3 Information Orientation (10) model 
Marchand et al. (2001) created a model called 'Information Orientation (10)', shown in 
Figure 5.3, as a composite of a company's capabilities to effectively manage and use 
information. The aim of their research was to demonstrate that a company must achieve 
competence and synergy across all three information capabilities of effective 
information uses as a precondition to achieving superior business performance. Their 
model is comprised of three categories of practices: information technology, 
information management; and information behaviours and values. Each of these three 
practices contains several dimensions as indicators to represent a useful domain for 
defining their mother-practice. 
The 10 model is an empirically-validated model representing the ways in which senior 
managers view effective information use. Therefore, Marchand, Kettinger & Rollins 
claim that their model can provide managers with a powerful new lens through which to 
manage and improve their company's performance. This new lens permits managers to 
measure how proficient their company is at using information effectively and to 
understand what actions need to be taken to improve the three information capabilities. 
One of their basic conclusions of the model is that higher 10 predicts higher business 
performance and thus can act as the measure of effective information use in companies. 
To achieve superior business performance, companies must be good at managing all 
three information capabilities. Each of the information capabilities alone is necessary, 
but not enough, to improve business performance. 
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Figure 5.3 Information Orientation (Marchand et ai., 2001) 
The three models mentioned above provide a useful starting point in understanding the 
way in which information system and information management impact on organisation 
performance. These models, also with consideration of the views of their critics, have 
been used to assist in the structuring of the framework for SIM performance 
measurement. For example, through the 10 model, a hypothesis of improved SIM 
leading to better safety performance can be supported. 
5.5 Approaches for developing a performance measurement framework 
In the information science field, information resources are those resources which 
facilitate the acquisition, creation, storage, processing, or provision of information that 
generates the knowledge or other value required to achieve the goals and objectives of 
the organisation. Developing an effective information management system requires 
determining what and where these information resources are. This is the primary role of 
information audit. Traditionally, information audits have tended to be designed 
specifically for an individual organisation in which they are to be implemented and, 
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consequently, their role has varied depending upon the particular circumstances and 
objectives of the organisation. Therefore, information audit is discussed further later in 
order to fully exploit its potential in helping to develop the framework for SIM. 
On the other hand, from the performance measurement point of view, there are a 
number of frameworks and models developed for designing performance measurement 
from strategy (Nudurupati & Bititci, 2003). Some of the approaches include Strategic 
Measurement and Reporting Technique (Cross et al., 1989), Benchmarking (Watson, 
1993), Performance Measurement Questionnaire (Dixon et al., 1990), Balanced 
Scorecard (Kaplan & Norton, 1992 & 1996), Integrated Performance Measurement 
System Performance Model (Bititci & Carrie, 1998) and Performance Prism (Neely & 
Adams, 2001). Management must create a balance within the performance measurement 
framework to ensure that it encompasses all areas that can affect successful mission 
accomplishment. Therefore, two well-known frameworks, Benchmarking and Balanced 
Scorecard (BSC) are illustrated below (Sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.3) because they can 
provide such a balance. 
5.5.1 Information audit 
Information is universally recognised as the most important strategic asset that an 
organisation can own. There must be a clear visible alignment of the information that is 
acquired by the information users with the objectives of the business unit to which they 
belong. The challenge is to identify the information that is needed to optimise the 
achievement of organisational objectives, who need it, how it will be used, its source 
and how it flows through the organisation and between the organisation and its external 
environment. The information audit is an established methodology that will address all 
of these issues. 
Henczel (2001) states that many definitions of the information audit have emerged over 
the past two decades and still there is no universally accepted definition. Possibly the 
simplest and most popular definition is that developed by St. Clair (1997) who defines 
an information audit as: 
'a process that examines how well the organization's information needs and 
deliverables connect to the organizational mission, goals and objectives '. 
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No matter which definition one favours, the information audit is a process that will 
evaluate effectively the current information environment. It identifies firstly the 
information that is required to meet the needs of the organisation and secondly the 
information that is currently supplied. It then allows a matching of the two to identify 
gaps, inconsistencies and duplications. The process will also facilitate the mapping of 
information flows throughout the environment to enable the identification of 
bottlenecks and other inefficiencies (Oran, 1999; Henczel, 2001). 
Just as there is no universally accepted definition of an information audit, there is no 
universally accepted model for the information audit process because of the 
dramatically varying structures, natures and circumstances of the organisations in which 
they are conducted. Regardless of the method chosen for a particular audit or the scope 
of the audit itself, there are a number of stages that must be worked through to ensure 
the success of the audit process. Henczel (2001) proposes a seven-stage information 
audit model shown in Figure 5.4. The model is not a highly controlled process but is 
more like a structured framework for general use when designing and carrying out an 
information audit. 
Figure 5.4 Information audit model (Henczel, 2001) 
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Information audit can be treated as the process of carrying out SIM performance 
measurement. Therefore, the Henczel's seven-stage information audit model was 
adopted as a guide to help carry out the case studies which are detailed in Chapter 9. 
5.5.2 Benchmarking 
Benchmarking is described by McNair & Leibried (1992) as an external focus on 
internal activities, functions or operations, in order to achieve continuous improvement. 
The process of benchmarking is linked to measuring the performance of a single process 
or multiple processes within a company to the performance found in competitors. 
During the 1990s there was considerable interest in benchmarking in manufacturing and 
other service industries. The successful implementation of benchmarking is reflected in 
the large number of publications which address this concept, application and the 
limitations of benchmarking (Camp, 1989; Spendolini, 1992; Macheil et al., 1994). 
Generally, important points to consider when benchmarking include: 
• Make sure that the benchmarking focus is on process improvement and not 
technological improvements for their own sake. 
• Emphasise the process, not mission, in deciding which candidate partner to 
benchmark against; however, recognise that it is best to select a benchmark area 
with a mission parallel to that of the process being benchmarked. 
• Benchmarking can be facilitated by inviting representatives of cutting-edge 
organisations from government or the private sector to talk about their best practices 
and processes, and even to observe and develop comparisons to your processes. 
• Benchmark more, not less. As you look into additional areas, you find new ideas, 
set new standards, and break down paradigms. 
• Extensive preparations are necessary for success. 
Benchmarking is not a one-time activity, nor simply analysing data against a competitor. 
It is a continuous improvement strategy and a change management process. Once begun, 
the entity should continue to benchmark against "best practices" in order to 
continuously improve. Therefore, benchmarking seems a suitable tool for measuring the 
effective implementation of safety management as well as SIM in the process industry. 
However, the industry has been reluctant to adopt it. This is probably attributable to the 
following (Macheil et al., 1994): 
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• Misunderstanding of the benchmarking concept; for many practitioners it simply 
means measuring everything. 
• Confusion surrounding what is required to make up a benchmarking exercise: what 
it means? How it is measured? With what are these measurements to be compared? 
• Unavailability of data, mainly because the structure of the operation/process does 
not allow data associated with field-based operations to be collected readily. 
• Application of benchmarking seems to require radical change in the way 
information is handled and documented. 
• Lack of relevant conceptual models to support and guide data collection. 
Moreover, SIM benchmarking only works if consistent methods for measuring the 
performance of SIM operations can be developed and introduced. Currently, such 
methods do not exist in the process industry. 
5.5.3 Balanced Scorecard (BSC) approach 
The BSC approach is an evaluation tool being increasingly used by organisations to 
measure performance. The organisation's strategy is evaluated by using financial, 
customer perspective and operational measures. The BSC was first introduced by 
Kaplan and Norton (1992) to allow managers to look at their business performance, 
from four important perspectives, which are financial, customer, learning and 
innovation, and internal business, as detailed on Figure 5.5. The BSC approach forces 
organisations to look at the business or process performance from four important 
perspectives. It links performance measures by requiring firms to address four basic 
questions: 
1. How do customers see us? - Customer perspective 
2. What must we excel at? - Internal business perspective 
3. Can we continue to improve and create value? - Innovation & learning perspective 
4. How do we look to shareholders? - Financial perspective 
Using Kaplan and Norton's framework, the four following principles have to be 
complied with in order to develop a BSC that is more than a group of isolated and 
eventually conflicting strategies and measures (Kaplan & Norton, 1996): 
• Cause-and-effect relationships - Ensures that the company vision and strategy is 
linked to the business unit and operational level measures. 
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• Outcome measures and performance drivers- An effective BSC should have a 
diversity of measures that include an appropriate mix of outcome measures and 
performance drivers. Outcome measures assess the actual results, effects or impact 
on SIM, compared to its intended purpose. Outcome measures may be at the level 
of user satisfaction with the SIM system services or cycle time reduction 
attributable to automated work processes. Kaplan & Norton (1996) defined the 
drivers of performance as ones that tend to be unique for a particular organisation, 
reflecting the uniqueness of the business unit's strategy. 
• Linkage to financial measures- The BSC must retain a strong emphasis on 
financial outcomes. Failure to convert improved operational performance into 
improved financial performance should send executives back to the drawing board 
to rethink the company's strategy or its implementation plans. 
• Diversity, format and content of measures- A performance management system 
should have a diversity of measures, matched to the right organisational need and 
the right level of decision-making, as well as the right action taken on the measure. 
These measures can capture the performance at the project, business unit and 
organisational level ofa company. 
Hovdo 
C1l31O!llers 
111116 Hovdo 'Ye look 10 ~ our shareholders? 
Can we continue 
10 improve &. 
crea1e value? 
Figure 5.5 The BSC Links performance measures (Kaplan & Norton, 1992) 
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A Balanced Scorecard is simply one way of expressing from a business viewpoint how 
factors other than purely financial ones may be encompassed within management 
thinking. Whichever business factors are chosen, the measures of their effectiveness are 
related to the objectives of the factors. The advantage of the BSC is that, while giving 
senior managers information from four different perspectives, it minimises information 
overload by limiting the number of measures used (Kaplan & Norton, 1992). When 
combined into a concise report, distributed to the management team and cascaded 
throughout the organisation, a well-designed BSC would: 
• Eliminate information overload by bringing together, in a single report, crucial 
elements of an organisations' strategic agenda; 
• Help managers understand interrelationships in performance by tracking how 
improvements in one area impacts other areas; 
• Force the management team to clarify the organisational strategy to a level of 
specificity at which its implementation can be measured and tracked. 
• Provide focus and the clear prioritising of needed actions/resources; 
• Improve communication by providing a common language and reliable 
information about current organisational strengths and weaknesses; and 
• Help focus management attention towards where the organisation is going. 
Schneiderman (1999) argues that there are a number of reasons why BSC's could fail. 
These reasons are that: 
• The independent variables are incorrectly identified as the primary drivers of 
performance. 
• The improvement goals are negotiated rather than based on stakeholder requirements; 
• The metrics are poorly identified. 
• There is no development system that breaks high-level goals down to the sub-
process level where accrual improvement activities reside. 
• There is no quantitative link between non-financial perspectives and expected 
financial results. 
5.5.4 Reasons for adopting BSC to develop SIM performance measurement framework 
Although the BSC approach has both advantages and disadvantages as mentioned above, 
it has been adopted in this work for the development of a SIM performance 
measurement framework. The reasons for this decision are: 
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1. The BSC fits with the information problem groups concluded from the results of 
plant investigation in Chapter 4. The general information problems on SIM have 
been categorised into four groups which are information management policy, 
internal business, user and culture, and technology and system. These problems 
can be focused by the BSC concepts since the original BSC has four perspectives 
which are financial, internal business, customer and innovation and learning. 
2. At the highest level, BSC is a framework that helps organisations translate 
strategy into operational objectives that drive both behaviour and performance. 
Therefore, the BSC can provide an excellent methodology for the development of 
a SIM performance measurement framework in a structured way to look at each 
organisation's SIM performance and to drive better behaviour in the using and 
sharing of safety information. 
3. The concept of the BSC encourages managers to consider and balance 
performance measures for different critical areas or perspectives that affect 
successful mission accomplishment. For the evaluation of SIM, the balance 
between user satisfaction, safety objectives, incident learning, safety culture, 
information culture, etc. have been cited as important factors. The BSC can 
provide a balance when considering these factors together. 
4. The BSC has been applied in IM, IS, safety management, risk assessment, and 
Knowledge Management (KM) fields successfully. This indicated that there is 
potential for success in adopting the BSC for SIM performance, since SIM 
contains issues with respect to information management and incident prevention. 
Following the original BSC framework, researches have been undertaken in these 
fields and demonstrated the success of using the BSC (DoD, 1996; Martinsons et 
al., 1999; Andreasson & Svartling, 2000; Stewart, 2003; Zingles & Hockerts, 
2003). For instance, DoD (1996) adopted the approach to develop a performance 
framework (see Figure 5.6) for managing information in the Department of 
Defence in the USA. 
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Figure 5.6 BSC for Information Management {DoD, 1996} 
The BSC approach addresses intangibles and endeavours to value the skills and 
competencies of employees- it may for example include dimensions relating to 
professionalism {collaboration, current awareness} or people orientation {team 
functioning, personnel competency acquisition}. Therefore, it is amenable to information 
and knowledge evaluation. Middleton (2002) states that if the BSC approach is to be 
applied specifically to information management, it might embody the following elements: 
• Customer relationships, evaluated in terms of: 
• Customer satisfaction through perception of adequate data 
• Cooperative programs 
• Ability to respond to requests 
• Flexibility of design that permits customisation of products and services 
• Management of knowledge and leaning with respect to: 
• Staff skills and extent of training in new applications software 
• Extent of Information Communication Technology (lCT) implementation 
compared with similar enterprise 
• Information services introduced or planned 
• Communication audit 
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• Internal business: 
• Extent of employees' awareness of information management objectives 
• Extent of budget committed to information management 
• Project management performance (such as on-time delivery, cost overrun) for 
specific information projects 
• Extent of information service utilisation, for example document delivery, 
literature searches. 
• Strategic: 
• Information management match with enterprise objectives 
• Proportion of information management plan put into effect 
• Extent of support for business processes 
• Financial performance such as ability to meet budgets 
• Value obtained from outlays 
The BSC approach has also been used in the KM field for years (Andreasson & 
Svartling, 2000). Tiwana (2000) has suggested applying the Balanced Scorecard to 
knowledge management using four elements: 
• Translate the knowledge management vision- Establish managerial consensus on 
what needs to be managed with respect to interpretation of the enterprise's vision 
at a more specific level than a mission statement. 
• Communication and link- Gauge how well employees are being trained in the 
system and processes; and measure how well rewards have been linked to 
effective use and contribution to knowledge. 
• Business planning- Establish how well the chosen metrics, targets, goals and 
resource allocation align with initial ideas for knowledge management system. 
• Learning and feedback- Evaluate goals, metrics and targets to see how well they 
are functioning. 
Broadly speaking the three main BSC books (Kaplan & Norton, 1992, 1996; Olve et al., 
1999) are not especially focused on safety, health and environmental issues but simply 
bringing to the reader examples of corporate BSCs. On the other hand, there was a 
limited amount of literature on the use of the BSC in the field of safety management. 
One case is from Novartis, a large pharmaceutical company in Switzerland. The 
company's HSE department used the BSC to measure their performance and stated its 
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success. The four perspectives of the HSE BSC are high performance organisation, 
systematic execution & implementation of HSE objectives, stakeholder service 
excellence, and excellence in financial performance (Zingles & Hockerts, 2003). 
Another study was done for the UK and Norway offshore installations by the University of 
Aberdeen (Meams & Havold, 2003). In the study six companies were investigated and they 
endorsed the value of applying a BSC approach to health, safety and environment. 
5.6 Developing a Balanced Scorecard for SIM 
As mentioned above, the most commonly used performance evaluation tool, 'The 
Balanced Scorecard', developed by Kaplan & Norton (1992), has been used extensively 
in the manufacturing, government, retail and financial services sectors. Kaplan and 
Norton have defined the BSC as a multi-dimensional framework for describing, 
implementing and managing strategy at all levels of an enterprise by linking objectives, 
initiatives and measures to an organisation's strategy. It must be noted that the BSC is 
not a static list of measures, but rather a framework for implementing and aligning 
complex programs of change, and, indeed, for managing strategy-focused organisations. 
As detailed in Section 5.5, the BSC concept has been chosen as a conceptual guide to 
assist in developing a framework of SIM performance in the process industry. The 
primary aims of this section are to describe steps for building the BSC, and to provide 
the process and the results ofthe development of the BSC for SIM. 
5.6.1 The process of building a BSC 
Olve et al. (1999) provides a detailed procedure for building a BSC. The general 
overview oftheir procedure is detailed below: 
• The vision: In the uppermost portion of the model there is the company's vision at 
the highest level. Vision means a company's desired future situation. The purpose 
of the vision is to guide, control and change an entire organisation towards 
realising a shared conception of the company in the future. 
• Perspectives: The overall vision is decomposed and described in terms of a 
number of perspectives. Scorecard perspectives are typically adopted from Kaplan 
& Norton's (1992) original four perspectives. Certain companies have added a 
separate employee or human perspective. 
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• Strategic aims: The vision is expressed as a number of more specific strategic 
aims. These serve to guide the company to achieve the vision. 
• Objectives (performance indicators): At this level those objectives are described 
which are most critical for the company's success with its vision. 
• Strategic measures: This portion of the scorecard describes the measures and goals 
which have been developed to enable management to follow the company's 
systematic efforts to exploit the objectives considered most critical for goal 
achievement. 
• Action plan: Finally, to complete the scorecard, there should also be a section 
describing the specific actions and steps to be taken in the future. 
The above overview provides the foundation for the development of the BSC for SIM 
performance measurement framework. 
5.6.2 The layout of the BSC for SIM 
The BSC concept, developed by Kaplan & Norton (1992) and later modified for 
information management by DoD (1996), was used as a foundation for the development 
of a framework for SIM performance measurement in the process industry. Building a 
BSC for SIM, which is relevant to the process industry, requires the development of 
industry specific perspectives, indicators and measures. 
The tiered BSC is a logical foundation for the layout of the BSC for SIM. The 
developed BSC for SIM utilises linked specific performance indicators with associated 
measures. These SIM performance indicators are grouped into SIM performance 
perspectives. The purpose of this exercise is twofold: 
• to develop a user-friendly BSC for SIM, detailing process industry specific 
perspectives, indicators and measures; and 
• to systematically develop and link indicators and associated measures, according 
to Kaplan & Norton's (1992) four perspectives, to ensure that SIM performance 
measurement can be undertaken through a structured method. 
Figure 5.7 illustrates the layout of the BSC for SIM and the requirements for its 
complete development. 
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Figure 5.7 The layout and explanation of the BSC for SIM 
5.6.3 SIM performance perspectives 
Although a number of IM and KM performance measurement frameworks, tools and 
specific measures have been developed over the years which address the different 
phases of the information management process, no specific framework has been 
developed for safety information management issues in the process industry. This 
research was inspired by the perceived lack of an appropriate performance measurement 
framework for SIM in the process industry. 
Section 5.5 of this chapter has critically reviewed modem or popular multi-dimensional 
frameworks to establish SIM performance measurement. SIM performance 
measurement perspectives are designed to be broad in nature, thus making them 
relevant to decision-making. Each perspective of the developed framework consists of a 
series of SIM performance indicators which evaluate specific criteria relevant to the 
perspective in a particular area. Thus, the first step in developing a comprehensive 
framework for SIM performance measurement in the process industry is to derive the 
perspectives of the framework and the relationship between them. Based on the analysis 
and synthesis of the value of SIM and its evaluation literature, the BSC for SIM is 
proposed and detailed in Figure 5.8. In the proposed BSC, four definable and robust 
perspectives are: 
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1. Strategic perspective: This perspective replaces the 'financial' perspectives of 
the original BSC. The generic term 'strategic' goes beyond traditional financial 
measures to encompass the many non-monetary or intangible benefits derived by 
SIM implementation. The perspective investigates how SIM contributes to the 
accomplishment ofthe organisation's overall safety mission and strategic goals. 
2. Operational perspective: This perspective replaces part of the 'internal business' 
perspective and the 'innovation and learning perspective' of the original BSC. The 
well-documented fragmented nature of the process industry requires this 
perspective to go beyond an internal process and to focus on and encompass the 
diverse processes involving other project participants. This perspective is concerned 
with the complete and up-to-date set of engineering documentation functioning to 
improve performance of operation as well as all safety related tasks. This 
perspective also focuses on the long-term goals of the organisation in managing 
safety information and creating competitive advantage in the future, e.g. enhancing 
organisational image on near miss and accident learning, and the potential of safety 
culture change to embrace innovation technology. 
3. User Orientation perspective: This perspective replaces the 'customer' 
perspective of the original BSC. User orientation has been adopted for this 
perspective. The new term broadens the original customer focus to include 
internal as well as external customers (Stewart, 2003). The value of the User 
Orientation perspective is based largely on the extent to which it helps the user do 
the job more efficiently and effectively. This perspective covers issues associated 
with usage such as SIM tool utilisation, availability of training and technical 
support, and satisfaction with the safety information system. 
4. Technology perspective: This perspective replaces part of the 'internal business' 
perspective of original BSC. This perspective focuses on the technical and system 
elements of SIM being implemented by the organisation. Therefore, this perspective 
refers to the hardware, software, application programs, telecommunication networks, 
and the technical expertise that support the safety information processing and 
communications activities at all levels of a process plant. 
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Operational Perspective 
How well are SIM products and 
services functioning to improve 
performance of operation as well 
as safety related tasks? 
Suggested Measure Areas 
Safety documentation 
Operation procedures 
Hazard analysis 
Emergency response 
Permit to work 
Strategic Perspective 
How does SIM contribute to the 
accomplishment of organisational 
safety mission and strategic 
goals? 
Suggested Measure Areas 
Strategic planning, Organisation 
& responsibility, 
SIM acquisition, Leadership, 
Goals 
Technology Perspective 
How do the hardware, software, 
and application programs support 
SIM? 
Suggested Measure Areas 
SIM tools, System utilization, 
System security, Privacy, 
Maintenance & preservation, 
Disposition 
User orientation Perspective 
How do internal and external 
users value SIM products and 
services and increase learning? 
Suggested Measure Areas 
User awareness, 
Training and support, 
User satisfaction, 
Information behaviours, User 
competence 
Figure 5.8 Proposed BSC for SIM performance Measurement 
The proposed framework, shown in Figure 5.9, examines the SIM implementation of 
four different, but inter-connected, perspectives. 
Cultural 
operation 
Process 
coordination 
Increased safety 
management 
Figure 5.9 The perspectives of the SIM performance measurement 
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Kaplan & Norton (1996) set forth a hypothesis concerning the chain of cause and effect 
that leads to strategic success. Hence, the cause-and-effect hypothesis is fundamental to 
understanding the metrics used in the BSC method. Figure 5.10 shows the cause-and-
effect hypothesis for this study. 
Perspectives 
Improved SIM operation leads to 
.1 Strategic I achievement of strategic goals "I 
t Integral, creative SIM systems 
and skilled users improve SIM .1 Operational I operation. I 
t 
Improved SIM technology leads 
.1 User Orientation I to improved services for users. 1 
t 
Technology is the foundation for r Technology the design of SIM systems. 
"I 
Figure 5.10 Cause-and-Effect Hypothesis 
Table 5.1 presents the comparison of the proposed BSC for SIM and existing four 
related BSCs. The main differences are: 
1. the boundary of each perspective has been adjusted; 
2. original 'Internal Business Perspective' has been divided into 'Technology 
Perspective' and 'Operational Perspective'; 
3. original 'Learning and Innovation perspective' and part of 'Internal Business 
Perspective' have been combined into 'Operational perspective'. The main 
reason for the changes is that SIM needs to focus more on internal activities 
rather than innovation; and 
4. original 'Financial perspective' has been renamed 'Strategic perspective' 
which focuses on SIM strategy achievement rather than finance benefit. 
100 
Chapter 5 Developing a SIM Performance Measurement Framework 
Table 5.1 Comparison of four BSCs' perspectives 
Original BSC IBsc for IM 'Construct IT' HSEBSC Proposed BSCs (Kaplan& BSC (Stewart, (Zingles & 
Norton, 1992) (000,1996) 2003) Hockerts, 2003) BSC for SIM 
Excellent in 
Financial Strategic Benefits financial Strategic 
performance 
Customer Customer User orientation Stakeholder service User 
excellent Orientation 
Perspectives Learning and Learning and Strategic High performance 
innovation innovation competitiveness organisation 
Systematic 
Operational 
Internal Internal 
Operational excellence & 
implementation of 
business business Technology/ HSE requirements 
System objectives Technology 
5.6.4 SIM performance indicators 
It is necessary that in a BSC each perspective should have its own sets of indicators and 
each indicator in turn should have its own set of measures. After a comprehensive 
review of the literature in such fields as performance measurement, safety management, 
safety engineering, strategic management, information technology and information 
systems, a set of strategic, outcome oriented, possible SIM performance indicators have 
been accumulated for the process industry. Then, all possible indicators were 
categorised, combined and reorganised in to collected indicators as listed in Table 5.2. 
A screening process was required to retain or modify the significant SIM performance 
indicators prior to carrying out quantitative analysis. Therefore, these collected 
indicators have been discussed and reviewed in order to reduce uncertainty and 
confusion. This process involved discussions with academics and process industry 
professionals from varying functions (e.g. safety managers, IT professionals, 
administrators, operators, etc.) to refine the collected indicators. 
In addition, conceptual cause-and-effect mapping was also used to screen the collected 
indicators. Conceptual cause-and-effect relationships were formulated through informal 
discussions with various safety management academics and industry professionals. 
Identifiable cause-and-effect relationships are an important aspect of the BSC when 
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choosing the appropriate indicators (Kaplan & Norton, 1996; Dive et al., 1999). 
In this research, the cause-and-effect relationships link SIM performance perspectives 
and indicators together. The chain of cause and effect relationships for SIM perspectives, 
as shown in Figure 5.10, start with improvements in the area of SIM technology and 
system. These improvements have the effect of causing improvements in user 
satisfaction and behaviour concerning SIM, which in turn causes improvements in SIM 
operations and, subsequently, improvements in the measurements of SIM strategic goals 
and safety management. 
The collected SIM performance indicators were refined in the screening process where 
they failed to link to the benefits' perspective. The cause-and-effect diagram for the 
SIM performance indicators is presented in Figure 5.11. The structure of this diagram 
has been discussed with academics and experts from the process industry to ensure its 
reasonableness. In Figure 5.11, the cause-and-effect relationships were developed 
starting from the Technology perspective and linking all four perspectives and by 
identifying consequence relationships between various indicators. Four example, user 
training and support can be expected to lead to user awareness, leading to improved user 
competence and achieving better information behaviours. 
However, the great challenge is to find clear cause-and-effect relationships and to create 
a balance among the different indicators in the selected perspectives (Schneiderman, 
1999). Therefore, it is important to include a decision on whether a balance can be 
reached among the different indicators so that short-term improvements do not conflict 
with long-term goals (Dive et al., 1999). Therefore, the cause-and-effect relationships 
between all indicators in the four levels (perspectives) can be expressed by a series of if-
then statements. This if-then test was undertaken in the screening process to ensure the 
eventual linking of SIM performance indicators to organisational benefits. For example, 
the organisation can establish the link between SIM tool efficiency and SIM 
responsibility through the following sequence hypothesis: 
• ..if the IT tools on the SIM project are efficient, then the SIM system utilisation is 
expected to be greater; 
• ..if SIM system is utilised well, then the user satisfaction and user behaviours on 
safety information sharing are expected to be greater; 
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• If the information behaviours were to be improved, then it will enhance 
processing safety information and their activities during daily operations. 
• If the handling of safety information is enhanced through improved information 
behaviours of the users, then comprehensive responsibility with regard to SIM 
will be achieved. 
A specific point that should be noted is that in the cause and effect relationships in 
Figure 5.11 all eight indicators under the Operational perspective interact with each 
other because these indicators perform interactively. For instance, process hazard 
analysis report is one of the input documents for obtaining the information necessary to 
make decisions regarding: permit to work, emergence response, management of change 
and operational procedures, etc. On the other hand, operational procedures, permit to 
work documentation, etc. are basic information for carrying out regular process hazard 
analysis. Therefore, cause-and-effect relationships between these eight indicators under 
the Operational perspective can be treated as one unit when consider the if-then 
statements. 
When implementing a performance measurement system, it is usual that indicators are 
poorly defined, which can lead to misunderstanding (Schneiderman, 1999). Hence, 
performance indicators should be clearly identified, understood and communicated 
(Nudurupati & Bititci, 2003). Therefore, the definitions of the 28 collected indicators 
are presented in Table 5.2. 
In addition to the screening of SIM performance indicators through discussions with 
experts and the cause-and-effect diagrams, some indicators might still need to refine in 
the screening process where their validity was questionable. Upon completion of the 
screening process, to established and confirmed all necessary SIM performance 
indicators for the SIMPM framework, the pervasive opinions of industry must be 
obtained through quantitative analysis because using SIM performance indicators 
usually produces subjective assessments. Therefore, these perspectives and indicators 
were refined through extensive questionnaire tests undertaken in Survey I. The method 
and process of Survey I are presented in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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Table 5.2 Proposed indicators and their definition 
Perspective Indicator Definition of indicator 
SI Strategic planning Quality of strategic and operational plans for SIM, and the linkages 
between plans, resources, controls and safety policy. 
S2 Organisation and Appropriateness of the organisational structures to support SIM. 
responsibilities Extent to which responsibilities are defined, understood and accepted. 
S3 Acquisition The extent to which mechanisms exist to ensure the optimal design, 
development and deployment of SIM initiatives. 
Strategic S4 Leadership The extent to which senior management is aware, understands, demonstrates commitment to a clear vision and set of strategic 
obiectives. 
S5 Evaluation The extent to which SIM audit and review processes are in place to 
ensure awareness of and compliance with. 
S6 Standardisation Degree to which SI standards exist, are understood and applied. 
S7 The extent to which mechanisms to facilitate partnerships and 
External relationship consultations with external organis'ations in support of effective SIM 
01 The extent to which process knowledge is identified, catalogued, 
Process knowledge stored and applied to support the plant operation process. 
02 Process Hazard The extent to which hazard information is identified and applied to 
Analysis support risk management. 
03 The extent to which operational procedures are created, applied and 
Operation procedures reviewed to ensure normal and abnormal operation safely. 
04 The extent to which internal and external incidents/accidents are 
Incidents reporting collected, analysed and learned to avoid similar case happens. 
Operational 05 The existence of mechanisms to ensure dangerous works are 
Permit to work permitted through carefully preview and confirm and on-site 
observation. 
06 The existence of mechanisms to ensure any major change in the plant 
Management of change is well defined, recorded and managed. 
07 The extent to which emergency response plans and procedures are 
Emergency response prepared, communicated and tested. 
08 The extent to which every safety work practices are planed, 
Safety work practices implemented and recorded. 
Ul User awareness The extent to which users are aware of SIM's products and services. 
U2 User training and The availability of user training and support programs to facilitate the 
support access and use of safety information. 
U3 The extent to which SIM users have the competencies and capacities 
User User competence to meet the challenges of SIM on a sustained basis. 
Orientation U4 Users' attitudes on SIM and the extent of sharing and communicating 
Information behaviours safety information. 
U5 The extent to which users can be located, retrieved and delivered SI 
System utilisation with timely and convenient access. 
U6 Mechanisms to measure and learn from user feedback on SIM 
User satisfaction products and services. 
T1 SIM tools The extent to which SIM tools effectively and efficiently support 
SIM. 
T2 The degree to which SIM enabling technologies are integrated across 
Technology integration the plant to support the delivery of safety information. 
T3 Security The extent to which mechanisms ensure safety information is 
Technology protected from unauthorised access, use and destruction. T4 Privacy Mechanisms to ensure that an individuals rights to the privacy in the ISystem handling SI are respected. ~ 
T5 The existence of mechanisms to ensure timely information recovery, 
Work continuity restoration of essential records and work resumption. 
T6 Maintenance and The extent to which the long-term usability and safeguarding of SI is 
I preservation ensured. 
T7 Disposition Mechanisms to ensure SI retention and disposal plans are followed. 
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Figure 5.11 Cause-and-effect diagram for SIM performance indicators 
5.6.5 SIM performance measures 
Once the number of performance indicators was identified, the next step was to decide 
specific measures, which reflect the performance of the indicators. Ideally, SIM 
performance measures need to be developed or selected by organisations from the 
process industry adopting a performance management approach. These organisations 
need to be involved in the development and implementation of performance measures to 
fully understand the implications of the results. 
Often the argument concerning safety revolves around the fact that it is distinct from 
other management tasks and organisations frequently fail to manage it effectively. 
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Lindsay (1992) argues that the same emphasis is not placed on safety as it is on other 
management tasks such as quality and environment. Looking at quality, the traditional 
approach is for products to be inspected and sorted for defects before they reach the 
customer. This has proven to be both costly and inefficient (HSE, 1997b). The modem 
approach is labelled process-based quality assurance- managing quality in and not 
inspecting defects out and a similar approach can be adopted for safety as suggested by 
Lindsay (1992). Instead of reacting to accident/incidents, it is better to concentrate on 
preventing them before they occur. In other words, it is better to adopt the proactive 
approach instead of the reactive approach. With the same concept, for the SIM 
evaluation, it is better to concentrate on preventing inadequate management of safety 
information rather than on identifying that an incident/accident has occurred due to 
misinformation. 
Preventing can only stem from an effective SIM system and for this the process industry 
needs a framework or benchmark against which to judge the adequacy of SIM. There 
are many existing management frameworks, such as ISO's Plan-Do-Check-Act, 
ISACA's COBIT model, and HS(G) 65- successful health and safety management (HSE, 
1997b), which can be adopted for developing SIM performance measures. Most of them 
have similar structures (see Table 5.3). This research adopted HS(G)65 approach 
because it is an excellent and specific model for safety management. Figure 5.12 
illustrates how feedback on performance may be used in an ongoing review and 
development of each of the key elements. Using the framework assisted in the 
development of the measures for each indicator. The HSE (1997b) discussed each level 
in detail as summarised in the following section. 
Table 5.3 Three management frameworks 
Frameworks Elements 
HS(G)65 Policy Organising Planning Implementing Measuring & Reviewing 
Acquisition & 
COBIT Process Planning & Implementation / Monitoring Organisation Delivery & 
Support 
ISO Item Plan Do Check & Act 
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Figure 5.12 HS(G)65 - Successful Health and Safety Management (HSE, 1997b) 
• Policy: Organisations that are successful in achieving high standards of health 
and safety generally have health and safety policies which contribute to their 
business performance. At the same time, meeting their responsibilities to people 
and the environment also fulfils both the spirit and letter of the law. Their 
policies influence all their activities and decisions, including those concerned 
with the selection of resources and information, the design and operation of 
working systems and the design and delivery of products and services. 
• Organising: Organising to achieve high health and safety standards is structured 
and designed to translate health and safety policies into effective practices. The 
visible and active leadership of a senior manager is necessary to develop and 
maintain a culture supportive to health and safety management where the vision, 
values and beliefs of leaders become the shared knowledge of all. 
• Planning and implementation: Successful organisations adopt a planned and 
systematic approach to policy implementation with an aim to minimise the risks 
created by work activities, products and services. Risk assessment methods are 
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used to decide priorities and set objectives for hazard elimination and risk 
reduction from which perfonnance standards are established and against which 
performance is measured. 
• Measurement of performance and reviewing: Health and safety performance 
in organisations that manage health and safety successfully is measured against 
pre-determined standards so as to reveal when and where action is needed to 
improve perfonnance. In both reactive and proactive monitoring, the objectives 
are not only to determine the immediate causes of substandard performance but, 
more importantly, to identify the underlying causes and the implications for the 
design and operation of the health and safety management system. Learning 
from all relevant experience and applying the lessons learned are important 
elements in effective safety management. This needs to be done systematically 
through regular reviews of performance based on data both from the monitoring 
of activities and from independent audits of the whole health and safety 
management system. 
Based on this HS(G)65 conceptual framework, Table 5.4 shows how SIM performance 
measures are designed. For each SIM perfonnance indicator, an extensive list of 
proposed SIM perfonnance measures is presented. However, for a comprehensive 
evaluation of information management, input, processing and output of information 
should be included (Middleton, 2002). In Table 5.4 the measures for 28 indicators of 
the SIM performance can be seen not to include an assessment of the existence of safety 
information. It is particularly true for the Operational Perspective, since this 
perspective and its associated indicators are concerned with safety operation using 
safety information in the plant. Therefore, it has been decided to include additional 
measures. These are key categories of safety information under the indicators of the 
Operational perspective. Figure 5.13 illustrates measures for the Operational perspective. 
A simplified flow of safety infonnation in the Operational Perspective is shown. Safety 
information input and output can be treated as safety information itself, but processing 
safety infonnation consists of the procedures and information processing and the 
effectiveness of the management of this activity. 
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Safety information input -. processing safety information -. safety inforFation output 
t .. feedback ... 
Measuring Input Measuring Process 
I.Target on safety information 1. Concern policy, planning, 
which is needed for operation organising, implementing, 
and safety management measuring and reviewing of 
2. Measures are collected from SIM activity process. 
the CCPS's safety information 2.Measures are collected using 
categories. HS(G)65 model 
Measuring Output 
1. Target on safety information 
which is results/output of 
safety management. 
2. Measures are collected from 
the CCPS's safety 
information categories. 
Figure 5.13 Measures for the Operational Perspective 
Safety infonnation input and output are objectives of SIM. As mentioned in Chapter 2, 
this research adopted CCPS' s safety infonnation categories as a basis to identify safety 
infonnation used in the process industry. Therefore, safety infonnation input and output 
in the Operational perspective can be collected based on the CCPS's list. It should be 
noted that in a safety management programme many types of safety infonnation are an 
input of one activity but also is an output of another activity. For example, hazard 
analysis report is an input of emergency planning but also is an output of risk 
assessment. Therefore, it is unnecessary to decide which safety infonnation is purely 
input or output when evaluating the overall SIM perfonnance. Moreover, original 
CCPS's categories include 15 types of safety infonnation. For the purpose of fit with 
the eight selected indicators in the Operational perspective, these 15 types of safety 
infonnation have been arranged into the eight categories. Table 5.5 provides the list of 
safety infonnation which should be treated as additional measures. This list can also be 
used as a checklist to assess the availability and accessibility of necessary safety 
infonnation in the process industry. 
Overall, Tables 5.4 and 5.5 provide 282 proposed measures which include 188 measures 
developed from the HS(G)65 and 94 measures collected through CCPS's safety 
infonnation categories. These measures are used for initial discussions and tests in 
Survey 11 in Chapters 7.3. The relationship between SIM perfonnance measures and 
SIM perfonnance indicators is also explained and examples provided on their 
employment in Chapter 8. 
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Table 5.4 Framework of creating SIM performance measures 
SIM assurance by applying HS(G) 65 
Policy (Indicator) Organising Planning Implementing Measuring & Reviewinlt 
SI-Strategic • Senior management is • Define a strategic SIM • Provide the strategic SIM plan • SIM plan is viewed 
planning involved in developing plan • SIM targets are defined for and updated at least 
and debating the content • Linkage of SIM plan continuous improvement annually 
of SI M plan and safety management • Communicate SIM plan to the 
• SIM plan is developed in systems workforce/representatives 
conaboration with the 
workforce 
S2-0rganisation • Establish a steering • Identify the specific • Define SIM's responsibility of • SIM's responsibility 
& committee for SIM population who are the target person is viewed at least 
responsibilities • Safety/employee SIM system targets • Assign a chairman for SIM annually 
representatives are performance measurement 
involved in the SIM 
committee 
S3-Acquisition • Ensure person in charge • Identify SIM system • Ensure both internal and • Manage and check 
on SIM system solutions external requirements SIM service level 
acquisition • ManageSIM • Deploy SIM systems to user 
investment 
• Ensure purchasing 
procedure 
S4-Leadership • Identify the role of • Define a mechanism to • Senior management • Measure the result of 
senior management in help senior participate in SIM activities senior management 
SIM management involving • Senior management involving in SIM 
SIM demonstrate whose 
awareness and support 
SS-Evaluation • Define a team for • Establish a plan for • Implementing SIM evaluation • ReviewSIM 
evaluating SIM evaluating SIM • Frequency of evaluation evaluation 
• Pre-evaluation training • Result analysis and fonow-up programme 
for evaluators • Track and check the 
result of fonow-up 
S6- • Establish a team to • Define safety document • Apply documents/ information • Review document 
Standardisation determine which standard applying plan transfer standards/codes standard regularly 
standard is apply for SI 
• Communicate document 
standard to SIM related 
person 
S7-External • Identify the person who • Identify external • Establish mechanism of • Identify Authorities 
relationship are in charge in organisations and communication with external satisfaction 
communicate safety whose requirement of organisations • Check the public 
information with safety information 
• Provide up-to-data safety satisfaction 
external organisations information to external 
• Regularly report plant's 
safety news to the medium 
OI-Process • Assigning person the • Establish methods to • Communicate process • Review process 
knowledge responsibilities for provide up-to-date knowledge to personnel knowledge to ensure 
assembling and creating process information • Provide access to databases its up-to-date 
process knowledge • Establish methods to of code, regulation and 
provide up-to-date standards related to process 
equipment information knowledge 
• Establish methods to 
provide up-to-date 
technology information 
02-Process • Identify person who are • Identify a plan for • Communicate and • ReviewPHA 
Hazard Analysis in charge of PHA PHA data documenting disseminate PHA results to documentation 
information control and disseminating personnel • AuditHPA 
• Defineand • Implanting PHA Follow-up communication 
communicate the PHA and records revalidation 
plan to personnel 
OJ-Operation • Identify person who are • Define a plan for • Provide up-to-data operation • Review operation 
procedures in charge of information creating and providing procedures through efficient procedures 
control of operation operation procedures methods • Review the methods 
procedures • Training of accessing and of providing 
applying operation procedure operation procedures 
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Policy (Indicator) Organising Planning Implementing Measuring & Reviewing 
04-Incidents • Identify person who are • Define incident • Manage incident reporting • Review incident 
reporting in charge of information reporting! investigation and investigation systems report and its follow-
control of incident processes • Collect external related up 
reporting • Define incident report accident information • Evaluate incident 
formats • Provide incident report reporting system 
through efficient methods 
• Incident analysis and its 
follow-up 
OS-Permit to • Identify person who are • IdentifY required • Establish mechanism to • Review procedures 
work in charge of information permits manage and provide permit- and records of permit 
control of permit-to- • IdentifY permit to-work information up-to- to work 
work procedures data • Evaluate Permit-to-
• Training of permit of work work efficiency 
process 
• Keep and analyse records of 
permit to work 
06-Management • Identify person who are • Establish a programme • MOC flow chart indicating • VerifY that a 
of change in charge ofMOC existing for all affected parties must be documented 
information control implementing MOC notified programme existing for 
• IdentifY MOC • Communicate changes to implementing MOC 
procedures affected people/units • VerifY the results of 
• Manage records of implementing MOC 
notification and follow-up have been documented 
07-Emergency • Identify person who are • IdentifY emergency • Provide emergency plan • Verify that a 
response in charge of information action plan • Communicating and training documented 
control of emergency • IdentifY emergency for emergency response programme existing 
response response procedures • Manage emergency response for implementing 
• IdentifY external records emergency response 
agencies coordination 
• VerifY the results of 
plan implementing 
emergency response 
have been 
documented 
OS-Safety work • IdentifY person who are • IdentifY needed safety • Manage records of safety • Verify that a 
practices in charge of information work practices and work practices documented 
control of safety work their frequency • Analysis of deviations from programme existing 
practices • Provide a paper-form safety work practices for implementing 
of safety work plan to • Communicating and safety work practices 
employee Implementing follow-up of • Review the follow-up 
safety work practices and its records 
UI-User • Communicate the • Establish user • Implementing user awareness • Review the user 
awareness concept of user awareness evaluation programme awareness 
awareness to SIM user programme • Users are informed new programme and its 
services and resources results 
U2-User training • Appointed person who • IdentifY SIM user • Implementing training • Review SIM training 
& support are in charge in SIM training and support programme programme and 
training and support plan • Provide technical support as support services 
services requirement 
• Select an external SIM • The % of training 
user training centre complement 
• The % of technical support 
complement 
U3-User • IdentifY key person who • IdentifY the standard of • Evaluate the % of users • Review user 
competence are in charge of SIM user competence qualified in using SIM competence 
user competence • IdentifY programme to systems programme 
confirm the • The extent of user innovation 
competence of SI M andleaming 
users 
U4-Information • Identify key person who • Identify mechanisms of • Implementing information • Review the 
behaviours are responsible for handing information sharing programme mechanisms handing information overload improving information overload and multiple • Require employees to report and multiple behaviours information their information sharing information 
results • Evaluate the % of 
sharing information 
US-System • Identify the person who • Identify a plan to • Ensure usage of SIM system • Evaluate the 
utilisation are in charge of ensure SIM system from different level in the frequency of 
evaluating system utilisation organisation from HQ to restoring system to 
utilisation 
• Requirement of external operators old manual 
support for SIM system • Analysis suggestions made procedures 
utilIsation by user 
111 
Chapter 5 Developing a SIM Performance Measurement Framework 
Policy (Indicator) Organising Planning Implementing Measuring & Reviewine: 
U6-User • Identify key users of • Establish user • Implementing user • Review user 
satisfaction SIM satisfaction evaluation satisfaction evaluation and its satisfaction 
• Requirement of external plan follow up evaluation 
survey organisation for • Identify key factors of • The % of user satisfied with programme 
user satisfaction user satisfaction SIM application 
• The % user satisfied with 
SIM training and technical 
support 
TJ-SIM tools • IdentifY various users • Have a plan for • A suit of flexible and • Tools and models are 
for suitable IT tools applying effective IT versatile internal and assessed on a 
tools to support SIM corporate tools are available continual basis and 
initiatives. • Users have on-line access to updated based on 
SIM supported tools and evolving SIM 
models. requirements. 
T2-Technology • IdentifY person who are • Have a plan for SIM • Technology architecture • Review technology 
integration in charge of ensuring technology integration exists to support SIM integration regularly. 
technology integration initiatives. • Technology 
of SI M architectures are 
• Technology support continually optimised 
staffs have a broad based on changing 
range of expertise in business Needs. 
technology functionality 
and integration. 
T3-Security • Identify person who are • IdentifY a plan for SIM • SIM system security • SIM system security 
in charge of managing system protection from architecture, controls and controls and 
SIM security unauthorised access, procedures are in place. procedures are 
use and destruction • All SIM security regularly reviewed. 
• Establish firewaII requirements are • SIM security 
between plant's IT communicated throughout immediate corrective 
system and SIM the organisation and are action is taken after 
system consistently applied to SIM identifYing potential 
initiatives. vulnerability 
T4-Privacy • Ensure all of person in • Define the individual • Have initiated a programme • Conduced SIM 
the organisation right in SIM system of privacy compliance for privacy impact 
involving in SIM • Identify SIM system SIM initiatives assessments 
privacy programme privacy requirements • All privacy requirements are • Regularly review the 
• Establish a policy for communicated throughout SIM privacy policy 
restoring paper-form SI and to take required 
corrective actions 
T5-Work • IdentifY person who are • Have a plan for • Establish an effective • Evaluate the extent of 
continuity in charge of SIM system keeping SIM system network to reduce SIM timely SIM system 
emergency response continuing service system shutdown. recovery and 
• Temporarily emergency restoration 
backup for SIM system 
T6-Maintenance • Identify person and • Have a plan for • Implementing the mechanism • Review the long-turn 
and preservation place for maintaining safeguarding and orIong-tum usability of SIM usability and 
and preservation SIM maintaining SIM system safeguarding of SIM 
systems systems • Implementing the mechanism system 
of safeguarding SIM systems 
17-Disposition • Identify person who are • Establish an approach • Has a formal set of principles, • Regularly review to 
in charge of managing to information disposal policies and standards for ensure the disposition 
information disposition which adheres to disposing of safety of safety information 
work retention and information is legal and policy 
disposition plan • These principles, policies and obligations 
standards for disposing of 
safety information are in 
widespread use throughout 
112 
Chapter 5 Developing a SIM Performance Measurement Framework 
Table 5.5 Safety information list for Operation Perspective 
Indicator Safety information 
Ol.i p l.i.l Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) 
Process Pl.i.2 block flow diagrams 
knowledge Pl.i.3 Process Flow Diagrams (PFD) 
pI.i.4 inventory of chemical used 
Pl.i.5 consequences of deviation 
Pl.i.6 safety upper and lower limits 
p l.i. 7 documents for materials of construction 
Pl.i.S Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P & ID's) 
Pl.i.9 piping service specification 
b l.i.l 0 equipment instrument specifications 
K>l.i.11 hazardous area classification drawings 
Pl.i.12 electrical area classification drawings 
p l.i.13 relief system design data 
K> l.i.14 ventilation systems data 
p l.i.15 documents of safety systems 
pI.i.16 fire protection system drawings 
p 1.i.17 records of installation 
pI.i.IS equipment lists and specifications 
p 1.i.19 equipment reference to codes and standards used for design and selection 
p 1.i.20 manufacture/supplier documents with all related certifications and mill tests 
Pl.i.21 equipment control systems records 
Pl.i.22 outside maintenance testing, inspection contractor qualification records 
p l.i.23 corporate standards 
p l.i.24 industry codes and standards 
pI.i.25 local and national safety regulations 
02.i K>2.i.1 PHA methodology/technique procedures 
Process p2.i.2 organisation chart of responsible parties 
hazard 02.i.3 records of PH A leader and members 
analysis (inclu 02.i.4 records of past PHAs and its follow-up de human 
factors) 02.i.5 relevant accidents/incidents documents 
02.i.6 facility sitting records 
02.i.7 PHA reports 
02.i.S PHA follow-up records 
02.i.9 employee participation 
02.i.IO human factors analysis procedure 
02.i.11 human factors analysis records 
02.i.l2 human errors record and investigation 
03.i 03.i.1 initial start-up 
Operating 03.i.2 initial star-up records 
procedures 03.i.3 normal Operations 
03.i.4 shutdown 
03.i.5 emergency 
03.i.6 preparation for maintenance 
03.i.7 Operation records 
P3.i.S Operation deviation records 
04.i P4.i.1 reporting/investigating plan 
Incident p4.i.2 reporting/investigation procedure 
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reporting and p4.i.3 investigation methods 
investigation p4.i.4 investigation teams 
p4.i.S investigation records 
~4.i.6 incident reports 
~4.i.7 investigation recommendation records 
~4.i.S follow-up records 
OS.i ~S.i.1 permit to work plan 
Permit to ~S.i.2 permit to work lists and definitions 
work ~S.i.3 permit to work application and format 
~S.i.4 permit responsibility 
~S.i.S requirement for display permits 
PS.i.6 requirements for monitoring permit 
~S.i.7 records of monitoring permit 
pS.i.S records of permit to work 
06.i 06.i.l MOC implementing procedure 
Management 06.i.2 MOC implementation requirements 
ofcbange 06.i.3 MOC follow-up procedure 
06.i.4 flow chart indicating parties to be notified and all affected documents 
06.i.S records of notification 
06.i.6 follow-up records that process is complete 
06.i.7 personal reassignment and replacement procedures 
06.i.S personal reassignment and replacement records 
07.i 07.i.l emergency action plan 
Emergency 07.i.2 escape procedures and routes with drawings 
response 07.i.3 key personnel organisation chart and job descriptions 
07.i.4 alarm/escape route/muster point card 
07.i.S alarm systems records of installation, maintenance, inspection 
07.i.6 outside agency coordination plan 
07.i.7 community plot plan which indicates location of all support agencies with 
ontacts information 
p7.i.S emergency response records 
OS.i PS.i.l employee and contractor training plan 
Safety work pS.i.2 safety training programme records 
practices PS.i.3 audit police and plan 
pS.i.4 auditors and their qualifications 
pS.i.S audit procedures 
pS.i.6 records of audit and its follow-up 
pS.i.7 contractor evaluation 
PS.i.S contractor safety qualification 
pS.i.9 process control software data 
PS.i.lO self safety check records 
PS.i.ll safety observation records 
pS.i.12 authority inspection records 
OS.i.13 tool box meeting 
OS.i.14 safety management policy document 
OS.i.IS safety management plan 
OS.i.l6 documents of safety responsibilities 
OS.i.17 safety management performance 
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5.7 Hierarchy of SI M performance measurement 
Based on the framework described in Section 5.6, a hierarchy of SIM performance 
measurement was developed. Figure 5.14 shows the hierarchy of the perspectives, 
indicators and measures for SIM performance. Each perspective has its own set of 
indicators (SI etc) and each indicator in turn has its own set of measures (Sl.p.1 etc) 
that form the assessment process. The total score for all of the measures are 
accumulated to form the score for each indicator. Similarly the sum of the scores for the 
indicators yields the score for the perspective. Details of the measurement processes and 
scoring method are given in Chapter 8. 
Index 
Perspective 
Indicator 
Measure 
I 
I 
SIM Performance 
measurement 
I 
I I I 
/ S 0 U ~T~ / 
SI, S2 .... S7 01,02 .... 08 U1,U2 .... U7 T1, T2 ... T6 
A 
01.p 01.i 
/ \ 
S1.p.1, S1.p.2, ... 01.p.1, 01.p.2, .. Ol.i.1, Ol.i.2,... U.p.1, U.p.2, ... STl.p.1, Tl.p.2, ... 
Note: S=Strategic perspective; O=Operational perspective; U=User perspective; T=Technology perspective; 
p=process for handling safety information; i=safety information 
Figure 5.14 The hierarchy of SIM performance measurement 
5.8 Summary 
There is a need for a technique to measure SIM performance in the process industry that 
will enhance the ability to predict and control the risk of inadequate SIM. A generic 
technique must be able to be applied in the ever-changing process industry. Other 
considerations are the relative cost involved in using it, the clarity of the system under 
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study, the desired output, its compatibility with programmed activities and its 
meaningfulness to mangers and those who will benefit from it. 
This study has adopted the BSC concept as the framework to develop a SIM 
performance framework. This proposed BSC for SIM contains SIM goals, perspectives, 
indicators and measures. 
By adopting the HS(G)65 model, 188 process measures have been proposed. This 
model involves the following steps: policy (indicator); organising; planning; 
implementing; measuring and reviewing. Using these steps the process measures under 
each indicator can be clearly identified. However, considering the objectives of SIM, it 
has been decided to add important safety information into the list of measures for the 
Operational Perspective. Therefore, 94 measures related to specific safety information 
have also been proposed. In total, there are 282 proposed measures. 
Once the SIM performance measurement framework had been proposed and its 
associated perspectives, indicators, and measures had been collected, they were refined 
by the process industry and experts through surveys. The following chapter (Chapter 6) 
explains the adopted methods of analysis for these perspectives, indicators and 
measures. The process, result and discussion of the surveys are provided in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 6 - Methods of Analysing Perspectives, Indicators 
and Measures 
6.1 General marks 
This chapter outlines the methods used to collect and analyse the information gathered 
through the surveys which have been carried out during this research project. The 
extensive scope of the research has led to the need for the information to be validated. 
Therefore, all the information used for the evaluation of SIM performance was collected 
from professionals ofthe process industry. 
Following the data collection, analysis determines the significance of the information 
with regard to the research. Analysis also enables the data to be summarised so that the 
main trends and differences can be highlighted in the most appropriate manner. In this 
research, analysis was used to compare, to measure the degree of importance and to 
establish the current trend in the data with regard to the measurement of SIM 
performance. 
6.2 Methods for gathering data 
The process industry draws on a wide variety of established subjects, including natural 
sciences, social sciences, technology, engineering and management, and then applies 
them to the particular context and requirements. Only by the use of appropriate 
methods of research, applied with vigour, can the body of knowledge for the process 
industry be established and advanced with confidence. 
The majority of research in the social sciences and management spheres involves asking 
and obtaining answers to questions through conducting surveys of people and by using 
questionnaires, interviews and case studies (Fellows and Liu, 1997). There is a finite 
resource available for carrying out the fieldwork, especially where those resources are 
very restricted. A decision on the choice of a research method is therefore necessary. 
The choice is affected by the consideration of the scope and depth required. Survey 
research was selected as an appropriate method for information collection in this study. 
Dane (1990) stated that survey research is the most appropriate where a combination of 
facts and opinions is to be obtained. Moreover, survey method can provide appropriate 
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description and prediction. Because surveys rarely involve manipulation of independent 
variables or the random assignment of conditions, generally they are not used for testing 
cause-effect hypothesis. Survey research includes methods in which participants are 
asked question directly, such as questionnaires or interviews. 
In order to fulfil the objectives of this study, one plant investigation and two surveys 
were chosen as the most appropriate means of collecting data. The aim of carrying out 
the plant investigation and two surveys was to establish the following issues: 
• To investigate current practices and problems of SIM. 
• To identify perfonnance evaluation methods. 
• To identify the critical and important proactive factors that affect SIM perfonnance. 
• To identify indicators and measures that contribute to ensuring adequate SIM. 
• To validate the importance of all identified SIM indicators and measures. 
The aim and the subjects of investigation and surveys are detailed in Table 6.1. The 
process and results of the plant investigation have been presented in Chapter 4. The 
following sections present the concepts and structures of questionnarie survey (Survey I) 
and expert judgment (Survey 11). 
Table 6.1 Methods for gathering data 
Method Subjects and Aim 
Plant Investigation • Subjects: Carry out SIM investigation on several chosen plants in 
Taiwan whose safety records range from very good through good and 
average to poor. 
• Aim: to identify SIM systems adopted by the process industry. 
Survey 1- • Pilot test to Chinese Petroleum Corporation in Taiwan. 
industry opinion • Aim: to assess the reliability and validity of variables contained 
on perspectives within the questionnaire. 
and indicators 
• Main survey targeted at all petrochemical plants (90 units) in Taiwan. 
Each plant was asked to return a questionnaire completed by a safety 
manager, a line supervisor and an operator. The survey covered two 
sub-types of chemical plant: chemical raw material manufacturing 
and chemical products manufacturing. 
• Aim: to identify SIM current practices in the process industry and the 
factors that affect SIM performance. 
Survey 11 -expert • Pilot test was done by 3 experts from safety and information 
judgement on management fields. 
measures • Aim: to assess the reliability and validity of variables contained· 
within the questionnaire. 
• Main survey was done by 12 experts. Experts are from industry, 
authority and academic fields. 
• Aim: to measure the degree of importance and to establish the 
weighting of each perspective, indicator and measure. 
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6.2.1 Survey I -industry opinion on perspectives and indicators 
The aim of Survey I is to identify current SIM practices in the process industry and to 
evaluate the possible perspectives and indicators of SIM perfonnance. The 
questionnaire method was used to gather required data from industry professionals in 
Survey I. A questionnaire is a prefonnatted written set of questions to which 
respondents record their answers. The questionnaire method has been recognised as an 
efficient data collection mechanism when the researcher knows exactly what is required 
and how to measure the variable of interest (Sekaran, 1992). 
Questionnaires can be administered personally or mailed to the respondents. When the 
survey is confined to a local area and to certain respondents, and the organisation is 
willing and able to assemble groups oftargeted persons to respond to the questionnaires 
at their work places, personally administering is the best way to collect data. Any 
doubts about survey questions can be clarified when personally administering 
questionnaires. Moreover, the researcher also has the opportunity to introduce the 
research topic and motivate the respondents to give their honest answers. On the other 
hand, a mail survey is the least expensive, least time consuming and most effective 
means to reach a specific sample (Dane, 1990). Further advantages of the mail survey 
include: a wide geographical area can be covered; and greater privacy is provided for 
the respondents. However, the mail survey increases the likelihood of misunderstanding 
and/or the returning of incomplete responses. Conducting a pilot survey is one way to 
minimise this problem. Furthermore, the mail survey ranks lowest among 
administration methods with respect to response rates (Dane, 1990; Sekaran, 1992). 
Fellows & Liu (1997) argued that the mail survey can expect a 25%-35% useable 
response rate. Some effective techniques exist for improving the rate of response, such 
as providing the respondent with stamped-addressed envelopes and keeping the 
questionnaire as short as possible. Techniques such as these will help to increase return 
rates of mail questionnaires (Kanuk & Bernson, 1975). 
In the Survey I of this research, questionnaires were mailed with stamped-addressed 
envelopes. To further motivate respondents, a pamphlet detailing the purpose of the 
survey, background to the framework and definition of tenninology was included with 
the questionnaire. Since the trust and commitment to the research effort by the 
respondents was of paramount importance, the questionnaire designed was completely 
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undisguised. Furthermore, follow-up telephone calls were made to target respondents to 
confirm that the questionnaire had been received and to provide an opportunity to allay 
any doubts about the survey questions. 
Since questionnaire has been chosen to use in the research, it is necessary to know how 
to design an effective questionnaire. Sekaran (1992) suggests considering three points: 
(1) the wording of the questions; (2) how the items will be categorised, scaled and 
coded after the questionnaire responses are received; and (3) the general appearance of 
the questionnaire. All the three points have been considered in the construction of the 
questionnaire in order to minimise bias in the research. 
6.2.2 Survey 11 - expert judgment on measures 
The main purpose of Survey II is to decide measures under each indicator. Because of 
the complication of identifying the set of measures (see Section 5.7), a method for 
Survey II was needed for obtaining reliable and fast answers. The expert judgment 
method has been selected in Survey 11. The method used knowledge elicitation 
techniques by experts in safety issues. 
The choice and number of experts are important factors in the expert judgment exercise. 
The experts should come from a diverse background, but within the area of research, in 
order that there is no undue influence from anyone individual. The number should be 
practical, the lower bound is necessary for diversity and the upper bound is the 
manageable maximum number of experts. Adler & Ziglio (1996) claimed that with a 
homogeneous group of experts, good results can be obtained even with small panels of 
10-15 individuals. It is important that the selection of appropriate experts is not based 
on personal preference. On the contrary, it needs to ensure that the aims and context 
within which the survey is carried out are satisfied. Among the criteria are knowledge 
and practical management of the topic under investigation, the capacity and willingness 
of selected experts to contribute to the exploration of the particular problem and with 
sufficient time available to dedicate to the exercise. Therefore, it is also important to 
ensure that the experts selected will produce a response more meaningful than if just 
anyone had completed the questionnaire. 
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Expert judgment is one of the methods to get conclusions from group decisions. The 
group decision approach can resolve differences and lead to consensus answers as a 
result of discussion amongst the experts, but it also suffers from group bias or 
disagreement (Lawrence, 1996). There are four techniques that can be considered 
besides expert opinion for research specifically aimed at using multiple experts. These 
techniques are brainstorming, nominal technique, consensus decision-making and 
Delphi Method. Tomlinson & 10hnson (1994) have discussed all of these four techniques. 
1. Brainstorming: Brainstorming is a technique that encourages the free wheeling 
discovery of new ideas and new approaches through interaction between two or 
more people. The discussion takes place in a comfortable constructive group setting. 
In this discussion, there is no right or wrong answer. The experts are briefed about 
the objective of the session before posing the problem. The experts are either asked 
to call out ideas as they occur to them or participate in turn. The facilitator or 
knowledgeable engineer records all decisions. The problem with this technique is 
getting all the experts together at one time and it is very time consuming. It is only 
suitable for experts who have the time and are sufficiently motivated to attend the 
session. 
2. Nominal technique: This method is administered to a group of experts 
considering a single specific task at each meeting. This technique requires strong 
involvement and interaction of the group as a whole. It requires the group to write 
down, individually, their ideas about the problem, and then to have a round-robin 
feedback to members of the group as a whole. Lastly, individuals vote on the 
priority to be attributed to the different ideas. The group decision is derived, 
mathematically, from rank ordering or the ratings. 
3. Consensus decision-making: Consensus decision-making uses a workshop that 
again requires the experts to gather together. Similarly to the Nominal technique, 
the experts will have to vote to arrive at a decision. In each round of voting the 
least supported solutions are eliminated until a solution is achieved. Once this 
process is completed, a decision period ascertains everyone's agreement with the 
choice. This technique, like brainstorming, requires all experts to be present at one 
meeting. Unlike brainstorming this method will be more fruitful by reaching an 
agreed decision. 
4. Delphi Method (DM): The objective of most Delphi applications is the reliable 
and creative exploration of ideas or the production of suitable information for 
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decision-making (Adler & Ziglio, 1996). The DM is based on a structure for 
collecting and distilling knowledge from a group of individuals as a whole, in 
order to deal with a complex problem (Adler & Ziglio, 1996; Tomlinson & 
Johnson, 1994). In the DM, a group of experts is used, but each works in isolation. 
This method is free from group bias but the group interaction and discussion of 
ideas is lost. The DM generally requires at least two survey phases. The first 
phase is the exploration phase. The second phase is more focused on the response. 
The DM has been accepted as a mature method to obtain consensus answers amongst a 
group of experts. Adler & Ziglio (1996) state that the DM is most suited to gathering 
information from experts who are diversely located compared with the other methods. 
All of the other three methods described previously require the experts to be present in 
the same room at the same time discussing the problem. Therefore, the Survey 11 
adopted the DM technology to collect and distill expert opinions. 
6.3 Method of analysing data 
The data that have been collected successfully need to be analysed in the way to fulfil 
research purposes. The factors which affect how the data are analysed are: 
• The number of variables being examined; 
• The level of measurement of the variables, and 
• Whether the data is for descriptive or inferential purposes. 
In the research, the SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) vI 1.0 for Windows 
was chosen for analysing the data collected from Survey I and Survey 11. Among its 
features are modules for statistical data analysis, including descriptive statistics such as 
plots, frequencies, charts, and lists, as well as sophisticated inferential and multivariate 
statistical procedures like analysis of variance (ANOVA), factor analysis, cluster analysis, 
and categorical data analysis. The SPSS is particularly well-suited to survey research, 
though by no means is it limited to just this topic of exploration. 
How the data is analysed depends on what is to be determined. A brief explanation on 
the level of measurement used to collected data and a further discussion on the methods 
chosen for the statistic analysis are given below. 
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6.3.1 Level of measurement 
It is generally helpful to classify all data as being on an ordinal, nominal, ratio or 
interval scale. Data that are of ordinal scale indicate some ranking such as grade, social 
class, and position in management hierarchy. While one category may be higher or 
better than another, the difference between each adjoining pair may not necessarily be 
the same. Data that are nominal include such categories as sex of respondents, plant, 
city, country and others. Data on a ratio scale are again numerical data where the 
interval on the scale is equal but zero does have a meaning. Data on an interval scale are 
numerical and intervals between numbers mean the same thing, but zero has no 
meaning. For example, in an IQ test the score of 90 to 95 should mean the same as the 
difference between 130 to135. 
The ordinal scales were used in this research. All data collected used a Likert scale or 
ranking of the score. Likert scaling is a popular method for the creation of a multiple-
item measure. The Likert technique produces an ordinal scale that generally uses 
nonparametric statistics. The scale is highly reliable when it comes to rough ordering of 
people with regard to a particular attitude or attitude complex (Black, 1999). The score 
includes a measure of intensity as expressed on each statement. With Likert scaling, 
individuals are presented with a number of statements which appear to relate to a 
common theme; they then can indicate their level of agreement on a five-point average. 
The answer of each constituent question is scored, for instance from 1 (strongly 
unacceptable) to 5 (strongly acceptable). An example of the scaling is as follows used 
in the Survey I: 
Less important 1 
Slightly important 2 
Important 3 
Very important 4 
Absolutely important 5 
6.3.2 Statistical significance 
Besides the scale used to evaluate the variables which are perspectives, indicators and 
measures in the research, the objective of the analysis finally determined the statistical 
method used. The objective was to establish the impact of individual factors for each 
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sub-factor in terms of their relative ranking of importance and to determine if there was 
any association between the response groups. 
In statistics, a result is significant if it is unlikely to have occurred by chance, given that 
in reality, the independent variable (the test condition being examined) has no effect, or 
formally stated, that a presumed null hypothesis is true. With reference to the research, 
three things can be found out if these groups differ in their perspectives. There are three 
possible answers to these questions: 
1. A group may be more perceptive than B group, 
2. A group may be less perceptive than B group; or 
3. There may no difference between them 
The above are three different expectations or hypotheses about what the answers might 
be. Therefore not expecting any difference is chosen as a null hypothesis for the 
research. 
In statistical hypothesis testing, the significance level of a test is the maximum 
probability that the observed statistic would arise under the null hypothesis (Le. 
consistent with chance variation). Hence, the significance level is the probability that 
the null hypothesis will be rejected in error (Hollander & Wolfe, 1999). The. 
significance of a result is also called its p-value; the smaller the p-value, the more 
significant the result is said to be. For example, when performing a test of significance 
and assuming the significance value is 0.01, if the p-value is equal to or lower than 0.01 
then the null hypothesis would be rejected, and the test statistic is said to be 
"statistically significant" (Howell, 2002). For a statistical value of 0.01, this basically 
means that if a statistical test says that the probability of this event occurring by chance 
alone is less than 0.01 or one time out of a hundred, then it probably did not occur as a 
random event Black (1999). 
Popular levels of significance are 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. If the significance level is small, 
the statistical test is more stringent, Le. a result that is "significant at the 0.01 level" is 
more significant than a result which is "significant at the 0.05 level" (Howell, 2002). 
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For this reason, in this research a significance value of 0.01 was adopted while 
performing the statistical analysis using the SSPS package. 
6.3.3 Correlation test 
Statisticians make a distinction between correlation and regression. Taking two sets of 
data from an experiment, X and Y, the Y variable is a random variable in both 
correlations and regressions. For a regression analysis of the data, X is described as a 
fixed variable. This means that the values for X are fixed prior to the experiment and the 
Y values come from the results. Therefore it is possible to define a relationship between 
X and Y which allows for the prediction of future values of Y if the experiment is 
repeated. Regression analysis shows how well the data fits the relationship. In a 
correlation analysis, both X and Y are random variables, and thus a correlation analysis 
looks for a degree of correlation between the two data sets, but does not look for a 
relationship to fit the data to. For this research, the analysis of the correlation of the 
survey results between respondent groups is required. 
There are a large number of measures of association that can be used to examine 
relationships between variables. The most familiar correlation coefficient is the 
Pearson's Product-Moment Correlation coefficient r, which is a measure of supposed 
linear relationship between two sets of data. The Pearson correlation r has been adopted 
to analyse the correlation of variables in this research, however, it is suitable for interval 
data but not ordinal data. With categorical or ordinal data, other measures must be used. 
Therefore, Spearman's correlation coefficient rs and Kendall's coefficient 't have been 
chosen to analyse the relationship between ordinal variables. These two prominent 
methods are available for this study because they involve ranking people on each 
variable and then comparing people's relative position on the two variables (Cramer, 
1998; De Vaus, 1990). Both rs and 't are normal correlation coefficients. They range 
between 0 to 1, can have a negative sign, and only measure linear relationships and are 
symmetrical. 
According to Cramer (1998), there is not much difference between rs and 't except 
where the ratio of case to categories is small (Le. fewer people and larger number of 
variables) the rs can be more appropriate. However, the rs is usually presented in terms 
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of a formula which, although it looks very different from that of the Pears on correlation, 
is actually equivalent, provided that no ties are allowed (Kinnear & Gray, 2000). 
6.3.3.1 Tied data 
Sometimes raw data is ranked but there are tied scores. The following method, which is 
described by example, can be used to rank the tied data (Howell, 1992). 
Consider a set of data arranged in increasing order: 
2,3,4,5,5,7,9,12, 12, 12, 14,16 
The lowest value (2) is ranked 1. The next two values (3 and 4) are ranked 2 and 3. The 
two tied values (5) can occupy either position 4 or 5. So they are given the average rank 
of (4+5)/2 or 4.5. Values 7 and 9 are ranked 6 and 7. The next three tied values would 
occupy positions 8, 9 and 10 and so are all given position 9. Thus values are ranked: 
value: 2, 3, 4, 5, 5, 7, 9, 12, 12, 12, 14, 16 
rank: 1, 2,3, 4.5, 4.5, 6, 7, 9, 9, 9, 11, 12 
6.3.3.2 Pearson's Product-Moment Correlation coefficient (r) 
Pearson's Product-Moment Correlation coefficient is one of several methods that can be 
used to analyse the relation between two sets of data, X and Y (Kinnear & Gray, 2000). 
The coefficient ranges from -1 to +1. A high position value shows a strong relation 
between X and Y, a high negative value shows a strong but inverse relation. A value of 
zero means no relation. r can be defined as follows. 
Firstly define the sum of the squares of the deviation of the value of X from the mean of 
X as: 
(6.1) 
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and the sum of the squares of the deviations ofthe values ofY from the mean ofY as 
N 2 
SS y = L (r; - Y) (6.2) 
1=1 
and define the sum of the products of the deviations of the values of X and Y from the 
means of X and Y respectively as 
Where Xj= ith value of data set X 
Yj= ith value of data set Y 
N=number of items 
x = ...:..1==1 __ 
N 
Then define Pearson's Product-Moment Correlation coefficient, r, as 
6.3.3.3 Spearman's correlation coefficient (rs) for ranked data 
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(6.5) 
(6.6) 
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Spearman's coefficient is a development from Pearson's coefficient for use on ranked 
data (Howell, 2002). It is known that the sum of the first N integers is N(N+ 1)/2. 
Similarly, the sum of the squares of the first N integers is N(N+l)(2N+1)/6. If :DC and 
LY are replaced by N(N+ 1 )/2 , and :DC2 and Ly2 are replaced by N(N+ 1 )(2N+ 1 )/6 in 
the above Pearson's formulae, and D is defined as the difference between the X and Y 
ranks, then Speraman' s coefficient, rs, is defined as: 
(6.7) 
However, ifthere are any tied data in the rankings, the formula is invalid because the set 
of N rankings no longer consists of the first N integers and so the replacements for the 
sums and sums of squares are incorrect. In this case Kendall's coefficient of 
concordance should be used to test the rankings. 
6.3.4.4 Kendall's tau ('t) 
Kendall's tau, represented by Greek letter 't , provides an alternative to the Spearman's 
coefficient (rs) as a measure of arrangement between rankings, or assignments to 
ordered categories (Kinnear & Gray, 2000). The basic idea is that one set of ranks can be 
converted into another by a succession of reversals of pairs of ranks in one set: the 
fewer the reversals needed (in relation to the total number of possible reversals), the 
grater the agreement and the larger the value of't (Hollander & Wolfe. 1999). 
Consider two samples, x and y, each of size n. The total number of possible pairings of 
x with y observations is n(n-l )/2. Now consider ordering the pairs by the x values and 
then by the y values. If x3 > y3 when ordered on both x and y then the third pair is 
concordant, otherwise the third pair is discordant. S is the difference between the 
number of concordant (ordered in the same way, ne) and discordant (ordered 
differently, nd) pairs (Hollander & Wolfe. 1999). 
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't is related to S by: 
S= ne - nd (6.8) 
S 
T = ------,~-----,,---
n(n-l)/2 (6.9) 
If there are tied (same value) observations then 'tb is used: 
(6.10) 
where tj is the number of observations tied at a particular rank of x, and Uj is the 
number tied at a particular rank of y. When there are no ties 'tb = 'to 't can vary 
throughout the complete range from -I to + I. From equation 6.9 and 6.10, it can be 
seen that small S leads to small 't indicating poor agreement and vice versa (Hollander 
& Wolfe. 1999). 
Kendall's 't has advantages over the Spearman's coefficient, especially with small 
datasets, in which there are tied assignments, where a value of statistical significance 
can still be obtained (Howell, 2002). 
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6.4 Group decision making with fuzzy majority 
Statistical tools were used for analysing Surveys I and 11 as described in the last section. 
However, in order to establish the degree of importance for each perspective and 
indicator, the group decision-making using fuzzy majority introduced by Lotfi Zadeh in 
1965 was used. To date, the application of Fuzzy set theory is widely used in electronic, 
manufacturing and household appliances. The following discussion is about the analysis 
method adopted for this research concerning the fuzzy majority approach. 
Decisions are made today in increasing complex situations. The use of expert opinions 
in various fields is essential. In many decision-making settings, the theory of decision-
making can be used. Group decision-making consists of deriving a solution from the 
individual preferences over a set of options in questions. The solution should reflect 
what a majority of individuals prefer. 
Though the above basic problem formulation seems extremely simple, maybe even trivial, 
it is certainly not. Kacprzyk et al. (1993) reported that since the very beginning, group 
decision-making has been plagued by negative results. Since the process of decision 
making, notably of group type, is centred on human beings, with their inherent 
subjectivity, imprecision and vagueness in the articulation of opinions, fuzzy sets have 
been used. 
According to Kacprzyk et al. (1993) one of the basic elements underlying group decision-
making is the concept of majority. Here the majority is used as a solution for an option 
best acceptable by a group as a whole, which is by most of its members since in no real 
situation would it be accepted by all. This approach is based upon an extension of the 
algebraic method, with the underlying truth drawn from the unit interval. This method 
uses the power of a fuzzy subset as a measure of cardinality (most importance). Before 
pursuing the approach further, an overview of fuzzy subset theory is presented. 
6.4.1 Fuzzy logic 
To understand how fuzzy systems provide superior information modelling, it is 
important to go back to its origin. As conceived by Lotfi Zadeh, the inventor of fuzzy 
logic, it provides a method of reducing as well as explaining system complexity. 
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"". that the conventional quantitative techniques of system analysis are 
intrinsically unsuited for dealing with humanistic systems or for that matter, 
any system whose complexity is comparable to that of the humanistic system. 
The basis for this contention rests on what might be called the principle of 
compatibility. Stated informally, the essence of this principle is that as the 
complexity of a system increases, our ability to make precise and yet 
significant statements about its behaviour diminishes until a threshold is 
reach beyond which precision and significant become almost mutually 
exclusive characteristics" (Dubois et al., 1993) 
Zadeh (1965) advocates an alternative approach as described below: 
"". based on the premise that the key elements in human thinking are not 
numbers, but labels of fuzzy sets, that is, classes of objects in which the 
transition from membership to non-membership is gradual rather abrupt. 
Indeed the perverseness of fuzziness in the human thought process suggests 
that much of the logic behind human reasoning is not the traditional two-
valued or even multi-valued logic, but a logic with fuzzy truths, fuzzy 
connectives and fuzzy rules of inference ". 
In this view of modelling complex systems, the underlying mechanics are represented 
linguistically rather than mathematically. Zadeh makes a case for human reasons to be 
considered not in terms of discrete symbols and numbers but in term of fuzzy sets. The 
transition from one category - concept, idea or problem state - to the next is gradual 
with some states having greater or less membership in the one set and then another. 
Fuzzy sets can be interpreted in different ways; the most common view is to see 
membership functions as a way of assessing a degree of satisfaction or preference for 
the different elements of interpretation. The most popular of fuzzy control systems are 
industrial applications in domestic appliances, process control and automotive systems. 
A fuzzy set is generally assumed to be imbedded in a non fuzzy universe of discourse, 
which may be a collection of objects, concepts or mathematical constructs. For example, 
a universe of discourse, Umay be a set of real numbers; the set of integers 0, 1,2 ... 100; 
the set of all students in a high school; the set of all research assistances; etc. Universes 
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of discourse are usually denoted by the symbols U, V, W ... with or without sUbscripts 
and/or superscripts. 
A fuzzy subset A of a universe of discourse U is characterised by a membership 
function !lA: U ~[O, 1] which associates with each element u of U a number !lA (u) in 
the interval [0, 1], with !lA (u) representing the grade membership ofu in A. The support 
of A is the set of points in U at which !lA (u) is positive. 
For example demonstrated by Dubois et al. (1984), let the universe of discourse be the 
internal [0,100], with u interpreted as 'age'. A fuzzy subset of U labeled 'old' may be 
defined by a membership function such as 
!lA (u) =0 for O~ u ~ 50 (6.11) 
-1 
--(1 +(u -550)-2J for 50< u ~100 (6.12) 
In this case, the support of 'old' is the interval [50,100], the height of 'old' is effective 
unity, and the crossover point of old is 55. It should be remarked that in many 
applications the grade membership of !lA (u) may be interpreted as the degree of 
compatibility of u with the concept represented by A. For example, in the case of fuzzy 
set 'old' as defined by (6.11) and (6.12), the degree to which the numerical age 60 is 
compatible with the concept of 'old' is Jiold(60)=0.8. 
The simple operation of fuzzy subsets includes inclusion, equality, complementation, 
intersection and union and disjunction sum which can be found in many fuzzy textbooks. 
The total allowable of universe of value is called the domain of the fuzzy set. The value 
of the domain can be positive and negative. For this research, the domain applied is 
IMPORTANCE and have a domain that constitutes from 0-1. A linguistic variable also 
carries with it the concept of fuzzy qualifiers. These qualifiers change the shape of a 
fuzzy set in predictable ways and function in the same fashion as adverbs and adjectives 
in English language. For the research, five rating levels are used that are: 
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• Less Important 
• Slightly Important 
• Important 
• Very Important 
• Absolutely Important 
6.4.2 Linguistic quantifiers 
Basically, these linguistic majorities try to formulate human rational behaviour. 
Kacprzyk et al. (1993) argues that if it has been deemed natural then this rationality 
boils down to the maximum of some utility (value) function, or some expected utility 
function in the case of uncertainty. Such functions have been shown to exist providing 
the preferences satisfy some 'natural' conditions. This approach makes the decision 
making problem virtually equivalent to optimisation. It has been popular and often 
successful, partly due to the availability of powerful mathematical means. 
Since the process of group decision making, notably of group type, is centered on 
human beings, with their inherent subjectivity, imprecision and vagueness in the 
articulation of opinions etc., fuzzy sets have been used in this field for a long time. 
Fedrizzi et al. (1993) argued that the ability to accommodate a fuzzy majority in 
consensus formation models should help to make them more human consistent and 
hence easier to implement. 
To summarise the above considerations, a possibility to accommodate a less rigid 'soft' 
majority would certainly help to make group decision models more human consistent. 
Natural manifestation of 'soft' majorities are called linguistic quantifiers e.g. 'most', 
'almost', 'more than 50%', etc. 
Drawing upon Zadeh's concept, Yager (1992) described three important classes of 
linguistic quantifiers: 
1. Monotone (increasing): 'at least', 'all', 'almost all'; 
2. Anti-monotone (decreasing): 'few', 'less than'; and 
3. Unimodal: 'about', 'exactly', 'not none' 
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The three classes of quantifiers, especially the monotones, play an important role in the 
representation of multi-criteria decision functions as well as in the representation of 
rules in expert systems. However the selection of the quantifier is purely a subjective 
choice of the decision-maker. Yager & Zadeh (1984) proposed some fuzzy-logic-based 
calculi of linguistically quantified propositions that make it possible to handle fuzzy 
linguistic quantifiers. According to Fedrizzi et al. (1993) these calculi have been applied 
to derive new solutions of concepts in-group decision making which have been 
implemented in a decision support system for consensus. A quantified proposition is 
exemplified by 'most experts are convinced' or 'almost all good houses are expensive'. 
Zadeh states that the conventional two-valued predicate calculus makes it possible to 
determine the truth of a quantified proposition for crisp quantifiers, say 'all' and 'at 
least one' (Kacprzyk, 1986). The truth of such propositions may be found by using the 
following calculus based upon fuzzy logic (Kacprzyk, 1986): 
A general form of linguistically quantified statement is 
QY'sareF 
Where, Q is a linguistic quantifier (e.g. all, at least one, most) 
Y is a class of objects {YI. .... Yn}(e.g. experts), and 
F is some property (e.g. convinced) 
(6.13) 
We may assign to the particular y's (objects) a different importance (relevance, 
competence), E, which may therefore be added to (6.13) yielding 
QEY'sareF (6.14) 
Say, "most (Q) of the important (E) experts (y's) are convinced (F)", 
The main problem here is how to find the truth of such linguistically quantified 
statements, i.e. truth (QY's are F) or truth (QEY's are F) knowing truth (y is F),Vy E Y. 
(V = universal quantifier). 
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In Zadeh' s method, a fuzzy linguistic quantifier Q is assumed to be a fuzzy set defined 
In [0, 1]. For instance, Q='most' may be given as: 
p-""",-(tp) ~{ ~tp-O_6 for ep ~ 0.8 for 0.3 < ep < 0.8 
for ep ~ 0.3 
(6.15) 
This may be interpreted as follows: if at least 80% of some elements satisfy a property, 
then most of them certainly (to degree 1) satisfy it, when less than 30% of them satisfy 
it (satisfy to degree 0), and between 30% and 80% - the more of them that satisfy, the 
higher the degree of satisfaction by most of the elements (Kacprzyk et a/., 1992). For 
this research, the proportional quantifiers 'most' will be used as they are more important 
for modelling a fuzzy majority than an absolute quantifiers (e.g. about 5, much more 
than 10, etc.). 
The property F is defined as a fuzzy set in Y={y} = {y\, ..... yn}' F~ Y, and J.1F(yJ is the 
truth of"Yi is F", i =1 ....... , p. 
The problem is to find truth (QY's are F) knowing all truth (Yi is F), i=1. ...... , p. Truth 
(QY's are F) is now calculated using the non-fuzzy cardinalities called ICounts, of the 
respective fuzzy sets in the following two steps (Kacprzyk et a/., 1992): 
Stepl: (6.16) 
Step2: truth (QY's are F) = JiQ (ep ) (6.17) 
In the case of importance, B= 'important' c Y, and J.1B (Yi) e[O.1] is a degree of 
importance of Yi: from 1 for definitely important to 0 for definitely unimportant, through 
all intermediate values. 
Step 1 : ep' 
I Count{BandF) 
ICount{B) 
(6.18) 
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(6.19) 
Step2: truth (QBY's are F) = f1Q (rp ') (6.20) 
Where '/\' is maximum, i.e. a/lb = max(a,b). For this research, all the experts 
(respondents of Survey I) have equal importance, therefore this approach of importance 
is not applicable. 
Kacprzyk (1986) illustrates an example to demonstrate this approach as shown below: 
If Y='experts'= {Jane, Bob, Bill}, 
F= 'convinced'=0.1IJane+0.6/Bob+0.8/Bill 
And Q='most' given by (6.19), then 
rp =113 (0.1+0.6+0.8) =0.5 
and 
truth (most of experts are convinced) 
truth (QY's are F) = f.i'most' (0.5) 
= 2 rp -0.6 
= (2 xO.5)-0.6 
= 0.4 
Thus the consistency of the particular definition of F with the proposition 'most of 
experts are convinced' is 0.4 and is categorised as low. 
This method is the best fit for the research because only the importance of the expert is 
measured. There has been criticism the approach such as not being fuzzy enough which 
may lead to unacceptable results. Due to this, Yager (1992) introduced the use of 
ordered weighted average (OW A) operators for the representations of fuzzy linguistic 
quantifiers. OW A is applied only when there is more than one alternative with few 
decision-makers and different levels of importance. Since this research does not have to 
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choose any alternatives, just measuring of importance, Zadeh's approach seems best 
appropriate. 
6.5 Summary 
The chapter detailed the data collection instruments used in this research. Three 
methods: plant investigation; questionnaire survey; and expert judement were adopted 
for gathering SIM performance data. The methods of statistic analysis and group 
decision making have also been presented. In the following chapter (Chapter 7), the 
detailed procedure followed in adopting these methods, and the results of the two 
surveys are discussed. 
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Chapter 7 - Data Collection and Analysis 
7.1. General Remarks 
SIM can be evaluated in terms of: the efficiency of the activities associated with the 
SIM system development and operations; and its contribution to the effectiveness of 
those that use SIM to improve safety and strive to help attain corporate goals. The key 
to developing an effective SIM performance measurement framework is the 
development of effective SIM performance perspectives, indicators and measures. 
Hence, this chapter not only focuses on the survey study of current SIM practice of the 
petrochemical industry in Taiwan, but also illustrates the development of the SIM 
performance perspectives, indicators and measures and the findings of the quantitative 
analysis, which allow the process industry to pursue SIM improvement. 
This chapter is divided into two main parts, Survey I and Survey n. Survey I was 
designed to identify SIM performance perspectives and indicators as well as their 
relative weights. Survey n was designed to decide the measures (sub-indicators) for 
each indicator. Each part contains three sections, namely, questionnaire construction, 
implementation of the survey and data analysis. The data obtained from these two 
surveys have established and validated the important factors affecting key performance 
indicators for SIM in the process plants. The identified perspectives, indicators and 
measures have formed the basis for the development of the SIM performance 
measurement tool. 
7.2 Survey I -Industry Opinion on SIM Perspectives and Indicators 
7.2.1 Questionnaire construction 
Hoinville (1978) claim that a good questionnaire has to be designed specifically to suit 
the aim of the research and the nature of the respondents. They add that the 
questionnaire needs to be clear, unambiguous, and uniformly workable. Its design must 
minimise potential error from respondents. The most important to consider is that since 
people's participation in a survey is voluntary, a questionnaire has to help in engaging 
their interest, encouraging their corporation and eliciting answers as close as possible to 
the truth. Therefore, Hoinville & 10well outline five main considerations, namely: 
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• questions have to be designed so that they are easy for respondents to understand 
and answer accurately and clearly; 
• questions have to be clear, unambiguous and useful, using a simple language, 
short questions and bias questions; 
• questions must be easy to administer; 
• questions should be constructed so that they are easy to analyse; and 
• the flow, structure and length of the questionnaire should encourage and keep the 
respondent's interest. 
Under these five considerations, the questionnaire of Survey I (Appendix C) was 
formulated after a comprehensive review of the literature in such fields as performance 
measurement, safety management, safety engineering, strategic management, 
information technology and information systems. The purpose of the review was to 
draft a questionnaire that would enable the achievement of the following goals: 
• Validation ofthe perspectives 
• Refining the screened list of indicators 
• Quantifying the relative importance of perspectives and indicators 
• Determining and quantifying the independence of indicators 
• Determining and quantifying each perspectives' dependency on indicators 
• Ranking perspectives and indicators 
The questionnaire layout comprised three main parts illustrated below. Once the 
questionnaires were designed and developed to cater for the above research objectives, 
they were sent to potential target respondents at all petrochemical plants in Taiwan. 
7.2.1.1 Section A 
This section of the questionnaire starts with the general information and definitions of 
key words used in the questionnaire followed by initial questions on the background of 
the respondents and the SIM portfolio of their organisations. Section A was designed to 
find out about the nature of the business and the respondent's experience in the process 
industry. 
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7.2.1.2 Section B 
This section is concerned with the current SIM practice in the industry, and is devoted 
to investigating the respondent's view on his organisation's SIM perfonnance. Hence, 
the respondents were required to make an assessment, from their point-of-view, of the 
perfonnance of SIM in their own organisation. Section B was designed to provide 
infonnation on the approach adopted, types of system applied, frequency of assessment 
and other valuable infonnation from existing SIM perfonnance self-assessment. This 
section helped establish the pattern of existing SIM self-assessment in the industry. 
7.2.1.3 Section C 
This section requires the respondents to rank the importance of the four perspectives 
and to mark the level of importance of each indicator on a five-point Likert scale, from 
'less important' at the one extreme to 'absolutely important' at the other. 
7.2.2 Implementing Survey I 
7.2.2.1 Pilot test 
Oppenheim (1992) emphasised the importance of pilot testing as follows: 
• The pilot test is carried out by administering the questions to a smaller sample 
than that to be used in the actual study; 
• It is used to assess the reliability and validity of variables before carrying out the 
actual study; and 
• The pilot test is used as an opportunity to gather any missing infonnation and 
clear up any ambiguity from the questionnaire. 
A draft of the questionnaire was sent to three academic staffs of the Department of 
Chemical Engineering, Loughborough University, namely, Dr. D. Edwards. Professor 
M. L. Preston and Professor T. A. Kletz. Then, the questionnaire was distributed to four 
safety managers within petrochemical plants in Taiwan. The responses were good and 
comments were incorporated in the actual questionnaires. The pilot test helped to refine 
the wording, ordering, structure and layout of the questionnaire. It also helped to prune 
the questionnaire to a manageable length. 
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One good suggestion from the pilot test concerned the ranking of the responses. 
Responses from the pilot test were bimodal with the rankings appearing in the not 
important and very important regions. Suggestions were made to clearly define the 
ranking scale for each level such as using the Likert's five-point or seven-point scale. 
7.2.2.2 Main survey 
It was important to send the questionnaire to a wide sample in order to have a 
representative feedback from the process industry. Based on the requirements of this 
research sponsor and the expectation of a reasonable level of response, the 
petrochemical industry of Taiwan was chosen as the target for Survey I. At this stage, 
the structure of the questionnaire was improved compared to the one used for the pilot 
test. The main survey questionnaire was extensively reviewed with Mr Shen-Shan Liou 
from the Chinese Petroleum Corporation. 
According to information from Taiwan's Labour Ministry, there were around 90 
petrochemical plants in Taiwan while the survey was being carried out. A total of 270 
questionnaires were sent out. Each plant received three questionnaires and was asked to 
have them completed by the safety manager, one line supervisor and one operator, 
respectively. 
The questionnaire was sent to all the petrochemical plants in Taiwan. The reasoning for 
this was threefold: these organisations would benefit the most from SIM 
implementation because of the high risk and complexity of the industry; high- risk 
plants would be more likely to adopt innovative information system and information 
technology for safety management; and safety professionals, working in these plants 
would be more suited to evaluating the importance of SIM performance perspectives 
and indicators. Additionally, responses were sought from the same organisation from 
respondents having different position descriptions, to gauge the varying perceptions of 
different professionals, within an organisation. 
The survey I focuses on the petrochemical industry which converts oil products and 
natural gas into petrochemicals. In general, the petrochemical industry includes 
refineries and petrochemical manufacturing. There is a strong link between the 
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petrochemical manufacturing and the refining sector. Hence, according to the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAIeS), the petrochemical industry can be 
categorised into three sub-groups as shown below: 
1. Upstream- Petroleum refineries (NAICS 32411) 
2. Midstream- Petrochemical Manufacturing (NAICS 32511) and 
Other Basic Chemical Manufacturing (NAICS 32519) 
3.Downstream- Resin, Synthetic Rubber, and Artificial and Synthetic Fibres and 
Filaments Manufacturing (NAICS 3252) 
The definition ofthese sub-groups is provided in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 Definition of the petrochemical industry and its sub-groups 
Industry type Definition 
Petrochemical industry Establishments primarily engaged in converting crude oil 
into oil products and converting oil products and natural gas 
into petrochemicals. 
Petroleum refineries Establishments primarily engaged in refining crude 
(NAICS 32411) petroleum into petrochemicals. 
Petrochemical Manufacturing Establishments primarily engaged in converting feed stocks 
(NAICS 32511) derived from petroleum, or from petroleum and natural gas 
liquids, into petrochemicals. 
Other Basic Chemical Establishments primarily engaged in converting 
Manufacturing (NAICS 32519) petrochemicals into other basic chemicals. 
Resin, Synthetic Rubber, and Establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing 
Artificial and Synthetic Fibres and polymers such as resins, synthetic rubber, and textile fibres 
Filaments Manufacturing and filaments. Polymerisation of monomers into polymers, 
(NAICS 3252) for example of styrene into polystyrene, is the basic process. 
7.2.3 Data analysis and discussion 
After many follow-up phone calls and emails, a total 177 questionnaires were returned 
from the 270 sent out, representing a response of 65.6%. 15 questionnaires were 
eliminated due to missing data or invalid answers, leaving a final sample size of 162. 
Therefore, the valid response was 60%. 
7.2.3.1 Section A analysis: classification of respondents 
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(1) Respondent profile 
The valid number of respondents involved in the survey was 162. The classification of 
respondents into position, organisation type and working experience is detailed in Table 
7.2. Respondents were categorised into three groups, namely, safety manager (SM), line 
supervisor (LS) and operator (OP). There were 79 safety manager respondents, 44 line 
supervisor respondents and 39 operator respondents. Figure 7.1 shows that the safety 
manager group provided the greatest response of 87.8%. The main reason for this great 
response was, that following the mailing of questionnaires, the local Safety Authorities 
assisted the researcher by making follow-up phone calls to all the target safety 
managers to confirm that the questionnaire had been received as well as to explain the 
survey objectives. 
Table 7.2 Classification of respondents 
Position Plant type Experience 
Safety manager Upstream (5) Less than 2 years (0) Midstream (46) 2 to 1 0 years (22) (79) Downstream (28) More than 10 years (57) 
Line supervisor Upstream (4) Less than 2 years (0) Midstream (20) 2 to IOyears (9) (44) Downstream (20) More than 10 years (35) 
Upstream (4) Less than 2 years (3) 
Operator (39) Midstream (20) 2 toIOyears (21) 
Downstream (15) More than 10 years (15) 
Less than 2 years (3) 
All (162) NA 2 to 1 Oyears (52) 
More than 10 years (107) 
Number in 0 means the number of respondents 
The respondents experience in the petrochemical industry was grouped into three 
categories: Group 1 represents the respondents' experience from 0 to 2 years; group 2 
from 2 to 10 years; and group 3 were the respondents with more than 10 years 
experience. The experience of all the respondents, in the petrochemical industry is 
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detailed in Figure 7.2. In addition, the experience of the respondents from the safety 
manager group only is also detailed in Figure 7.3. 
l00%~------------------------------~ 
80% 
60% 
40% 
20% 
0% 
operator line supervisor safety manager 
Figure 7.1 Response rate 
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Figure 7.2 All respondents experience profile 
Figure 7.2 clearly indicates that the majority of the respondents were very experienced 
personnel with 66% of the respondents having over 10 years of experience. This is a 
good figure to highlight the quality of the respondents who are very experienced in their 
field of work. 
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Figure 7.3 Experience profile of Safety Manager 
Figure 7.3 shows that the respondents in safety manager group had even greater 
experience in the petrochemical industry with 72% of them having over 10 years of 
experience, and with none having less than 2 years of experience. 
(2) Company profile 
As mentioned above, the questionnaire targeted all petrochemical plants in Taiwan, 
which are 90 in total. The company profile has been assessed according to the responses 
of the safety manager group, because of the high response from that group (87.8%) and 
the fact that each plant has only one safety manager. This is shown in Figure 7.4. 
Figure 7.4 Company profile 
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Figure 7.4 clearly indicates that the majority of the companies in the petrochemical 
industry in Taiwan are midstream plants (59%), followed by downstream plants (35%), 
with only 6% of the plants being categorised as upstream. This fits the statistical data 
from the Bureau oflndustrial Development of Taiwan. 
30-99 
23% 
0-29 
--= ........ 500+ 
27% 
Figure 7.5 Company size (employees number) 
Figure 7.5 shows the number of employees for the surveyed plants. The majority of the 
plants were large with 27% the plants having over 500 employees, and 49% of the 
plants having employees in between 100 to 499. This is a good figure to highlight that 
most surveyed plants are related large organisations. 
Similarly to the Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) regulations in the UK, 
Taiwan's Labour Inspection Law requires every hazardous site to submit a safety report 
to the Safety Authority. The hazardous site can only operate after obtaining a formal 
permit from the authority. Figure 7.6 reveals that 80% of the surveyed organisations 
have at least one hazardous site. This confirms that most surveyed organisations are 
responsible for the management of a major hazard site and demonstrates that the local 
safety authority is extremely concerned with safety in the petrochemical industry. 
For businesses, the widespread adoption oflnternational Standards means that suppliers 
can base the development of their products and services on specifications that have 
wide acceptance in their sectors. This, in turn, means that businesses using International 
Standards are increasingly free to compete in markets around the world. ISO 
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(International Organisation for Standardization) 9000 has become an international 
reference for quality management requirements in business-to-business dealings, and 
ISO 14000 is well on the way to achieving as much, in enabling organisations to meet 
their environmental challenges. Therefore, most international companies prefer being 
approved and certificated under popular international standards. Figure 7.7 shows that 
most surveyed plants follow the ISO Standards on Quality and Environmental 
Management. 92% of plants receive ISO 9000 certification and 71 % of them receive 
ISO 14000 certification, but only 23% of plants receive the OHSAS 18001 
(Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series 18001) certification. 
57% 
I:J 0 hazardous site 
.1 hazardous site 
01+ hazardous sites 
Figure 7.6 Percentage of number of hazardous sites 
100% 92% 
ISO 9000 ISO 14000 OHSAS 18001 others None 
Certification Type 
Figure 7.7 Certifications 
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7.2.3.2 Section B analysis: current SIM practices 
This section focuses on the investigation of current SIM practices in order to provide 
information about the approach adopted, types of system applied, frequency of 
assessment and other valuable information from existing SIM performance self-
assessment. 
(l) General profile 
Figure 7.8 indicates that 83% of surveyed plants have adopted a 'part computerised' 
SIM system. Only 8% of surveyed plants use an entirely 'Manual' system. It shows that 
most of the petrochemical plants in Taiwan rely more on computerised systems for SIM 
activities. 
Fully 
Computersied 
9% 
Part 
Computersied 
83% 
contractor 
27% 
comnerical 
package 
22% 
Figure 7.8 SIM basic type 
Mamual 
8% 
self-developed 
51% 
Figure 7.9 Types of computerised SIM system 
Figure 7.9 shows that over 51 % of surveyed plants developed their SIM systems 
themselves, 27% of them used a software contractor to develop a personalised SIM 
system and 25% of them purchase a commercial package. This indicates that 
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commercial packages may not provide an appropriate SIM system, in the opinion of 
Taiwan's petrochemical industry. 
NO 
48% 
Figure 7.10 Evaluating SIM? 
YES 
52% 
Figure 7.10 shows that 52% of surveyed plants evaluated their SIM's performance but 
48% of them did not. This indicates that the concept of SIM performance is not well 
recognised by the industry. The 52% of surveyed plants in Figure 5.10 relates to 41 
plants in total. Figure 7.11 shows the methods adopted to evaluate SIM in these 41 
plants. The most popular is the Checklist method, being used by 71 % ofthe plants. The 
second most popular method is Internal Audit, being used by 62.9% of the plants. There 
are followed by Document Review and External Audit, being used by 57.1 % and 51 % 
of the plants, respectively. However, over 65.7% of these 41 plants reflected that the 
methods adopted for evaluating SIM performance are only slightly reliable or unreliable 
(see Figure 7.12). 
% 
100~------------------------------------------~ 
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60 
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Figure 7.11 Methods used to evaluate SIM of 35 factories 
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Figure 7.12 Reliability of SIM evaluation methods 
Figure 7.13 shows the respondents' opinion on the importance of SIM. Each respondent 
was required to mark the level of importance of each indicator on a five-point Likert 
scale, from 'not important' at the one extreme to 'very important' at the other. Most 
respondents were of the opinion that SIM is important (3) to absolutely important (5). 
For all respondents, the average value of SIM importance is 4.14. The average values 
from the three response groups are similarly high, which are 4.28, 4.19 and 4.04 for 
safety managers, line supervisors and operators, respectively. It shows the strongly 
agreement on the SIM importance between these groups. 
60%~------------------------------------~ 
40% 
20% 
0.6% 
0% +-------4-----~~-
not important less important important 
44.4% 
very important absolutely 
important 
Figure 7.13 SIM importance in the opinion of the respondents 
(2) Respondents' opinion on current SIM system 
The second part of section B discusses the findings with respect to the respondents' 
opinions on the SIM systems currently in use. The respondents were required to 
consider each ofthe 25 Performance Factors on a five-point Likert scale, from 'strongly 
disagree' at the lower end and to 'strongly agree' at the upper other. Table 7.3 shows 
the survey results. In the table, both the mean and ranking for each group and all 
respondents have been calculated. For all 162 valid responses, the average score of all 
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Performance Factors is 3.31, revealing a positive view on the current SIM practices. 
However, the score 3.31 is only just greater than '3.0-slightly agree' which indicates 
that respondents do not think that the current SIM practices are entirely effective. 
Moreover, the average score of the operator group, 3.15, is lower than the ones of the 
safety manager group (3.34) and the line supervisor group (3.40). This comparison 
indicates that most respondents in the operator group are either less satisfied or 
unfamiliar with current SIM practices. 
Table 7.3 Mean and ranking of performance factors (current practice) 
Performance Factors SM SM LS LS OP OP All AI~ mean Ranking mean Ranking mean Ranking mean Ranking 
IPl planmng 3.61 6 3.50 11.5 3.31 10.5 3.51 8 
1P2orgamsatlOn __ & 
responsibility 3.43 11 3.66 8.5 3.41 6 3.49 9 
1P3 comply safety policy 3.70 4 3.80 4.5 3.59 2 3.70 4 
1P4 HQ support 3.75 2 4.05 1 3.41 6 3.75 2 
IP5 audIt SIM 2_82 24 2.77 24 2.72 22 2.78 23 
IP6 good ex-relatIonshIp 2.85 23 2.80 23 2.54 25 2.76 24 
IP7 process knowledge 3.32 14 3.66 8.5 3.33 9 3.41 12 
!p8 process hazard analYSIS 3.47 9.5 3.75 6 3.38 8 3.52 7 
P9 operatIon procedures 3.80 1 3.84 3 3.64 1 3.77 1 
IPlO mternal/external 3.23 17 3.43 13 2.97 18 3.22 16 incident 
IPll unnecessary 
information· 3.23 17 3.02 21 3.03 16.5 3.12 18 
1P12 up-to-date mtormatlOn 3.29 15 3.11 19.5 2.67 24 3.09 20 
IP 13 external message 3.23 17 3.11 19.5 2.82 20 3.10 19 
IP 14 more sately 3.73 3 3.89 2 3.51 3 3.72 3 
p 15 tramed to use 3.59 7 3.80 4.5 3.31 10.5 3.58 6 
P 16 reduced mtormatlOn 3.49 8 3.55 10 3.28 12 3.46 10.5 load 
P 17 on tIme satety 
information 3.42 12 3.34 15 3.03 16.5 3.30 13.5 
P18leammg & mnovatlOn 3.68 5 3.68 7 3.44 4 3.62 5 
P19 unsatlstied· 3.05 21 3.18 17 2.77 21 2.98 21 
P20 easy to use 3.47 9.5 3.50 11.5 3.41 6 3.46 10.5 
P21 exchangmg channels 2.91 22 2.98 22 2.85 19 2.91 22 
IP22 generate reports 2.63 25 2.75 25 2.69 23 2.68 25 
IP23 secunty 3.18 19.5 3.34 15 3.21 13 3.23 15 
1P24 dispOSItIon 3.18 19.5 3.16 18 3.18 14 3.17 17 
IP25 support person 3.34 13 3.34 15 3.15 15 3.30 13.5 
TOTAL 3.34 NA 3.40 NA 3.15 NA 3.31 NA 
In the Table 7.3, the factors with the "*,, symbol were designed as reverse items. The 
scores for these factors in the table have been adjusted so as to be positive. 
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The top five ranked perfonnance factors with their means are listed as follows: 
• P9-it provides most operation procedures required (3.77) 
• P4-it is highly supported by headquarters (3.75) 
• Pl4-it helps the work to be done more safely (3.72) 
• P3-it complies with the company's safety policy (3.70) 
• Pl8-it improves safety learning and innovation (3.62) 
These high ranked perfonnance factors reveal the truly positive perfonnance of the 
current practices. It shows most respondents agree that: most operation procedures have 
been provided by their SIM systems; SIM activities have been well supported by 
Headquarters; SIM systems can improve safety at work; SIM systems comply with 
safety policy; and SIM can help employees acquire safety knowledge and improve 
safety learning. 
The last five ranked perfonnance factors with their means are listed as follows: 
• P22-it can help generate related report (2.68) 
• P6-it improves external relationships (2.76) 
• PS-it is audited frequently (2.78) 
• P21-it provides good communication channels for exchanging infonnation (2.91) 
• Pl9-most employees are satisfied with the SIM system (2.98) 
Each of these last five ranked perfonnance factors has a mean value under 3.0, which 
indicates negative perfonnance in the opinion of the respondents. It shows most 
respondents agreed that currently used SIM systems: do not provide a good function 
with regard to generating safety related reports; do not help in improving the 
relationship with the public and authorities; have not been audited frequently; the 
employees find it unsatisfactory. These low ranked factors indicate that from the users' 
viewpoint there are concerns and dissatisfactions. These results provide good directions 
upon which to base a further review for the currently used SIM systems. 
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(3) Correlation of groups' opinion 
Statistic textbooks often classify different strengths of correlation. The following 
general categories indicate a quick way of interpreting a calculated correlation value 
(Hinkle et al., 1988): 
0.0 to 0.2 - very weak to negligible correlation 
0.2 to 0.4 - weak, low correlation (not very significant) 
0.4 to 0.7 - moderate correlation 
0.7 to 0.9 - strong, high correlation 
0.9 to 1.0 - very strong correlation 
For the information given in Table 7.3, the Kendall's coefficient ('t) and the Pearson's 
Product-Moment Correlation coefficient (r) have been calculated using the SPSS to 
identify the degree of correlation between groups of respondents. All the values of t and 
r between all groups in the correlation analysis given in Table 7.4 were over 0.7, except 
the one t value for SM vs. OP which was 0.692. For example, to determine the 
correlation between the SM group and the LS group, the means of all the performance 
factors for the groups SM and LS are entered into the SPSS worksheet (see Figure 
7.14). The Pearson's Product-Moment Correlation coefficient (r) is calculated with the 
statistical significance value 0.01. Then the value of t for the SM group vs. the LS 
group, is obtained which is 0.920 (see Figure 7.14 & 7.15). Based on the criteria given 
above, the result shown in Table 7.4 indicates great agreement between the groups on 
their opinions of the current SIM practise in Taiwan's petrochemical industry. 
Table 7.4 Correlation test of performance factors 
Groups t (for ranking) r (for mean) 
SMvs.LS 0.782 0.920 
SMvs.OP 0.692 0.870 
LS vs. OP 0.735 0.900 
SMvs.ALL 0.867 0.977 
LSvs.ALL 0.860 0.970 
OPvs.ALL 0.806 0.941 
The correlation analysis is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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Figure 7.14 An example of using the SPSS for the correlation test 
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Figure 7.15 The result of a correlation test example 
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(4) Reliability 
The reliability of the survey for assessing current SIM practices was established in two 
ways. The first was the split-half technique which is a method of assessing the 
reliability of a scale by dividing into two the total set of measurement items and 
correlating the results, where a person's responses to one half of the survey (randomly 
selected) are correlated against their responses to the other half (Carmines & Zeller, 
1979). Therefore, the explanation of the result is based upon the criteria presented in the 
previous section. The results of the analysis gave reliability coefficients of about 0.8, 
indicating a strong high correlation (degree of reliability). The second way in which the 
reliability of the survey for assessing current SIM practices was established employed 
the Cronbach's alpha (a) value, which is a numerical coefficient of reliability, indicates 
the internal consistency of a model or survey. Values of alpha range from 0 to 1. An 
alpha greater than 0.7 is desirable for indices that are used as a scale (Kinnear & Gray, 
2000). Taking into account all 'Performance Factors', the a value is 0.92. This 
indicates again a high degree of reliability in the results of this way used to assessment 
of the performance factors. 
7.2.3.3 Section C analysis: perspectives and indicators· 
The most imperative component of Survey I was to gauge the opinions of industry 
professionals concerning the importance of the various SIM performance perspectives 
and their associated indicators. To facilitate the understanding of the performance 
evaluation concepts and the proposed BSC for SIM, questions were asked to determine 
the weighting of perspectives and the importance of indicators. The responses to these 
questions were used to validate the developed framework of SIM performance through 
statistical analysis. 
The first part of section C required respondents to rate the importance of the four SIM 
performance measurement perspectives of the BSC for SIM. It was essential that the 
sum of the four perspectives weight was 100% (see Table 7.5). For all respondents, the 
mean weighting of the four perspectives, in descending order, was operational, 
strategic, user orientation and technology. The results demonstrate that the respondents 
place most importance on the operational perspective. However, the other three 
perspectives have a weighting between 19-27%, indicating that all four perspectives are 
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essential for proper SIM performance measurement. If the situation had presented itself 
in which one of the four perspectives was substantially less than the remaining 
perspectives, then there may been a case to remove it from the framework. 
Table 7.5 Perspective weight 
Perspective 
Perspective weight (%) from each group 
SM LS OP ALL 
Strategic 27.0 27.5 23.5 26.3 
Operational 29.2 29.9 29.3 29.4 
User Orientation 23.5 23.1 27.6 24.4 
Technology 20.3 19.5 19.6 19.9 
The second part of section C required respondents to rate the importance of each 
performance indicator associated with each perspective by indicating the level of 
importance, on a five-point Likert scale. The scale used was: (1) Little Important; (2) 
Slightly Important; (3) Important; (4) Very Important; (5) Absolutely Important. The 
mean value and ranking of each performance indicator are detailed in Table 7.6 for each 
group of respondents. The mean values ranged from 2.91 for T7-Disposition, to 4.59 for 
S4-Leadership. The mean value for all indicators was 3.90, indicating that the 
respondents rated the indicators, on average, as very important. Only one value had a 
mean less than 3 (i.e. T7-Disposition). In Table 7.6, both the mean and ranking for each 
group and all respondents have been calculated. Moreover, the average score of the 
operator group, 3.80, is slightly lower than the ones of the safety manager group (3.91) 
and the line supervisor group (3.96). This comparison indicates that there is not a 
significant difference in the opinion of these three groups on the importance of all 
indicators. 
Leadership (with a value of 4.59) is considered to be the most important factor for SIM. 
It is not a surprise because leadership has been cited as a crucial element not only in 
safety programs but also in most management practices. Leadership is exhibited by 
senior management in setting clear policy and guidelines for performance, and for 
enhancing the value of the SIM ethic within the organisation. 
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Table 7.6 The survey results of industry's view on the importance of indicators 
SM Ranking LS Ranking OP Ranking Overall Ranking by 
Indicator mean bySM mean byLS mean byOP mean overall 
S I-Strategic planning 4.08 8 4.09 11.5 3.87 12.5 4.03 10 
S2-0rganisation & responsibilities 4.11 6.5 4.16 7 3.92 9 4.08 6 
S3-Acquisition 3.96 16.5 4.11 10 3.82 16.5 3.97 14.5 
S4-Leadership 4.70 1 4.59 1 4.36 1 4.59 1 
S5-Evaluation 4.11 6.5 4.16 7 3.82 16.5 4.06 8 
S6-Standardisation 4.01 13 4.02 13 3.77 19.5 3.96 16.5 
S7-Extemal relationship 3.41 27 3.64 25 3.26 27 3.43 27 
o I-Process knowledge 4.01 13 4.20 5 3.92 9 4.04 9 
02-Process Hazard Analysis 4.15 5 4.25 3 3.97 6.5 4.14 5 
03-0peration procedures 4.38 2 4.45 2 4.31 2 4.38 2 
04-Incidents reporting 4.22 3 4.14 9 4.03 4 4.15 3.5 
05-Permit to work 4.19 4 4.23 4 3.97 6.5 4.15 3.5 
06-Management of change 4.06 9 4.00 14 3.90 11 4.01 12 
07-Emergency response 4.00 15 4.09 11.5 4.00 5 4.02 11 
08-Safety work practices 3.72 20.5 3.70 23.5 3.85 14.5 3.75 21 
U1-User awareness 3.96 16.5 3.82 21 3.85 14.5 3.90 18 
U2-User training & support 3.87 18 3.93 17 3.87 12.5 3.89 19 
U3-User competence 3.76 19 3.98 15 3.77 19.5 3.82 20 
U4-Information behaviours 4.01 13 4.16 7 4.10 3 4.07 7 
U5-System utilisation 3.72 20.5 3.70 23.5 3.56 23 3.68 13 
U6-User satisfaction 3.63 24 3.77 22 3.58 21.5 3.66 24 
ifl-SIM tools 4.03 11 3.91 18.5 3.92 9 3.97 14.5 
[f2-Technology integration 4.04 10 3.95 16 3.79 18 3.96 16.5 
1r3-Security 3.67 23 3.86 20 3.54 24.5 3.69 23 
1r4-Privacy 3.57 25 3.61 26 3.59 21.5 3.59 25 
1T5-Work continuity 3.71 22 3.91 18.5 3.54 24.5 3.72 22 
1r6-Maintenance and preservation 3.53 26 3.48 27 3.49 26 3.51 26 
1r7-Disposition 2.94 28 2.89 28 2.90 28 2.91 28 
Average 3.91 NA 3.96 NA 3.80 NA 3.90 NA 
(SM: safety manager group, LS: line supervisor group, OP: operator group) 
Operation procedures (with a value of 4.38) has the second highest rank of all 
indicators. Operation procedures are designated to cover all aspects of operation and 
ensure reliable, efficient and safe operation of the plant. There is no question that 
operation procedures are necessary for the various modes of process operation to ensure 
continuous, efficient, and safe operation of a facility. 
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Incident reporting/investigation (with a value of 4.15) is also placed as a highly 
important indicator. Proper procedure and documentation of incident investigation 
provides the basis for corrective actions leading to improvements in the organisation's 
safety management program. 
Permit to work has the same mean as incident reporting/investigation (with a value of 
4.15). A permit to work system is required to ensure that affected parties are made 
aware that non-routine work is being performed and to ensure that appropriate safety 
precautions are taken prior to the work. There are many examples where inadequate 
permit to work systems have failed to prevent accidents. Safety standards and 
regulations require the adoption of safety work permit systems. Comprehensive and 
clear documentation is necessary to ensure that such systems are in place and effective. 
Disposition has the lowest mean (with a value of 2.91). This shows that relatively less 
importance is placed on dealing with the maintenance and availability of safety 
information over an extended period. 'Disposition' is one of the information life cycle 
elements ensuring the continued availability of still-useful safety information. The main 
reason for the lack of priority given to this indicator is that it is believed that modem IT 
tools can provide huge storage capacity with low costs enabling all information to be 
retained and made available. 
Although 'External relationship' is the second lowest indicator, the mean value of 3.43 
shows it is still important. The survey data shows that some respondents are not 
comfortable in providing safety information to the public due to confidential reasons. 
However, the right to know of the public and the authorities on safety and health issue 
is the trend of new safety legislation. Good SIM performance must provide a 
mechanism to share information and facilitate partnership with external organisations. 
7.2.3.4 Correlation of the groups' opinions on indicators 
Analysis of variance (ANOV A) approach was adopted to test whether the mean values 
of each item were equal for each group of respondents: safety manager; line supervisor; 
and operator. This helped clarifying whether or not the opinions of these three groups 
were similar for the 28 indicators dealt with in the survey. The results detailed in Table 
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7.6 suggest a consensus between the three groups in relation to all indicators covere din 
the survey. 
respondents 
Furthermore, within the mean and ranking for the three groups 
and for the respondents overall, the Kendall's coefficient (t) and 
of 
the 
Pearson's Product- Moment Correlation coefficient (r) have been calculated for e ach 
nd r pairing of the groups of respondents (see Table 7.7 and 7.8). All the values of t a 
are greater than 0.7, except the value of t for SM vs. OP which is 0.659. As descri bed 
by Hinkle et al. (1988), a value of 0.7 and above for correlation coefficient indic ates 
great agreement among the groups on the importance of the indicators. 
Table 7.7 Kendall's Correlation 't) for the rankin2 of all indicators 
Ranking by SM !Ranking by LS Ranking by OP Ranking by AL L 
lKendall's 't -b Ranking by SM 1.000 0.742 0.703 0.865 
Ranking by LS 0.742 1.000 0.659 0.784 
Ranking by OP 0.703 0.659 1.000 0.740 
Ranking by ALL 0.865 0.784 0.740 1.000 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Table 7.8 Pearson's Correlation (r) for the mean of all indicators 
SMMEAN LS MEAN OP MEAN ALL MEAN 
SM MEAN 1.000 0.945 0.944 0.992 
fLS MEAN 0.945 1.000 0.910 0.971 
pp MEAN 0.944 0.910 1.000 0.966 
~LL MEAN 0.992 0.971 0.966 1.000 
Correlation is significant at the om level (2-tailed) 
Moreover, considering the four perspectives separately, the correlation coefficie nts 
between groups have been calculated (see Table 7.9). Most of the values of each r 
and r are more than 0.7, indicating the great agreement among each pairing of gro ups 
on the importance of indicators in each perspective. However, the t value of o. 467 
indicates that the SM group and the LS group have low agreement on the importanc e of 
hat 
of 
indicators within the User Orientation Perspective. The t value of 0.500 indicates t 
the SM group and the OP group have slightly different opinions on the importance 
indicators within the User Orientation Perspective. These values show that so me 
indicators, i.e. user awareness, need further refining. 
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Table 7.9 Correlation analysis for the ranking of indicators 
Strategic perspective 
Indicator SM LS OP Rmking Ranking Rmking rs 't r 
mean mean mean IbySM Iby LS Iby OP 
SI Strategic planning 4.08 4.09 3.87 4 5 3 SMvs.LS SMvs.LS SMvs.LS 
S2 Organisation! 4.11 4.16 3.92 2 3 2 0.857 0.714 0.989 
responsibilities 
S3 Acquisition 3.96 4.11 3.82 6 4 4 SMvs.OP SMvs.OP SMvs.OP 
S4 Leadership 4.70 4.59 4.36 
0.821 0.714 0.991 
1 1 1 
S5 Evaluation 4.11 4.16 3.82 3 2 5 LS vs.OP LS vs.OP LS vs.OP 
S6 Standardisation 4.01 4.02 3.77 5 6 6 0.750 0.619 0.990 
S7 External relationship 3.41 3.64 3.26 7 7 7 
Operational Perspective 
Indicator SM LS OP Rmking Ranking Rmking rs 't r 
mean mean mean bySM Iby LS Iby OP 
01 Process knowledge 4.01 4.20 3.92 6 4 6 SMvs.LS SMvs.LS SM 
02PHA 4.15 4.25 3.97 4 2 5 0.738 0.571 vs.LS 
03 Operation procedures 4.38 4.45 4.30 1 1 1 
0.910 
SMvs.OP SM 
04 Incidents reporting 4.22 4.14 4.03 2 5 2 0.738 vs.OP SM 
05 Permit to work 4.19 4.23 3.97 3 3 4 0.643 vs.OP 
06MOC 4.06 4.00 3.90 5 7 7 LS/OP 0.808 
07 Emergency response 4.00 4.09 4.00 7 6 3 
0.619 LS/OP 
0.500 LS/OP 
08 Safety work practices 3.72 3.70 3.85 8 8 8 0.772 
User Orientation Perspective 
Indicator SM LS OP Rmking Ranking Rmking rs 't r 
mean mean mean IbySM byLS Iby OP 
Ul User awareness 3.96 3.82 3.85 2 4 2 SMvs.LS SMvs.LS SMvs.LS 
U2 User training & support 3.87 3.93 3.87 3 3 3 0.714 0.467 0.665 
U3 User competence 3.76 3.98 3.78 4 2 4 SMvs.OP SMvs.OP SMvs.OP 
U4 Information behaviours 4.01 4.16 4.10 1 1 1 0.943 0.867 0.907 
U5 System utilisation 3.72 3.70 3.56 5 6 6 LS vs.OP LS vs.OP LS vs.OP 0.711 0.600 0.902 
U6 User satisfaction 3.63 3.77 3.59 6 5 5 
Technology perspective 
Tl Indicator SM LS OP Rmking Ranking Rmking rs 't r 
mean mean mean IbySM Iby LS Iby OP 
T2 SIMtools 4.03 3.91 3.92 2 3 1 SMvs.LS SMvs.LS SMvs.LS 
T3 Technology integration 4.04 3.95 3.79 1 1 2 0.964 0.905 0.927 
T4 Security 3.67 3.86 3.54 4 4 5 SMvs.OP SMvs.OP SMvs.OP 0.857 0.714 0.966 
T5 Privacy 3.57 3.61 3.59 5 5 3 
T6 Work continuity 3.71 3.91 3.54 3 2 4 LS vs.OP LS vs.OP LS vs.OP 
T7 Maintenance and 3.53 3.48 3.49 6 6 6 0.750 0.619 0.901 
preservation 
T8 Disposition 3.04 2.92 2.90 7 7 7 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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7.2.3.5 Item analysis and reliability 
For the purpose of increasing the internal consistency of the survey (raise the 
reliability), Item Analysis was carried out to determine which indicators ought to be 
kept and which should be removed. This study used two approaches to carry out the 
Item Analysis. The first was 'corrected item-total correlation', in which the correlation 
is determined between the respective indicator and the total score for all the other 
indicators. If the correlation is low, it means that the indicator isn't really assisting in the 
measurement of what is trying to be measured. If the correlation is lower than 0.3, 
indicating little or no association (Diamantopoulos & Schlegelmilch, 1997), the 
indicator should be removed as suggested by Wu & Lee (2003). The results show no 
correlation values below 0.3. The second approach was 'Alpha if indicator deleted'. In 
this approach, a measure of the reliability of a respective indicator was obtained by 
determining the Cronbach's alpha (a) of the indicator set if the indicator under 
examination was deleted. Since the 'Alpha if indicator deleted' values vary among these 
indicators by only less than 0.01, and since the reliability remained strong in each 
instance, no indicator should be deleted from the set. Cronbach's alpha (a.) analysis was 
also performed on the total data set to provide a measure of reliability. The total a. is 
0.9268, demonstrating consistency in the survey responses. 
Table 7.10 Reliability Coefficients 
No Indicators Corrected item-total correlation Cl ifitem deleted 
SPI Strategic planning 0.5873 0.9220 
SP2 Organisation and responsibilities 0.5790 0.9221 
SP3 Acquisition 0.5204 0.9230 
SP4 Leadership 0.4242 0.9242 
SP5 Evaluation 0.4778 0.9236 
SP6 Standardisation 0.5952 0.9218 
SP7 External relationship 0.3983 0.9254 
OPI Process knowledge 0.5551 0.9225 
OP2 Process Hazard Analysis 0.5667 0.9222 
OP3 Operation procedures 0.5522 0.9225 
OP4 Incidents reporting 0.5977 0.9218 
OP5 Permit to work 0.6501 0.9210 
OP6 Management of change 0.6766 0.9207 
OP7 Emergency response 0.4813 0.9235 
OP8 Safety. work practices 0.5344 0.9227 
UPI User awareness 0.4490 0.9239 
UP2 User training & support 0.5636 0.9225 
UP3 User competence 0.3872 0.9246 
UP4 Information behaviours 0.3135 0.9265 
UP5 System utilisation 0.5818 0.9222 
UP6 User satisfaction 0.5786 0.9223 
TPI SIMtools 0.6094 0.9218 
TP2 Technology integration 0.5004 0.9232 
TP3 Security 0.6304 0.9212 
TP4 PRIVACY 0.5523 0.9225 
TP5 Work continuity 0.6503 0.9209 
TP6 Maintenance and preservation 0.5606 0.9223 
TP7 Disposition 0.4452 0.9239 
PS: N of Cases = 162; N ofItems = 28; Alpha (a)= 0.9253; Standard item alpha (a,n)= 0.9268 
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7.2.3.6 Estimating the truth of 'Importance' 
This section aims to measure the truth concerning the degree of importance placed on 
each indicator. The analysis identified weights for each indicator, achieved by adopting 
the fuzzy majority approach as explained in Section 6.4. To obtain the answers, the 
following steps were adopted: 
• Identify intrinsic properties 
• Determine the linguistic variables 
• Determine the domain of the fuzzy variables 
• Calculating the truth of linguistic quantified statements 
• Calculating the fuzzy logic based calculus of linguistically quantified propositions 
(1) Identify intrinsic properties 
A fuzzy set has several intrinsic properties that affect the way the set is used how it 
participates within a model. To develop the linguistic quantifier, the following were 
assumed: 
Q= 'most' 
y = (indicators) 
F = (important) 
(2) Determine the linguistic variables 
(7.1) 
(7.2) 
(7.3) 
The fuzzy modelling technique revolves around the idea of a linguistic variable. At its 
root, a linguistic variable is the name of a fuzzy set. The linguistic variable used for this 
exercise is "Importance". The fuzzy qualifiers are as follows: 
Absolutely Important (AI) 
Very Important (VI) 
Important (I) 
Slightly Important (SI) 
Little Important (LI) 
Each question in this section is a manifestation of a criterion of concern in evaluating a 
proposal. Each question - 'How important is the indicator to this perspective?' will be 
given an answer according to the following scale: 
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Absolutely Important (AI) 
Very Important (VI) 
Important (I) 
Slightly Important (SI) 
Little Important (LI) 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
(3) Determine the domain of the fuzzyvariables 
Data Collection and Analysis 
The total allowable universe of a value is called the domain of a fuzzy set which can be 
both positive and negative. For this exercise the domain is positive and is defined as in 
Table 7.11. 
Table 7.11 Domain of a fuzzy set 
Fuzzy linguistic variables Range Mean 
Absolutely important (AI) 0.7-1.0 0.9 
Very important (VI) 0.5-0.9 0.7 
Important (I) 0.3-0.7 0.5 
Slightly important (SI) 0.1-0.5 0.3 
Little important (LI) 0.0-0.3 0.1 
The domain takes the range from 0 to 1. This arbitrary value can be provided by the 
decision-maker or the expert themselves. For this exercise, the value is provided by the 
decision-maker since there are 28 indicators to answer. The task of asking the evaluator 
(expert/respondent) to provide the range would prove too complicated not to mention 
risking putting them off responding by consuming too much of their time. The 
possibility of having too many ranges which were not within the expected range, further 
proves to be too complex to handle. Furthermore, membership functions of fuzzy sets 
can assume different shapes, but for the sake of simplicity and ease of computation, 
triangular shapes are used most often (Kllir & Yuan, 1995). For these reasons, the 
shape, range and mean of the fuzzy set for this research were determined as shown in 
Figure 7.16, which is based on Abdul Majid's study (1997). The apex of the triangle 
represents the mean of the ranges of values. 
The range used is 0.4 for the intermediate membership functions and 0.3 for the two 
extremes. The use of the above scale provides a natural ordering that Sj>Sj if i>j. 
Essentially, the scale is ordered linearly implying that one level of importance is better 
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than another. The scale does not impose undue burden on the evaluator and respondents 
will only circle the appropriate importance to each indicator. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 
1.0_~ ... ! 
0.5 
o 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
Figure 7.16 Membership function for fuzzy variables "Importance" 
(4) Calculating the truth of linguistic quantified statements 
The next step is calculating the statement that (Qy's are F) knowing truth (y is F), Vy E 
Y (Vy = universal quantifier for all y). Based on Zadeh's calculus (since it is simple 
and more transparent), the degree of importance for each indicator is determined as 
shown in the example given below for the 'Strategic Perspective'. First, the frequency 
of ranking given by all the respondents for the Strategic Perspective is listed as shown 
in Table 7.12: 
Table 7.12 Frequency ranking by respondents - results of Survey I 
Indicators of Strategic Perspective Rank LI SI I VI 
SI Strategic planning 0 4 26 93 
S2 Organisation and responsibilities 0 3 24 92 
S3 Acquisition 1 3 37 80 
S4 Leadership 0 1 10 44 
S5 Evaluation 0 2 34 79 
S6 Standardisation 0 3 38 84 
S7 External relationship 5 17 57 69 
Then, calculate the degree of membership (I) for each of the indicators 
• Strategic planning (lSI) 
AI 
39 
43 
41 
107 
47 
37 
14 
= {(39xO.9) + (93xO.7) + (26xO.5) + (4x0.3) + (Ox0.1)}/162 = 0.71 
• Organisation and responsibilities (lS2) 
= {(43xO.9) + (92xO.7) + (24xO.5) + (3x0.3) + (Ox0.1)}/162 = 0.72 
• Acquisition (ls3) 
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= {(41xO.9) + (80xO.7) + (37xO.5) + (3x0.3) + (lx0.1)}/162 = 0.70 
• Leadership (IS4) 
= {(1070.9) + (44xO.7) + (lOxO.5) + (lxO.3) + (Ox0.1)}/162 = 0.82 
• Evaluation (IS5) 
= {(47xO.9) + (79xO.7) + (34xO.5) + (2x0.3) + (Ox0.1)}/162 = 0.71 
• Standardisation (Is6) 
= {(37xO.9) + (84xO.7) + (38xO.5) + (3xO.3) + (Ox0.1)}/162 = 0.69 
• Standardisation (Is7) 
= {(l4xO.9) + (69xO.7) + (57xO.5) + (l7xO.3) + (5x0.1)}l162 = 0.59 
The same calculation process is carried out for the remaining 21 indicators. Table 7.13 
shows the end results as calculated for all 28 indicators. 
Table 7.13 The degree of membership (I) for the indicators 
Perspective Indicator I (degree of importance) 
Strategic S 1- Strategic planning 0.71 
S2- Organisation and responsibilities 0.72 
S3- Acquisition 0.70 
S4- Leadership 0.82 
S5- Evaluation 0.71 
S6- Standardisation 0.69 
S7- External relationship 0.59 
Operational 01- Process knowledge 0.71 
02- Process hazard Analvsis 0.73 
03- Operation procedures 0.78 
04- Incidents reporting 0.73 
05- Permit to work 0.73 
06- Management of change 0.70 
07- Emergency response 0.70 
08- Safety work practices 0.65 
User Ul- User awareness 0.68 
Orientation U2- User training & support 0.68 
U3- User competence 0.66 
U4- Information behaviours 0.73 
U5- System utilisation 0.64 
U6- User satisfaction 0.63 
Technology Tl- SIM tools 0.69 
T2- Technology integration 0.69 
T3- Security 0.64 
T4- Privacy 0.62 
T5- Work continuity 0.64 
T6- Maintenance and preservation 0.60 
T7- Disposition 0.48 
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The degree of membership (from Table 7.13) reveals the membership value for each 
indicator. Based on Table 7.13, using the Strategic perspective, the lowest and the 
highest membership in the group (I), the results can be interpreted as follows: 
o 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
Figure 7.17 Example of membership function for Is7 and ~for fuzzy variable ''Importance'' 
From Figure 7.17, where IS7 the mean score is 0.59, its membership in the fuzzy set is 
xl and x2. This means S7 has a low membership for the 'Very Important' group - xl, 
but a high membership for the 'Important' group - x2. This indicator falls between 
'Important' and 'Very Important'. The degree of membership determines how strong 
the level of importance is. For the case of Is4, a mean score of 0.82 is obtained and the 
same principle is applied. The degree of membership is low for 'Very Important'-yl, 
but high for the 'Absolutely Important' - y2. This means that it can be categorised as 
between 'very important' and 'absolutely important'. In a sense the degree of 
membership in a fuzzy set can be viewed as the level of compatibility between the 
response and level of importance. For each indicator, Figure 7.17 enables the group to 
be identified for which its degree of membership is high. 
(5) Calculation ofthe fuzzy logic based calculus of linguistically quantified propositions 
The weight of the perspective was calculated using the fuzzy logic based calculus of 
linguistically quantified propositions. The following example for the calculation of the 
weight for the 'Strategic perspective' is explained. 
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Property F is defined as a fuzzy set in Y, thus 
Y = {SI, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, S7} 
F= {IMPORTANT} 
= 0.711 S1+0.721 S2 +0.701 S3+0.821 S4+0.711 S5+0.691 S6+0.59/S7, 
which means that indicator SI is important to degree 0.71; S2 is important to degree 
0.72; S3 is important to degree 0.70; S4 is important to degree 0.82; S5 is important 
to degree 0.71; S6 is important to degree 0.69 and; S7 is important to degree 0.59. 
The value oftruth (Qy's are F) is determined as follows: 
rp= :LCount{F) = :LCount(F) =!tJl (y) 2: Count{Y) p P ;=\ F I 
rp = 117 (0.71 + 0.72 + 0.70 + 0.82 + 0.71 + 0.69+0.59) = 0.70 
Truth (0' 's are F)= J1Q (lfJ)= JI'most' (rp) = JI'most' (0.70) 
(8.4) 
The result JI'most' (0.70) indicates that the degree of truth that all 7 indicators are 
important to the 'Strategic perspective' is 0.70. Based on Table 7.11, this means that it 
falls within the 'very important' to 'absolutely important' category. The next step is to 
measure the quantifier 'most'. Here the Q = 'most' is defined according to Zadeh's 
definition as explained in Section 6.4.2 and is as follows: 
p'mm" (rp) ~{~rp-O'6 for rp 2: 0.8 for 0.3< rp <0.8 
for lfJ ~ 0.3 
Therefore, the value of truth for the 'Strategic perspective' is 
JI'most'(rp) = 2lfJ-0.6 = (2 x 0.70) -0.6 = 0.80 
(8.5) 
This means that the degree that 'most' indicators are important to Strategic perspective 
is 80%. In other words, for this perspective, 80% was obtained to achieve the linguistic 
quantifier 'most' . 
The above analysis has enabled the degree of truth concerning the importance of 
indicators for each perspective to be determined in Table 7.14. This will also constitute 
the weight used for each perspective in the survey. 
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Table 7.14 Linguistically quantified propositions and weight of perspective 
Perspective ffJ )l'most' (f/J) weight 
Strategic 0.70 0.80 27.6% 
Operational 0.72 0.84 29.0% 
User Orientation 0.67 0.74 25.5% 
Technology 0.56 0.52 17.9% 
Sum NA 2.90 100% 
7.2.3.7 Establish weights for perspectives and indicators 
The relative weight of SIM performance perspectives is the mean weight established 
from the Survey I. From the results of above sections (Section 7.2.3.3 and 7.2.3.5), the 
weight of each perspective has been calculated using two methods, namely, direct 
survey and fuzzy majority. The results show the same ranking order and have a high 
correlation coefficient value (pearson's product-moment coefficient r = 0.95) indicating 
that the two sets of perspective weights are in good agreement (see Table 7.15). The 
weights calculated from the values given by the respondents of Survey I reflect directly 
the personnel opinions of the respondents whereas the weights determined using the 
fuzzy majority approach was the weight of each perspective obtained by calculating the 
importance of each indicator to the relevant mother factor (perspective). Consequently, 
the perspective weights determined using the more mathematical and less opinionated 
approach, fuzzy majority, was adopted in this research. 
The perspective weights derived by adopting the fuzzy majority approach were then 
used to derive the relative weights of the indicators (see Table 7.16). The relative 
weights of the indicators were calculated from the product of truth importance (I) value. 
For example for the indicator SI, Strategic planning, its relative weight was calculated 
by dividing its mean score (I) value from the survey by the summed value, i.e. 
0.7114.92=0.143, the same process was adopted for the remaining indicators. Finally, 
the Weight (w) of each indicator was calculated from the product of the relative weight 
of the indicator and the weight of its perspective to which it belongs. For example for 
the indicator SI, the product of 0.143 x 0.276 = 0.039. 
The ranking of the 28 indicators is detailed in Table 7.16. The highest ranked indicators 
are S4, Leadership, and U4, Information behaviours. The lowest ranked indicator is T7, 
Disposition. It is important to note that, even though User Orientation perspective had 
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six of the ten highest ranked indictors, it was the second lowest ranked perspective. It is 
also important to note that Technology perspective was the lowest ranked perspective. 
These suggest that the respondents see these perspectives as key enablers to achieving 
SIM performance improvement. However, their overall perception is that the majority 
of value generated from SIM is derived from the 'results driven' Operational 
perspective and Strategic perspective. 
a e . T bl 715 P erspec Ive welgl s f . ht 
Section B (direct survey) Section C (fuzzy majority) 
Perspective Weight(%) Rank Weight (%) Rank 
Strategic 26.3% 2 27.6% 2 
Operational 29.4% 1 29.0% 1 
User Orientation 24.4% 3 25.5% 3 
Technology 19.9% 4 17.9% 4 
a e . elgl o perspec Ives an T bl 7 16 W . ht f f d· d· t ID Ica ors 
Perspective with Indicator Mean I Relative Weight Rank 
weight weight (w) 
Strategic perspective S 1- Strategic planning 4.03 0.71 0.143 0.039 9 
(0.276) S2-_urganisation and responsibilities 4.08 0.72 0.145 0.040 6 
S3- Acquisition 3.97 0.69 0.141 0.039 9 
S4- Leadership 4.59 0.82 0.166 0.046 1 
S5- Evaluation 4.06 0.71 0.144 0.040 6 
S6- Standardisation 3.97 0.69 0.140 0.039 9 
S7- External relationship 3.43 0.59 0.119 0.033 20 
SUM NA 4.92 1.000 0.275 NA 
Operational 01- Process knowledge 4.04 0.71 0.124 0.036 17 
perspective (0.290) 02- Process hazard Analysis 4.14 0.73 0.127 0.037 14 
03- Operation procedures 4.38 0.78 0.136 0.039 9 
04- Incidents reporting 4.15 0.73 0.127 0.037 14 
05- Permit to work 4.15 0.73 0.127 0.037 14 
06- Management of change 4.01 0.70 0.122 0.035 19 
07- Emergency response 4.02 0.71 0.123 0.036 17 
08- Safety work practices 3.75 0.65 0.113 0.033 21 
SUM NA 5.73 1.000 0.290 NA 
User Orientation Ul- User awareness 3.90 0.68 0.169 0.043 3 
perspective U2- User training & support 3.89 0.68 0.169 0.043 3 
(0.255) U3- User competence 3.82 0.66 0.165 0.042 5 
U4- Information behaviours 4.07 0.73 0.182 0.046 1 
U5- System utilisation 3.68 0.64 0.158 0.040 6 
U6- User satisfaction 3.66 0.63 0.157 0.040 6 
SUM NA 4.02 1.000 0.255 NA 
Technology Tl- SIM tools 3.97 0.69 0.158 0.028 22 
perspective (0.179) Y2- Technology integration 3.96 0.69 0.158 0.028 22 
T3- Security 3.69 0.64 0.147 0.026 24 
T4- Privacy 3.59 0.62 0.142 0.025 26 
T5- Work continuity 3.72 0.64 0.147 0.026 24 
T6- Maintenance and preservation 3.51 0.60 0.138 0.025 26 
T7- Disposition 2.91 0.48 0.110 0.020 28 
SUM NA 4.36 1.000 0.179 NA 
169 
Chapter 7 Data Collection and Ana/ysis 
7.3 Survey 11- expert judgement on measures 
After identifying four perspectives and 28 indicators as well as their relative weights 
from Survey I, an extensive study was carried out to identify and list out the measures 
for each indicator. This task was managed through literature reviews, suggestion and 
existing management systems. Section 5.6.5 has presented the possible measures which 
includes 188 measures developing from the HS(G)65 and 94 measures collecting 
throughout CCPS's safety information categories. Table 7.17 lists the number of 
perspectives, indicators and measures developed for the experts in Survey 11 to evaluate. 
In order to determine the set of measures, a method was needed that would give reliable 
and fast answers. The method used knowledge elicitation techniques by experts in 
safety issues. This expert judgement approach is explained in Section 6.2.2. To avoid 
the prolonged process of evaluating each proposed measure, it was decided to employee 
the 94 measures from CCPS's safety information categories, but to evaluate the 188 
measures developing from the HS(G)65 structure under experts' judgement in Survey 
11. 
Table 7.17 Number of perspectives, indicators and measures 
Perspectives Indicators Measures 
Strategy 7 44 
Operational 8 62 (94) 
User Orientation 6 39 
System 7 42 
Total 28 188 (282) 
The numeral in () includes the measures from CCPS's safety information categories 
For this research the members of the Industrial Safety and Health Association of 
Taiwan were chosen. From the association a panel of 12 experts was assembled. The 
experts came from academic and industrial background, with strong interest in safety, 
including safety information issues. The experts are key safety personal representing 
their organisation in the area of safety. Therefore, there is no doubting their credibility 
in the area of safety. It is also assumed that the experts are those types of people whose 
views and experience of SIM would be worthy of consideration. Table 7.18 shows the 
list of experts and their affiliations. 
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Table 7.18 Expert List 
Name Organisation position 
H.C.Wu Institute of Occupational Safety and Health in Taiwan Senior 
Researcher 
DrY.C. Yu Institute of Occupational Safety and Health in Taiwan Senior 
Researcher 
HJ. Fuh Inspection Department, Labour Ministry of Taiwan Director 
W.Y. Haung Southern District Inspection Office, Council of Labour Affairs Section Chief 
DrT.C.Wu Department of industrial Safety and Health, Head & Vice 
Hungkuang University, Taiwan Professor 
P.G. Lee Independent consultant, trainer and educator Senior safety 
30-year experience on safety inspection auditor 
C.PWu Safety and Health Office, Mailiao Plant, Formosa Safety Manager 
Plastics Corp 
U.W.Chang DuPont Polyester, PuPont Far Eastern Petrochemicals Ltd. Senior Safety 
manager 
S.H. Liou Lin Yuan Petrochemical Plant, Chinese Petroleum Senior Safety 
Corporation Auditor 
W.H.Lin Kaohsiung Refinery, Chinese Petroleum Corporation HSE manager 
Grace Ho China Engineering Consultants, Inc. IS Engineer 
P.T. Che Labor Inspection Office, Taipei City Government, Section Chief 
Taiwan 
In this survey, the sample selected was a non-probability sample using quota sampling. 
Quota sampling is concerned with choosing a set of key informants- people who are 
knowledgeable about a particular subject or domain. This selection of people best 
represents the variation in domain of a culture (Black, 1999; Bernard, 2000). 
7.3.1 Questionnaire construction (Appendix D) 
In Survey n, a combination of closed and open-end questions was used. An open-ended 
approach was chosen to enable experts to put their comments about the indicators and 
measures concerned. The comments were important and were taken into consideration 
when developing the indicators and measures for this tool. The panel members were 
given an explanation of what each score meant. The five-point rating scale still applied 
in this survey and was selected based on a study by Adler (1996), in which he had used 
this rating to determine that only the important factors were chosen. The scale was as 
follows: 
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5 = very important 
4 = important 
3 = moderately important 
2 = slightly important 
1 = less important 
Data Collection and Analysis 
Although the experts were known, the questionnaire still includes the general 
information section (Section A) to ask experts to provide their personal data. Section B 
is similar with the section C in Survey I, requiring experts to rate SIM performance and 
the importance of each indicator. The aim of Section B is to compare the results 
obtained from Survey 11 with those from Survey I. Then, Section C requires experts to 
weight the measures, provide comments, suggest clarification, and argue in favour of or 
against an issue. 
7.3.2 Implementing Survey 11 
A briefing was carried out before distributing the questionnaire. The briefing explained 
the format of the questions and the expectations. All experts had agreed to participate. 
The 12 experts sacrificed significant time and effort to ensure that the important 
measures were identified. The experts provided a highly professional response despite 
length of the questionnaire and the time required for its completion. The participants 
were very helpful and provided good comments and feedback to the questionnaire 
which help to validate the performance framework as well as to identify adequate 
indicators and measures. 
7.3.3 Data analysis for Survey 11 
7.3.3.1 Section A: general information 
The 12 experts were from four types of organisation, 4 from the process industry, 3 
from research/academic institutes, 3 from safety authorities and 2 were consultants. All 
experts were highly experienced with an average of 15 years experience in safety 
related fields. The expertise of the participants includes safety management, safety 
performance measurement, safety audit and inspection, accident investigation, and 
IMlIT in the safety field. All experts believe that SIM is 'Very important' to 
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'Absolutely important' to an efficient safety management program, with a mean of 4.42 
in the five-point Likert scale. 
7.3.3.2 Section B - ranking perspectives and indicators 
Section B ascertained the opinions of experts as to the importance of the various SIM 
performance perspectives and their associated indicators. The content of this section is 
the same as the Section C of Survey L The first part of Section B requested experts to 
rate the importance of the four perspectives of the SIM. It was essential that the sum of 
the four perspectives weight was 100%. The mean weighting of the four perspectives, in 
descending order, was operational, strategic, user orientation and technology. The 
results indicate that experts place most importance on the operational and strategic 
perspectives. The other two perspectives have a weighting 20.8% and 18.8% 
respectively. 
The next task focused on a comparison of the results gathered from Survey I with those 
gathered from Survey 11. Table 7.19 shows the comparison of the results which 
indicates slightly different opinions on perspective weights between the two surveys but 
with same ranking. The Pearson correlation coefficients indicate the high agreement of 
two surveys. 
Table 7.19 Comparison of perspectives resulted from Survey I and Survey IT 
Perspective wei2ht from Survey I & IT 
Perspective Survey Le (Section C) ~urvey Ld (Section D) Survey 11 (Section B) 
(%) Rank (%) Rank (%) Rank 
Strategic 26.3 2 27.9 2 30.0 2 
Operational 29.4 1 28.8 1 30.4 1 
User Orientation 24.4 3 25.6 3 20.8 3 
Technology 19.9 4 17.7 4 18.8 4 
Pearson correlation= 0.891 (Lc vs. 11); = 0.925 (Lc vs Ld); = 0.847 (Ld vs. 11) 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
The next part of Section B, in the questionnaire, required experts to rate the importance 
of each performance indicator in association with the perspectives detailed above. The 
experts were required to mark the level of importance of each indicator, on a five-point 
Likert scale, ranging from: (1) Less Important; (2) Slightly Important; (3) Important; (4) 
Very Important; (5) Absolutely Important. The mean values for the 28 performance 
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indicators is 3.99 (see Table 7.20). The mean values ranged from 2.91 for 'External 
relationship' to 4.83 for 'Leadership' indicating that experts rated the indicators, on 
average, as very important. Table 7.20 also shows the mean value of each indicator 
with the ranking obtained from the results of Surveys I and n. Comparing the two set of 
data using correlation analysis shows the good agreement amongst the importance of 
indicators, indicating experts in Survey n have similar opinions on SIM indicators with 
respondents in Survey I. 
Table 7.20 The mean and ranking of indicators 
Indicators Survey I Ranking by Survey II Ranking by 
mean Survey I mean SurveyII 
S 1- Strategic planning 4.0300 10 4.2500 5 
S2- Organisation and responsibilities 4.0802 6 4.1667 9.5 
S3- Acquisition 3.9691 14.5 4.0833 14.5 
S4- Leadership 4.5864 1 4.8333 1 
S5- Evaluation 4.0556 8 4.0833 14.5 
S6- Standardisation 3.9568 16.5 3.9167 19.5 
S7- External relationship 3.4321 27 3.2500 28 
01- Process knowledge 4.0432 9 4.1667 9.5 
02- Process hazard Analysis 4.1358 5 4.2500 5 
03- Operation procedures 4.3827 2 4.5000 2 
94- Incidents reporting 4.1481 3.5 4.4167 3 
P5- Permit to work 4.1481 3.5 4.2500 5 
~6- Management of change 4.0062 12 4.1667 9.5 
P7- Emergency response 4.0247 11 4.1667 9.5 
P8- Safety work practices 3.7469 . 21 3.3333 26.5 
~1- User awareness 3.8951 18 3.6667 22 
~2- User training & support 3.8889 19 3.5833 23.5 
~3- User competence 3.8210 20 3.5833 23.5 
~4- Information behaviours 4.0741 7 4.0000 17 
~5- System utilisation 3.6790 13 4.1667 9.5 
~6- User satisfaction 3.6605 24 4.0833 14.5 
~1- SIM tools 3.9691 14.5 4.0833 14.5 
rr2- Technology integration 3.9568 16.5 4.1667 9.5 
~3- Security 3.6914 23 3.9167 19.5 
T4- Privacy 3.5864 25 3.3333 26.5 
T5- Work continuity 3.7222 22 3.9167 19.5 
T6- Maintenance and preservation 3.5062 26 3.9167 19.5 
T7- Disposition 2.9136 28 3.4167 25 
Average 3.8978 NA 3.9881 NA 
Correlations Kendall's 't = 0.716; Pearson Correlation (r)= 0.775 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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7.3.3.3 Section C - Ranking measures 
The objective of this section was to establish the relative importance of the measures 
contributing to indicators. To achieve this objective, a ranking method called Average 
Index was used by computing the mean values of the experts' responses. 
The ranks used in this survey were as follows: 
5 = very important 
4 = important 
3 = moderately important 
2 = slightly important 
1 = less important 
The above rating was mainly used to determine the importance of the measures. The 
average index was calculated as follows (Marsh, 1988): 
Average index= for five scale (8.6) 
Where ai is a constant expressing the weight given to i, Xi variables expressing the 
frequency of the response for i; 
i =1,2,3,4,5 
Xl = the frequency for very important 
X2 = the frequency for important 
X3 = the frequency for moderately important 
X4 = the frequency for slightly important 
Xs = the frequency for less important 
where, al = 5, a2 = 4, a3 = 3, 14 = 2, as = 1 
The above analysis has used a discrete scale that has converted to a continuous index 
(Average Index). This can be split into discrete categories as follows: 
Very high importance 4.50~ mean score ~5.00 
High importance 3.50~ mean score ~4.50 
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Moderately importance 
Slightly importance 
Less importance 
Very low importance 
2.50~ mean score ~3.50 
1.50~ mean score ~2.50 
0.50~ mean score ~1.50 
O.OO~ mean score ~0.50 
Data Collection and Analysis 
The significance of using a ranking method is that it identifies the top choice, which can 
then be used to establish the most important factors among several choices. In this 
survey only measures with a ranking of 'high importance' and 'very high importance' 
were chosen. Therefore, it has been decided that the measures with a mean less than 3.5 
were remove from further analysis. The results of the analysis are given in Appendix E. 
According to the results 12 of the proposed measures which were identified to be 
removed from the list are as follows: 
• S2.p.5 Assign a chairman for SIM performance measurement (3.17) 
• S3.po4 Ensure purchasing procedure (3.33) 
• S6.p.1 Establish a team to determine which standard is apply for SI (3.00) 
• S7.p.5 Regularly report plant's safety news to the medium (2.56) 
• 05.p.5 Evaluate Permit-to-work efficiency (2.68) 
• 08.p.3 Provide a paper-form of safety work plan to employee (3.17) 
• U2.p.1 Select an external SIM user training centre (2.22) 
• U4.po4 Require employees to report their information sharing results (2.75) 
• U5.p.2 Requirement of external support for SIM system utilisation (2.68) 
• U6.p.3 Requirement of external survey organisation for user satisfaction (3.00) 
• T3.p.3 Establish firewall between plant's IT system and SIM system (3.17) 
• T4.704 Establish a policy for restoring paper-form SI (3.33) 
The results of the Survey II analysis have been used to determine the measures of each 
indicator. One hundred and seventy six (176) measures were chosen based on the rating 
and suggestions made by the experts and 94 measures were included from CCPS's 
safety information categories. The contribution of each of the 270 measures to the finial 
score is, on average, about 004%. Therefore, slight changes to the contribution of each 
measure introducing by weighting one measure against another will be insignificant in 
terms of in the effect on the final score. Consequently, the weight of the contribution of 
each of the measures to its mother factor (indicator) was taken to be equal. 
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Chapter 8 - Developing a SIMPM Tool 
8.1 General remarks 
Based on the proposed SIMPM framework presented in Chapter 5 and the results of 
data collection and analysis detailed in Chapter 7, this chapter describes the 
development of the SIMPM tool, the process to complete the tool, and the result 
interpretation for the tool. 
This proposed tool includes two stages. Stage 1 adopts a SIM checklist and stage 2 
introduces the SIM Performance Index (Figure 8.1). Checklists are an excellent way to 
pass on lessons learned, especially for hazard identification (Leveson, 1995). For 
reviewers, checklists can help them to verify that prohibited or bad practices have been 
avoided and that requirements have been satisfied. On the other hand, the performance 
index is a partially subjective scoring method in which indicators are assigned relative 
weightings and combined into an overall score. Advantages of the index method lie in its 
intuitive nature. It also provides a catalyst for continuous improvement and ensures that 
measures are in place to demonstrate that improvements are substantiated on more than 
mere anecdotal evidence. However, the use of an index does not necessarily imply that 
improvements will automatically be achieved each and every year as there are many 
factors that may impede such success, e.g. financial, operational or other constraints. An 
important potential of an index is that it facilitates communication, with either internal or 
external stakeholders of the company. It is important that links are made beyond the 
immediate focus of an index and its set of indicators (Marsden et al., 2003). In the study 
of the use of a performance index undertaken in Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation in 
the US (Miakisz, 1999), the following conclusions were drawn: 
1. Indicators developed do not need to be 'perfect', rather that they should aim to be 
accurate enough that they can detect significant shifts in performance. 
2. Indicators developed should be designed with the major stakeholders in mind, 
both internal and external to the organisation. 
3. An index as a tool is of little value to an organisation unless targets are in place. 
4. One of the major aims of an index is to increase awareness and focus attention on 
achieving results in that area on a continuous basis. Measurement is not carried 
out for its own sake, but to stimulate improvement in performance. 
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These conclusions have provided a clear direction for the development of the SIMPM 
tool. 
I SIMPMtool I 
J 
Stage 1: SIM checklist 
(Screening with 28 indicators) Method: Checklists 
! 
Stage 2: SIMPI (SIM Performance Index) Method: Indexing system 
Level 1: 4 perspectives 
Level 2: 28 indicators 
Level 3: 270 measures 
Figure 8.1 The framework of the SIMPM tool 
8.2 The proposed SIMPM tool 
It is expected to cover most of the issues relating to SIM in the SIMPM tool. However, 
implementing the proposed framework into a useable tool requires the consideration of 
practical issues. Ease of use must be a priority, otherwise, the tool will not be accepted 
by the industry or other potential users. If the tool has only one single stage evaluation 
covering all perspectives, indicators and measures at one time, the evaluation will be 
very time consuming and impracticable. Moreover, it has been stressed by some experts 
in Survey 11 that information demanded for input into the measurement tool should not 
be over-burdensome. If the information required demands a great deal of investment 
and/or human resource then it will not be adopted by most organisations. Therefore, it 
was decided to incorporate a two-stage evaluation process into the SIMPM tool. 
In the first stage evaluation using the proposed tool, the measured plant needs to carry 
out a SIM audit based on a checklist. It is simple and easy. It is suggested that the audit 
is undertaken by a professional external auditor. The respondent of the evaluation from 
the measured plant is recommended to be the safety manager since he should be the 
person with knowledge of the whole of the plant's SIM system. The SIM checklist 
contains 28 indicators, each indicator having a main question to be answered and 
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checked. Therefore, the first stage evaluation is designed to be a simple screening 
process to identify potential problems in the SIM system. Only if potential problems are 
identified, then an in-depth assessment is carried out, which is the second stage 
evaluation. If the result of the first stage evaluation was satisfactory, there is no need to 
proceed to the second evaluation stage. By adopting such a two-stage approach the 
proposed tool avoids making unnecessary demands on human resource that may 
discourage some plants from using the SIMPM tool. The purpose of the two-stage 
process is that it makes possible an initial screening evaluation that can be done very 
quickly in the first stage. If acceptable results are achieved the second, more time 
consuming stage can be avoided. 
The result from the second stage evaluation using the SIMPM tool is an index called the 
SIMPI (Safety Information Management Performance Index). The index, SIMPI, is 
made up of 4 perspectives through a mixture of qualitative data from mUltiple 
respondents. 
The overall score is calculated using the ratings from these perspectives. The scoring 
system and calculating method were presented in Chapter 7. Each perspective was 
weighted according to importance. For example, from the analysis, the Operational 
perspective was identified to be considered the most important, so has a higher 
weighting than the other perspectives. 
If the result of the first stage evaluation exceeds the criteria that is discussed and 
presented in Section 8.5 then it is unnecessary to perform the second stage evaluation. 
On the other hand, if the result of the first stage evaluation fails to meet the criteria, then 
the second stage evaluation must be carried out in order to identify existing problems 
and to determine improvement directions. Moreover, the tool also provides a good 
connection between the two stages. Each indicator in the first stage is expanded into 
several measures (check points). When weaknesses of a plant under review have been 
identified at specific indicators in the first evaluation stage, the process can focus on 
assessing these indictors in the second stage but need not through all the measures. For 
example, a plant can evaluate its 'permit-to-work' information by using the main 
question of 'permit-to-work' indicator in the first stage as well as implementing the 
evaluation for the 'permit-to-work' indicator in the second evaluation stage. 
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The frequency of carrying out the SIM performance measurement is recommended to 
be at least once every 6 months for the first stage evaluation. The second stage 
evaluation can depend on the results of the first stage evaluation. A plant with a score of 
less than 70% in the first stage evaluation should carry out the second stage evaluation 
immediately. If the result of the first evaluation is continually over 70% then the second 
stage evaluation should be done at least once every two years. 
8.3 The first stage evaluation 
The first stage evaluation applies the checklist method. The SIM performance checklist 
(see the first part of Appendix F) is made up of 28 indicators which indicate a plant's 
SIM performance. Under each indicator is a main question to be answered. There are 
three responses possible to each question, i.e. 'Yes', 'No' or 'Not available'. It would be 
considered appropriate to select 'Yes' if the question is true of most (e.g. approximately 
two-thirds) of the plant in terms of required information, employees, significant hazards, 
etc. The option 'No' is intended for plants that are not well on the way to achieving a 
'Yes'. It could be appropriate, for instance, if there are several initiatives being 
undertaken in the plant but they have not been implemented in most parts of the plant; 
or that the programme of initiatives applies to less than two-thirds of the workforce. 
Another option is 'Not available' to reflect the fact that it is not necessary to consider 
the indicator in assessment of SI M performance of the plant. It might be appropriate, for 
example, for a totally automatic plant in the period of normal operation not to consider 
the 'permit-to-work' indicator in the assessment of SIM performance. Another example 
is if a plant which adopts a completely 'Manual' way to deal with safety information 
would not need to consider the 'technology integration' indicator and 'SIM tools' 
indicator. 
The checklist is designed to be undertaken by an auditor not working on the plant. The 
respondent from the plant under review is recommended to be the safety manager of the 
measured plant. In carrying out the audit, the auditor needs to: 
1. consider the main question of each indicator, 
2. record appropriate evidence, 
3. agree as far as possible with the respondent those indicators that must be assessed, 
4. mark the score considered to be most appropriate for each indicator, 
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5. make notes during the evaluation, particular during interviews with the 
respondent, 
6. calculate the score, and 
7. recommend further evaluation if necessary. 
To ensure that the evaluation remains focused, it is necessary to restrict the gathering of 
information and evidence to the constraints of the terms set out in the checklist. 
However this would not preclude the auditor from drawing to the attention of 
management any observation outside the scope of the evaluation, if considered to be 
sufficiently important. Typically the information and evidence will be obtained or 
confirmed from record and documentation examination through the plant's SIM system, 
interviewing with the respondent and inspection, if it is necessary. If the auditor cannot 
collect or confirm the evidence for assessing the performance of an individual indicator 
during the evaluation period, the 'No' option must be selected since the response time 
of providing safety information is a critical factor in the performance of a SIM system. 
The first stage evaluation is a screening process. A maximum of 1.5 hours would be 
appropriate estimation of the time required to complete. The purpose of the evaluation 
is to obtain information from respondent (safety manager) about the way in which SIM 
is carried out within the plant in practice. This may be quite different to the 
requirements of policy or procedure of the measured plant. In order to do this, 
evaluation should be conducted in an environment that is conducive to encouraging 
openness from the respondent. The place should be comfortable and private and easy to 
access the SIM system. 
In the SIM checklist each indicator is equally weighted. At the end of the first stage 
evaluation the SIM checklist is given a score by dividing the number of all available 
indicators with the sum of 'Yes' to give a score which is then quoted as a percentage. 
Therefore, the score should be in the range of 0 to 100%, where 0 is worst and 100% is 
the best possible result. It is suggested that an acceptable score is one that is greater 
than 70%, otherwise the score is an indication that the plant is experiencing major 
problems or weaknesses in particular areas (specific indicator) of its SIM which, 
potentially, might be the cause of future incidents. 
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8.4 The second stage evaluation 
The SIMPI (safety information management performance index) is the result of the 
second stage of the SIMPM tool. The full structure ofthe paper version of the SIMPI is 
detailed in Appendix F. Overall the SIMPI comprises a mixture of the outcome of 4 
perspectives to give a balanced view ofa plant's SIM performance. Having this mixture 
brings the strengths of both indicators and perspectives to the index. 
Financial indicators and compliance indicators have not been included in the SIMPI for 
a number of reasons. Both were considered desirable on a number of counts but the 
difficulties and questions of validity led to the decision not to incorporate them at this 
stage of the evaluation process. 
There is very little consistency in the way that financial investment in SIM is calculated, 
and, indeed, questions as to whether this is really possible where so many functions are 
integrated. For example, the firewall of a process control system is not only concerned 
with process operation but also business security and SIM. Moreover, there are 
questions about whether more financial outlay always indicates improved SIM 
performance. More spent on IT for SIM could indicate more information difficulties 
rather than an effective IT infrastructure for SIM. 
The compliance indicators are about outcomes of the actions of the enforcing authority 
that are desirable from some accountability perspectives. The reason for not including 
compliance indicators is that there are discrepancies regarding the standard of SIM 
performance required by regulating authorities. Moreover, the main disadvantage of 
compliance as an indicator of performance is that the numbers are very small and would 
only give significant information about a plant's performance if the number of actions 
became relatively large, and this would only affected a minority of plants. 
In the SIMPI each perspective is made up of a series of indicators describing factors that 
influence SIM performance. Each indicator is made up of a series of measures. For 
each measure it is necessary to: 
1. consider each statement. 
2. mark the score considered to be most appropriate for the organisation. 
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3. enter the total score in the boxes provided at the bottom of each column. 
The format for determining a plant SIMPI is showed in Table 8.1. The overall rating 
would be worked out using a collection of separately rated perspectives weighted as to 
importance. In Table 8.1 the four rated perspectives each have a weighting. The 
Operational perspective is weighted at 0.29 out of a total of 1. This reflects the 
importance assigned to this perspective which is not only the 'output' but also the 
'process' of a SIM system. Moreover, unlike the other three perspectives, the 
Operational perspective has two main evaluation items, one is the evaluation of the 
operational process related to SIM, and the other is a list of safety information. 
In the SIMPI each perspective and indicator are weighted differently. However, the 
measures under their mother-indicator all have the same weight as described in Section 
7.3.3. 
Table 8.1 The result form of the SIMPI 
Organisation: 00000000 
Measurement date: / / (dd/mm/yy) 
Leader of the evaluation team: 
SIMPI :Overall rating (Scale of 0 to 10: O=worst, 10= best) 
Details of SIMPI 
Perspectives Score (S) Relative Importance Weighted rating (W) (sxW) 
Strategic 0.276 
Operational 0.290 
User Orientation 0.255 
Technology 0.179 
Extra Information related to SIM performance 
1. Has a director's declaration for SIM been made? 
2. Does this plant conduct highly regulated activities requiring 
a report or documentation that are covered by regulations 
such as MHWAO· (similar to COMAH) in Taiwan etc? 
3. Does this plant conduct highly regulated activities that are 
covered by safety international/national standards such as 
OHSAS 18001 etc? 
• MHW AO(Major Hazardous Workplace ApprOVing for Operation) regulation 
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The index results are completed by a further set of 3 factors that provide qualitative 
information on the activities and approach to SIM performance within the plant. These 
are listed below: 
1. Directors' declaration: this section of SIMPI asks the plant to indicate whether 
the management has made a declaration that it has assessed the safety 
information problems associated with its activities, and has implemented an 
appropriate set of risk management controls. 
2. Conduct of highly regulated activities: the respondents are asked to declare 
whether any activities are carried out in the plant that are subject to special law, 
e.g. Major Hazardous Workplace Approving for Operation (MHWAO) 
regulation in Taiwan which is similar to COMAH in the UK. 
3. International standard for safety: the plant is asked to declare whether it 
conducts highly regulated activities that are covered by international/national 
standards for safety and it is issued with a certification such as OHSAS 18001 
etc? 
The procedure of carrying out the second stage evaluation starts from the third level -
measures. For each measure on the SIMPI evaluating form, there are three possible 
responses, i.e. "Yes", "Some" or "No". It would be considered appropriate to select 
"Yes" if the measure is mostly true (e.g. approximately 80%) of the organisation in 
terms of sites, employees, documents, reports, etc. The option "Some" is intended for 
an organisation that is well on the way to achieving a "Yes" (e.g. applicable to 
approximately 65%). It is appropriate, for instance, if there are several initiatives being 
undertaken across the organisation or units that have not quite reached all parts of the 
organisation; or that this programme has been applied to some (e.g. applicable to 
approximately 65% but not most of the workplace). 
Prior to the second evaluation an open meeting should be held with the workplace 
management. At this meeting the auditor/evaluator explains how the evaluation is to be 
conducted, the aim of the measurement and how the results will be communicated to 
management. At the conclusion of the evaluation a closing meeting is held to present 
the preliminary findings and conclusions and to provide a final opportunity for 
management to present additional evidence. The emphasis is on management methods 
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and behaviour and not on individual personality or attitude. The questions used to assess 
the plant are based on the 28 indicators looked for in a SIM 'best practice' plant and the 
implementation and effectiveness of those criteria within the plant. 
In the second stage evaluation it is necessary to involve personnel representing different 
facets ofthe plant. A single measurement in the second stage evaluation requires at least 
five types of respondent, including the site manager, the safety manager, a line 
supervisor, an operator and a member of the IT staff. Each respondent completes the 
same evaluation form. It is expected that the second stage evaluation form can be 
answered by each respondent in less than 3 hours. Therefore, it should be possible to 
complete the second stage evaluation in one day. The final score of the SIMPI is the 
average of five respondents' answers. An Excel spreadsheet has been adopted to 
calculate the SIMPI for the purposes of reducing evaluation time and ensuring 
evaluation accuracy. 
There may be a tendency that some respondents will respond in a manner designed to 
please the management or merely to disturb the measurement. The practice of involving 
several representatives can reduce the effect of such undesirable action. However, it is 
necessary to avoid over stretching the human resource involved in measurement. 
Therefore, in the second stage evaluation it was decided not to require the replies from 
all the different types of respondent. 
After completing the second stage evaluation, a report should be compiled, which 
should include: 
• a SIMPI format with a total score 
• a comparison graph across the four perspectives 
• a comparison graph across the 28 indicators 
• an overall assessment (executive summary) of the plant's performance in 
relation to workplace SIM systems and areas requiring immediate improvement 
• an allocation of the appropriate level depending on the score 
In arriving at an overall assessment regard is taken as to the importance of each 
indicator. At this stage of the evaluation the skilled and experienced auditor needs to 
consider that in certain circumstances a poor result with respect to specific perspective, 
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for example the operational perspective should result in a poor assessment even if some 
of the other perspectives achieve a good score. 
8.5 Result interpretation 
Once the performance measurement has been completed, there are two major results. 
The results can be interpreted using the preliminary interpretation, designed as in Table 
8.2. 
For the first stage evaluation, a criterion for the SIM checklist score of 70% is set. 
When the score is less than 70%, it indicates the performance is unacceptable and the 
second stage measurement must be carried out immediately. The reasons for the 
decision are twofold. Firstly, the research uses the mean of the Very Important group of 
fuzzy variables, 0.7, as shown in Figure 7.14, to represent the lowest requirement for an 
adequate SIM performance. Secondly, the result of the case study showed that one plant 
scored over 70%, which means the criterion of 0.7 is an achievable goal. 
a e . T bl 82 SIMPM resu In erpre a IOn It' t t f 
Stage Method Respondent Score Score and Meaning 
range 
I SIM Checklist Safety manager 0-100% Over 70%= is acceptable but 
suggest to review weaknesses 
Under 70% =is unacceptable-
need to take the second stage 
evaluation in order to 
identify potential problems. 
11 SIMPI - Site manager 0-10 9-10=excellent 
(SIMP index) - Safety manager 7-9=good 
- Line supervisor 5-7=moderate, need to improve 
-Operator 
weaknesses 
-IT staff 
3-5= poor, need to review all 
aspects 
0-3=unacceptable, need to take 
urgent actions on the whole 
of the SIM system 
For the second stage evaluation, the SIMPI is given. The rating of SIMPI is based on 
the mean of each linguistic variable of the fuzzy set in Figure 7.14 and the suggestion of 
experts in the pilot test case study. Any achievement above 9 is an excellent SIM 
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performance where the management gives SIM as high a priority as other main business 
drivers. The groups that obtain between 7-9 are also high achievers and have good SIM 
performance but there is still space for some improvement. Plants that achieve between 
5-7 are considered moderate. They still regard SIM as a priority but could improve. 
Plants obtaining between 3-5 are considered to have a poor SIM performance and need 
to look at ways to improve the SIM system. Lastly, plants achieving a score below 3 are 
unacceptable. Management has not given SIM the priority necessary. The 
implementation of SIM in the plant is not effective and urgent steps need to be taken. 
This preliminary interpretation still needs to be reviewed although it been agreed by 
most experts in Survey 11. The interpretation scale needs to be as explanatory and 
helpful as possible. The interpretation must be able to convey enough feedback on the 
level of achievements, acknowledging good performance, avoiding complacency and 
providing a challenge to improve. 
8.6 Summary 
This proposed SIMPM tool aims to provide a catalyst for continuous improvement. It 
was designed to ensure that measures are in place to demonstrate that improvements are 
substantiated on more than mere anecdotal evidence. However, the use of the tool does 
not necessarily imply that improvements will automatically be achieved each and every 
year as there are many factors that may impedes such success, e.g. financial, operational 
or other constraints. An important facet of the tool is in the potential to facilitate 
opportunities for communication, with either internal stakeholders or external parties to 
the company. It is important that linkages are made beyond the immediate focus of an 
index and its set of perspectives and indicators. 
There are two stages in this proposed tool. The first stage evaluation provides a simple 
checklist to assess SIM performance quickly. The second stage evaluation is a 
comprehensive index which includes four perspectives and requires all the necessary 
safety information to be checked. The second stage evaluation is an in-depth auditing 
which needs time and resources to complete. The validation of the proposed SIMPM 
tool through case study is presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 9 - Implementation and Validation 
9.1 General remarks 
The case study of the SIMPM tool with a sample of plants was necessary to fulfil the 
objectives of this research, namely to determine: 
• The feasibility of gathering the information for the SIMPM tool. 
• The validity of the SIMPM tool as a proactive measure of SI M performance. 
• The way in which the SIMPM tool can be improved. 
• Any other issues participants wished to raise. 
The case study implemented the proposed SIMPM tool and illustrated how the tool can 
be employed within the process industry. Therefore, this chapter describes the process 
and results of implementing the SIMPM tool and the effectiveness of the tool to 
measure and improve SIM within process plants. 
The case study was carried out in Taiwan. To study a representative sample of the 
process industry in Taiwan, the plants participating in the case study were selected from 
different locations, were of different size and produced different products. A single 
testing was carried out in advance in order to identify effective schedules for the 
following case study. During the period of the case study, the focus was not only on 
getting results but also on understanding how the SIMPM tool was used by finding 
answers to questions such as: how long did it take to audit a plant? Who did it? When 
was it carried? How well did the tool perform? A critical point for the case study was to 
receive feedback from people who had actually completed the evaluation using the 
SIMPM tool and had gone through the process of providing all the information required 
to calculate the final results. 
9.2 Carrying out the case study 
9.2.1 Sample selection 
In order to achieve the research objectives, it was necessary to find process plants that 
were willing to participate in the case study. There were many problems encountered in 
trying to identify such plants. Some plants were just not interested, others did not fully 
understand the objectives, others explained that they were too busy with tight schedules 
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or they had a strict confidentiality policy and could not provide internal IS structure to a 
third party. 
Nevertheless, considering factors such as location, plant-type, and plant-size, seven 
process plants were selected to participate. These seven plants were different to those 
plants which had been investigated in the early stage of this research as described in 
Chapter 4. During testing two of them withdrew owing the reasons of pressure of work 
or that it was necessary to maintain business information security. Therefore, five plants 
completed the case study successfully. The basic descriptions of these five plants are 
presented briefly in Table 9.1. 
Table 9.1 Plants that participated in the case study 
Plant type Main product Employee Number Location Testing date 
Refinery Petrol, LPG, 1175 northern 21-Jan-05 Taiwan 
Petrochemical Caprolactam 245 northern 4-Feb-05 Manufacturing Nylon Chip Taiwan 
Petrochemical Purified Central 
Manufacturing Terephthalic Acid 148 Taiwan 23-Feb-05 (PTA) 
Resin manufacturing polyproiylene 221 Southern 2-Mar-05 (P ) Taiwan 
Petrochemical VCM Southern 
Manufacturing. (Vinyl Chloride 145 Taiwan 22-Mar-05 Monomer) 
For the business security reasons, these plants must remain anonymous. Therefore, 
these five plants will be called plant A, plant B, plant C, plant D and plant E. The order 
of these plants does not correspond to the sequence given above. The following sections 
describe the plants involved, how SIMPM tool was implemented and the results of the 
case study. 
9.2.2 Pilot testing 
There were three safety managers as respondents for the SIMPM tool pilot testing. 
These were selected from the process industry in Taiwan. Every respondent reviewed 
the whole SIMPM tool. Comments covering each unsure or ambiguous part as well as 
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detailed feedback on individual parts were provided by the respondents. The pilot 
testing established the following more general points regarding the SIMPM tool: 
• The two-stage evaluation process was a good design. 
• The first stage evaluation was easy to carry out but needed to clearly present the 
main question of each indicator. 
• The second stage evaluation took too long to complete. 
• The contents presented were easy to understand. 
• All of the respondents were able to use the tool without specialised help. 
The pilot testing was also used to indicate how long respondents would take to complete 
the first stage evaluation and the second stage evaluation. At least 1.5 hours is required 
at the first stage. At least 3 hours is required for a single respondent for the second stage 
evaluation. (There are five respondents at the second stage evaluation.) Around 2 hours 
is needed to collect the results from five respondents and to calculate the score. One 
hour is required to produce a general report. In total, 6 hours will be appropriate to 
complete the second stage evaluation. Below are the estimated times for completing the 
evaluation using the SIMPM tool. 
Table 9.2 Estimated time for carrying out SIMPM 
Stage /Perspective Estimated time (hour) 
First stage (SIM checklist) 1.5 
Second stage (SIMPI) 6 
Produce the result report 1 
Calculate the SIMPI 2 
Complete the SIMPI form 3 
Strate!{ic perspective (0.5) 
Operational perspective (1.5) 
User Orientation perspective (0.5) 
Technolo!{Y perspective (0.5) 
9.2.3 The main study 
Once the amendments were completed based on the pilot testing reviewer's suggestions 
and remarks, the SIMPM tool was ready to be fully tested. Appointments for testing 
were made with each plant's safety manager. A meeting with each case study plant was 
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held before the starting the testing on site. The meeting was held to introduce and 
explain the purpose and operation of the SIMPM tool. The points covered in the 
meeting were as follows: 
• The concept for having a tool for assessing SIM performance; 
• The objectives ofthe SIMPM tool; 
• The amount of human resources required; 
• How the SIMPM works; 
• The estimated time needed for each stage and for the respondent; 
• How to collect the documents to support the answers given during the evaluation; 
• The evaluation criteria. 
In the case study it was appropriate to use the paper version of the SIMPM tool; data 
entered on to computer later. Thus the respondents were able to answer the questions at 
any location. For instance, the site manager was able to answer the relevant 
questionnaire in his office. However, the process would be easier to implement and 
would require less supervision if all the respondents from a particular organisation were 
briefed together and then responded individually in the same room. 
It was normal that some respondents couldn't complete the questionnaire for the second 
stage evaluation on the testing day due to a busy work schedule or for other reasons. In 
such cases, the respondents were given one week to complete the questionnaires. Once 
the responses were returned, all answers were entered into the computer. A brief result 
on the analysis was carried out. Once the results were ready, meetings were held with 
all respective site managers, safety managers and line supervisors. The meetings were 
mainly to brief the plants of the following: 
• The results of the first stage and the second stage. 
• The analysis of perspectives of SIMPI in the second stage. 
• The respondents influence on perspectives. 
• Highlighting the weak perspectives and indicators that needed urgent attention. 
• Reasons for poor performance of the weak perspectives and indicators. 
• Highlighting the excellent perspectives and the indicators. 
• Showing the excellent performance. 
• The need for periodic assessment to monitor the weaker perspectives and 
indicators. 
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During testing it was necessary to collect the plants' safety records for the purpose of 
comparing SIM performance and safety performance. The required safety records 
include: 
• Fatality 
• Disabling Frequency Rate (F.R.)= Lost day cases* I,OOO,OOO/work hours 
• Disabling Severity Rate (S.R.)= lost days from accidents*I,OOO,OOO/work hours 
• Authority inspection results, including the violations and fines issued by the local 
health and safety authority 
9.3 Results of the testing 
This section discusses the results of the SIMPM tool case study. The detailed 
explanation of the method of calculating the scores of SIMPM was discussed in Chapter 
8. The following discussion focuses on the results of plant A as an example. 
9.3.1 First stage evaluation of plant A 
The first stage evaluation of the SIMPM tool provided a percentage as the result from 
the SIM checklist. The first stage evaluation achieved for plant A was 68% as shown in 
Table 9.4. This places it within the 'Moderate' category based on the Table 9.3. 
Table 9.3 Scale of the first stage evaluation 
Scale (%) Indication of SIM performance (first stage) 
90% ~ the SIM checklist score ~1 00% Excellent 
70 %~ the SIM checklist score <90% Good 
50%~ the SIM checklist score <70% Moderate- need to improve few SIM 
elements 
30% ~ the SIM checklist score <50% Poor- need to improve major elements 
of SI M 
the SIM checklist score <30% Unacceptable- need to take urgent 
action 
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Table 9.4 The result of the first stage evaluation -Plant A 
•••••••• ••••• _ ••••••• __ •••••• "M' ••••• _ ••• _ ••••••••••••••• 
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
. . . .. . . ...... . _ ............................. _ .... _ ........... -......... . 
Indicator Finding Evidence 
YES NO NA 
S1 Strategic planning 
~ 
No clear SIM strategy or plan 
Is there a good understanding of the SIM plan and are available. 
senior management and staff signed on to it? 
S2 Organisation and responsibilities Safety management system 
Has the SIM implementing teams and responsibility of ~ requires individual's duty for 
the individual been identified and informed? handling SI. 
S3 Acquisition 2004 Budget did not demonstrate 
Does a method exist to ensure the optimal design, ~ the support of SIM system development and deployment of SIM system? development. 
S4 Leadership Monthly safety meeting and 
Are mechanisms in place for senior management to be ~ safety review by managers. 
made aware, understand and demonstrate leadership and 
support of SIM? 
S5 Evaluation No SIM audit or evaluation 
Does the SIM audit and review processes that are in place 
to ensure awareness of and compliance with SIM? 
~ available. 
S6 Standardisation No standard for safety 
Have documentation standards been applied to most ~ documents. 
safety information? 
S7 External relationship Has a good Web page to 
Are mechanisms in place to facilitate partnership and ~ communicate safety issue with consultations with external organisations in support of external. 
SIM? 
01 Process knowledge Have a mechanism to keep and 
Are effective processes in place to ensure compliance ~ update process documents into 
with the applicable safety related knowledge? hard copy well as IT system. 
02 Process Hazard Analysis 
~ 
Good performance AT hazard 
Is there a mechanism to ensure compliance with PHA and Identification and its follow-up 
hazard communication? by controlling in paper-form. 
03 Operation procedures 
~ Apply ISO 9000 standard to Is there a mechanism to provide up-to-date Operation 
manage operation procedures. 
I procedures? 
04 Incidents reporting Incident reporting by paper-form 
Are effective processes in place for reporting, collecting, ~ but has a database to manage investigating and learning about internal as well as incident investigation and 
external incidents? reports. 
05 Permit to work 
Is a mechanism in place to ensure dangerous works are ~ Has a well defined permit-to-
not permitted through preview and confirm? work system (paper form) 
06 Management of change 
No mechanism to control MOC Is there a mechanism to ensure major change is well ~ defined, recorded and managed? records. 
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07 Emergency response ER plan and relating infonnation 
Have emergency response plans and procedures been ~ are managed using software prepared, communicated and tested? package. 
08 Safety work practices Check, toolbox meeting, self-Have safety work practices such as routing check, ~ assessing are planed, toolbox meeting, self-assessing been planed, implemented and recorded. implemented and recorded? 
Ul User awareness When a new safety mechanism is 
Are processes in place to check the extent to which users ~ set, User will be infonned both are aware ofSIM's products and services? by notes and email. 
U2 User training and support Safety Training includes the 
What is the process to ensure the availability of user ~ operation of SM systems and training and support programs to facilitate the access and relating sub-systems. 
use of safety infonnation? 
U3 User competence Most of users are professional at 
Are processes in place to identify the extent to which ~ work and CAN use SI no SIM users have the competencies and capacities to meet difficulty. 
the challenges of SIM? 
U4 Information behaviours No particular process to manage 
Has a mechanism been implemented to identify users' ~ and encourage safety infonnation 
attitudes on SIM and the extent of sharing and sharing. 
communicating safety information? 
US System utilization IT infrastructure allows users to 
Is a process in place to ensure users can locate, retrieve ~ locate, retrieve and transfer SI 
and transfer SI with timely and convenient access? with timely and convenient 
access. 
~6 User satisfaction 
Are mechanisms in place to measure user satisfaction and ~ 
No evaluation of user satisfaction 
for SIM system. 
learn from user feedback on SIM activities and services? 
Tl SIM tools ~ 
IT and new advices support SIM 
What is the process to ensure the extent to which SIM well. 
tools effectively and efficiently support SIM? 
T2 Technology integration ~ 
Has a SM system with many 
Does a process exist to enable technologies integrated subsystems to integrate SI. 
across the plant to support the delivery of SI? 
T3 Security ~ 
Its IT system has set firewall for 
Are mechanisms in place to ensure safety information is security. The process control 
protected from unauthorised access, use and destruction? system is independent. 
T4 Privacy 
Have mechanisms been implemented to ensure that ~ Not considering it yet. individual rights to the privacy in the handling SI are 
respected? 
TS Work continuity 
Are mechanisms in place to ensure timely information ~ Uninterrupted Power System and 
recovery, restoration of essential records and work also preserve SI externally. 
resumption) 
T6 Maintenance and preservation Has a process to preserve and 
Is there a process to ensure the long-tenn usability and ~ maintain important safety 
safeguarding of safety infonnation? infonnation such installation, 
P&ID, PHA, control data .... 
T7 Disposition 
..J No specific rule for safety Is there a Mechanism to ensure safety infonnation information disposition. 
retention and disposal plans are followed? 
Total for all 19 9 0 ----
Score= (yES number/28-NA) 68% ----
194 
Chapter 9 Implementation and Validation 
9.3.2 Second Stage evaluation of plant A 
The second stage evaluation of the SIMPM tool is the score of an index called SIMPI. 
Plant A achieved an overall score of5.5 as shown in Table 9.6. This places it within the 
'Moderate' category based on the Table 9.5 below: 
Table 9.5 Scale of the second stage evaluation 
Scale Indication of SIMPI performance 
9 ~SIMPI~10 Excellent 
7 ~SIMPI<9 Good 
5 ~SIMPI<7 Moderate- need to improve a few SIM elements 
3 ~SIMPI<5 Poor- need to improve the majority of SIM elements 
SIMPI<3 Unacceptable- need to take urgent action 
Table 9.6 The result ofthe second stage evaluation -Plant A 
Organisation: Plant A 
Measurement date: 25 / 02 / 05 (dd/mm/yy) 
Leader of the evaluation team: 
SIMPI :Overall rating (Scale of 0 to 10: O=worst, 10= best) 5.5 
Details of SIMPI 
Perspectives Score (S) Relative Importance Weighted rating (W) (SXW) 
Strategic 6.276 0.276 1.705 
Operational 7.448 0.290 2.160 
User Orientation 3.639 0.255 0.928 
Technology 3.927 0.179 0.703 
Extra Information related to SIM performance 
1. Has a director's declaration for SIM been made? Yes 
2. Does this plant conduct highly regulated activities 
requiring a report or documentation that are covered by Yes 
regulations such as MHW AO* (similar to COMAH) in 
Taiwan etc? 
3. Does this plant conduct highly regulated activities that are 
covered by safety international/national standards such as OHSAS 18001 
OHSAS 18001 etc? 
* MHWAO(Major Hazardous Workplace Approvmg for OperatIOn) regulation 
195 
Chapter 9 Implementation and Validation 
For plant A, although the overall SIMPI is 5.5, which is within the performance 
category of 'Moderate' (score 5-7), the User Orientation perspective and IT perspective 
achieved a poor score which indicates that major improvements are needed in these two 
areas. 
(1) Indicator Performance 
Table 9.7 presents the results of each indicator performed for plant A. Chapter 8 has 
introduced how the indicators are calculated. The results here enable the management to 
immediately identify the weak indicators and take immediate actions based on the Table 
9.8. 
Table 9.7 Indicator score of plant A 
Indicator Score Indicator Score 
S1 Strategic planning 0.65 08 Safety work practices 0.78 
S2 Organisation and responsibilities 0.62 U1 User awareness 0.34 
S3 Acquisition 0.55 U2 User training & support 0.43 
S4 Leadership 0.72 U3 User competence 0.32 
SS Evaluation 0.56 U4 Information behaviours 0.34 
S6 Standardisation 0.63 US System utilisation 0.32 
S7 External relationship 0.58 U6 User satisfaction 0.44 
01 Process knowledge 0.69 T1 SIM tools 0.34 
02 Process Hazard Analysis 0.66 T2 Technology integration 0.38 
03 Operation procedures 0.78 T3 Security 0.45 
04 Incidents reporting 0.82 T4 Privacy 0.34 
05 Permit to work 0.91 TS Work continuity 0.56 
06 Management of change 0.68 T6 Maintenance and preservation 0.46 
07 EmerKency response 0.63 T7 Disposition 0.16 
Table 9.8 Scale of indicator performance 
Scale Indication of indicator performance 
0.90-1.0 Excellent 
0.70-0.89 Good 
0.50-0.69 Moderate- need to improve few SIM elements 
0.30-0.49 Poor- need to improve major elements of SIM 
0-0.29 Unacceptable- need to take urgent action 
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The User Orientation perspective and the IT perspective achieved a 'Poor' score. This 
means that major improvements are needed. From Table 9.7, the areas that needed 
immediate improvements are those indicators with a score under 0.4, such as indicators 
UI, U3, U4, US, TI, 1'2, T4 and T7. 
(2) Respondents influence on the performance 
At the second stage evaluation, five respondents are required to complete the 
questionnaire. These are the site manager, a line supervisor, an operator, the safety 
manager and a member of the IT staff. Therefore, the SIMPM tool also enables 
management to analyse the influence of each category of respondents on each 
perspective. This exercise should not be used to put blame on the low achieving 
respondents but rather as a step in helping to improve performance. Tables 9.4, 9.6 and 
9.7 show the results for plant A's SIM performance measurement. By comparing scores 
agreement and disagreement between categories of staff on a perspective is clearly 
shown. For instance, in Table 9.9, considering the Technology Perspective of plant A, 
the IT staff scored 0.829 and site manager 0.870, but the safety manager, line supervisor 
and operator scored under 0.70. This may suggest that technology support to safety 
information is in place, but for some reason, the safety manager, line supervisor and 
operator did not think that this indicator performed well. 
Table 9.9 Respondents influence on the performance 
site line safety 
operator IT staff Average 
manager supervisor manager 
Strategic 
1.703 1.817 1.730 1.742 1.535 1.705 perspective 
Operational 
2.001 2.172 2.267 2.295 2.065 2.160 perspective 
User Orientation 
0.885 0.923 0.988 0.854 0.993 0.928 perspective 
Technology 
0.870 0.648 0.604 0.561 0.829 0.703 perspective 
SIMPI 5.549 5.560 5.590 5.452 5.422 5.5 
Analysing the individual scores for each respondent category also helps management to 
recognise where the SIM system has been effective. For a particular group of 
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respondents, a high score in Table 9.9 for a particular perspective indicates that that 
group of respondents considered that that particular perspective had been implemented 
effectively. A low score indicates that the group of respondents considered that that 
particular perspective had been implemented less effectively. An example that can be 
demonstrated here is for the User Orientation perspective. From Table 9.9, the average 
is 0.928 but the operator achieves the lowest score of 0.854. Analysing the questions 
will help management to understand why the operator did not provide a higher score. 
9.4 Analysis 
The results obtained from the five plants were analysed and are presented in this section. 
The discussion of the results can be divided into four headings: 
• comparison within the five plants; 
• comparison within the same plant with the two stages ofthe evaluation; 
• comparison within two of the plants with two tests, the second being conducted 5 
months after the first; 
• comparison with safety records from all plants. 
9.4.1 Comparison within the five plants 
Table 9.10 presents the overall result of these five plants. The scores of the first and 
second stages are provided separately. 
Table 9.10 Comparisons within the five plants 
Plants First stage Second stage 
SIM checklist Remarks SIMPI Remarks 
Plant A 68% Moderate 5.496 Moderate 
Plant B 46% Poor 4.281 Poor 
Plant C 75% Good 6.479 Moderate 
PlantD 57% Moderate 5.620 Moderate 
Plant E 39% Poor 4.534 Poor 
In Table 9.10, the result of the SIM checklist reveals the screening SIM performance of 
the five plants at the current situation. From the analysis and based on index grouping, 
the overall performance of these five plants demonstrates that plant C has the highest 
SIM performance score with 75%. Plant E achieved the lowest percentage of 39% 
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which is classified as 'Poor'. Only plant C achieved 'Good' SIM performance but still 
has room for improvement to attain 'Excellent' performance. The other four plants need 
to improve their SIM performance immediately. 
The result of the second stage evaluation, SIMPI, reveals the overall SIM performance 
for the five plants. From the analysis and based on index grouping, plant C has the 
highest SIMPI with 6.479 which is classified as 'Moderate' but Plant B achieved the 
lowest score with 4.281 which is classified as 'Poor'. 
The lowest score at the first stage was plant E but at the second stage was B. This 
reveals that the results of SIMPM might not give a perfect indication of an 
organisation's performance when compared with other organisation, but they do provide 
a clear indication of good or poor performance. 
(1) Perspectives performance 
In order to identify low performance areas, analysis was carried out to study the 
achievement of each perspective and indicator. Figure 9.1 illustrates how the five plants 
scored for the perspectives. The perspectives were grouped based on the performance 
scored as described in Section 9.4. Figure 9.1 shows that only two plants have one 
perspective rated 'Good'. All plants have perspectives rated 'Poor to Unacceptable' 
which means immediate actions need to be taken. This suggests that SIMPM has been 
effective in that it has provided a spectrum of results. 
perspective performance 
10.0 
8.0 DSP 
6.0 .OP 
4.0 DUP 
2.0 DTP 
0.0 
A B C D E Average 
plant 
Figure 9.1 Comparisons of perspective performance 
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Figure 9.2 The trend of SIMPM perspectives 
Figure 9.2 illustrates the trend of SIMPM perspectives. All the plants perfonned well 
under the Operational perspective but worse at the User Orientation perspective and 
Technology perspective. This helps to identify weak perspectives in these five plants 
and reveals that the process industry in Taiwan needs to address concerns related to 
SIM system user satisfaction and technology integration. 
(2) Indicator perfonnance 
Table 9.11 presents the perfonnance of each indicator within the five plants. This helps 
to identify the weak indicators among the 28 indicators. 
Table 9.12 presents each indicator's variance among the five plants. The following 
analysis explains the trend of the scores of the indicators and compares indicator scores 
among these five plants. It must be clear that the analysis is not to find out how well the 
process industry is doing in Taiwan nor to find out how sensitive the indicators are. 
Such an analysis would not be meaningful since the sample size is too small to be 
statistically valid. 
200 
Chapter 9 Implementation and Validation 
Table 9.11 Indicator performance scores for each plant 
Indicator Plant A Plant B Plant C PlantD PlantE 
SI Strategic planning 0.65 0.34 0.75 0.78 0.25 
S2 Organisation and responsibilities 0.62 0.42 0.74 0.60 0.46 
S3 Acquisition 0.55 0.32 0.57 0.53 0.43 
S4 Leadership 0.72 0.40 0.78 0.72 0.54 
SS Evaluation 0.56 0.29 0.59 0.66 0.38 
S6 Standardisation 0.63 0.43 0.63 0.58 0.48 
S7 External relationship 0.58 0.37 0.57 0.58 0.35 
01 Process knowledge 0.69 0.60 0.76 0.65 0.47 
02 Process Hazard Analysis 0.66 0.50 0.70 0.60 0.45 
03 Operation procedures 0.78 0.63 0.80 0.69 0.56 
04 Incidents reporting 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.80 0.67 
05 Permit to work 0.91 0.78 0.86 0.81 0.70 
06 Management of change 0.68 0.64 0.73 0.67 0.62 
07 Emergency response 0.63 0.50 0.66 0.54 0.46 
08 Safety work practices 0.78 0.68 0.81 0.70 0.65 
Ul User awareness 0.34 0.28 0.66 0.40 0.36 
tu2 User training & support 0.43 0.36 0.64 0.49 0.41 
U3 User competence 0.32 0.30 0.45 0.33 0.27 
U4 Information behaviours 0.34 0.34 0.58 0.34 0.34 
US System utilization 0.32 0.28 0.54 0.34 0.30 
U6 User satisfaction 0.44 0.27 0.49 0.41 0.39 
Tl SIM tools 0.34 0.26 0.38 0.40 0.30 
T2 Technology integration 0.38 0.33 0.55 0.52 0.35 
T3 Security 0.45 0.43 0.58 0.58 0.42 
T4 Privacy 0.34 0.33 0.59 0.51 0.33 
TS Work continuity_ 0.56 0.50 0.66 0.64 0.50 
T6 Maintenance and preservation 0.46 0.42 0.56 0.46 0.40 
T7 Disposition 0.16 0.12 0.56 0.36 0.12 
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Table 9.12 Mean score and variance of indicator 
STD VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR 
Indicator MEAN DEV Plant A PlantB PlantC PlantD PlantE 
bs Permit to work 0.81 0.08 0.10 -0.03 0.05 0.00 -0.11 
04 Incidents reporting 0.79 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.12 
08 Safety work practices 0.73 0.07 0.05 -0.04 0.09 -0.02 -0.07 
03 Operation procedures 0.69 0.10 0.09 -0.06 0.11 0.00 -0.13 
06 Management of change 0.67 .0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.06 0.00 -0.05 
01 Process knowledge 0.64 0.11 0.06 -0.03 0.12 0.02 -0.16 
S4 Leadership 0.63 0.16 0.09 -0.23 0.15 0.09 -0.09 
02 Process Hazard Analysis 0.58 0.11 0.08 -0.08 0.12· 0.02 -0.13 
[l'S Work continuity 0.57 0.08 -0.01 -0.07 0.09 0.07 -0.07 
S2 Organisation and responsibilities 0.57 0.13 0.05 -0.15 0.17 0.03 -0.11 
07 Emergency response 0.56 0.09 0.08 -0.06 0.10 -0.02 -0.10 
SI Strategic planning 0.55 0.24 0.10 -0.22 0.20 0.22 -0.30 
S6 Standardisation .. I 0.55 0.09 .0.08 -0.12 0.08 0.03 -0.07 
SS Evaluation 0.50 0.16 0.07 -0.21 0.09 0.17 -0.12 
[1'3 Security 0.49 0.08 -0.04 -0.06 0.09 0.09 -0.08 
S7 External relationship 0.49 0.12 0.09 -0.12 0.08 0.09 -0.14 
S3 Acquisition 0.48 0.11 0.07 -0.16 0.09 0.05 -0.05 
U2 User training & support 0.47 0.11 -0.04 -0.11 0.18 0.02 -0.05 
T6 Maintenance and preservation 0.46 0.06 0.00 -0.04 0.10 0.00 -0.06 
T2 Technology integration 0.43 0.10 -0.04 -0.09 0.12 0.09 -0.08 
T4 Privacy 0.42 . 0.12 -0.08 -0.09 0.17 0.09 -0.09 
Ul User awareness 0.41 0.15 -0.07 -0.13 0.25 -0.01 -0.0·5 
U6 User satisfaction 0.40 ·0.08 0.04 -0.13 0.09 0.01 -0.01 
U4 Information behaviours 0.39 0.11 -0.05 -0.05 0.19 -0.05 -0.05 
US System utilization 0.36 0.11 -0.04 -0.08 0.18 -0.02 -0.06 
Tl SIM tools 0.34 0.06 0.00 -0.08 0.04 0.06 -0.04 
U3 User competence 0.33 0.07 -0.02 -0.03 0.12 0.00 -0.07 
T7 Disposition 0.26 0.19 -0.10 -0.14 0.30 0.10 -OJ4 
(3) Mean of score of Indicators 
The mean score can be grouped based on its dispersion with the minimum difference 
between each mean score as 0.03. The dispersion provides a range of 0.55 when taking 
the difference between the highest mean score (0.81) and the lowest mean score (0.26). 
Since this is a big range, it can suffer from distortion from these extreme values. In 
order to eliminate this distortion, the discussion below concentrates on the group 
dispersion of the mean score in descending order. 
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Figure 9.3 Mean group distribution of indicators 
Starting with the highest mean score of 0.81 one indicator achieves this mean score. By 
observation, this mean score of 0.81 can be grouped together with the mean score of 
0.79. This seems to be a drop of 0.06 from 0.79 to 0.73. So the second grouping can be 
the mean score of 0.79 with one indicator. From 0.79, the next mean score is 0.69 
meaning a drop of 0.04. This forms another group ranging from 0.69 to 0.67. There are 
two indicators is this group. The next level is the mean score of 0.64 with a drop of 0.03. 
The mean score of 0.64 to 0.63 form another grouping with two indicators. The 
following level is the mean score of 0.58 with a drop of 0.04. The mean score of 0.68 to 
0.55 form another grouping with 6 indicators. The following group of dispersion can be 
formed with the mean score of 0.50 to 0.46 with 6 indicators too. A drop of 0.03 can be 
observed for the next mean score of 0.43 that can be grouped together with 0.39 to form 
the next group. The next level is the mean score of 0.36 with a drop of 0.03. The mean 
score of 0.36 to 0.33 form another grouping with three indicators. Lastly the mean score 
of 0.26 forms the last group with one indicator. The shape of Figure 9.3 shows the mean 
group distribution of indicators as described above. The distribution is skewed towards 
the low values. This shows the mean for the majority of the indicators lies below 0.58. 
This suggests that the plant's SIM systems do not perform well in more than half ofthe 
indicators. The present performance may be due to the ineffectiveness of their 
implementation. 
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(4) Standard deviation 
The most commonly used method of summarising dispersion is the standard deviation. 
Here, the standard deviation calculates the average amount of deviation from the mean. 
The standard deviation reflects the degree to which the values in a distribution differ 
from the mean. 
For all 28 indicators, the SI-Strategic planning has the highest standard deviation of 0.24 
and T7-Disposition with the second highest standard deviation of 0.19. This means that 
there is a big dispersion from the mean for these two indicators. The results suggest that 
the plants did not strongly agree on the importance of SI and T70n SIM performance. 
Therefore, not all five plants have them successfully implemented SI and T7. 
The lowest standard deviation from Table 9.12 is 0.04 for the indicator 06-Management 
of change. This small deviation suggests that there was strong agreement with the mean 
score with all plants implementing this important indicator. This indicator (06) is a 
reflection of the importance of Management of change with regard to SIM issues in the 
process plants. 
(5) Variance 
Variance is an expression showing the spread or dispersion of the performance score 
around the mean. Indicators with high standard deviation have a high variance. The 
indicators with high variance show strong disagreement from the mean. For example, 
in Table 9.12, it shows that the indicator SI-Strategic planning has the highest variance 
(-0.30 to 0.22). This suggests that Plant E with -0.30 variance scored poorly in 
comparison with the mean for this indicator while Plant D obtained +0.22 variance 
scored higher than the mean. This suggests that these plants scored differently for the 
indicator S I-Strategic planning. 
Conversely the lower variance shows strong agreement between the scores for the 
indicator in question. For example, the lowest variance is 0 which reflects that there was 
100% compliance with the mean. The indicator T6-Maintenance and preservation 
clearly shows strong agreement to the mean with two plants achieving 0 variance. This 
strong agreement reflects that all plants scored similarly for this indicator. 
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Overall, the above discussions reveal the trend of the results obtained among the five 
plants. Even though the sample is small such comparison has demonstrated the 
performance scores of each indicator. The results from the case study suggest that at 
least four indicators T7, U3, Tl, and U5 were not implemented effectively in five plants. 
Besides ineffective implementation, the low performance score may be affected by 
misinterpreting the questions by the respondents. This setback can be overcome by 
carrying out an evaluation in any future testing. Whatever the reasons may be, SIMPI 
allowed management to carry out analysis of the answers obtained from the respondents 
and thus allowed management to plan remedial actions targeting the right indicators. 
9.4.2 Comparison within the same plant with two stages 
The evaluation scores of the two stages for these five plants can be observed in Table 9.13. 
The ranking of these five plants in this study has also been given. In the table, !he 
Pearson's Product-moment Correlation coefficient (r) and the Kendall's coefficient (t) 
have been calculated by analysing the correlation of the results of the two stages. The 
value of Pearson's Product-moment Correlation coefficient (r) is 0.924 with a statistical 
significance value of 0.01, which indicates great agreement between the evaluation of the 
means scores ofthe of two stages. However since there were only 5 cases involved in the 
analysis, then a value of't of 0.6 with a statistical significance value of 0.142 (> 0.01) 
shows that the ranking analysis is unreliable. 
Even though the sample was too small from which to derive significant conclusions, a 
comparison with the data obtained from the two stages was carried out to draw a trend 
as shown in Figure 9.4, where the correlation of the two stages can be observed. This 
trend and the correlation analysis suggest that it is reasonable to use stage 1 as a 
screening method to evaluate SIM performance. 
Table 9.13 the results of two-stage evaluations 
Stage Plant A Plant B Plant C Plant D Plant E Correlations 
't (for ranking) r (for mean) 
mean 0.68 0.46 0.75 0.57 0.39 
1 0.6 0.924 
ranking 2 4 1 3 5 
2 mean 5.496 4.281 6.479 5.620 4.435 
ranking 3 5 1 2 4 (p-value 0.142) (p-value 0.01) 
Correlation is significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed) 
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9.4.3 Comparison within the same plants with two tests 
For the purpose of recognising a plant's progress in SIM, after the case study (study 1), 
two plants (plants B and C) agreed to carry out a second case study, called 'study 2'. 
Plant C had the best score and plant B was the worst score in the study 1. Prior to study 
2, a discussion was carried out with the management of both plants to review the results 
of study 1. Both plants agreed to carry out another study in order to demonstrate 
improvement in SIM. 
Study 2 was approximately 5 months after study 1. The respondents of study 1 and 2 
were the same people at site supervisor and safety manager level but different at line 
supervisor, IT staff and operator level. The time gap and different respondents can 
reduce the possibility of showing an increase in performance simply because the 
respondents had become more experienced in completing the questionnaire. The 
following discussions explain the results of both studies for the two plants. 
PlantB 
The results of both studies are shown 10 Table 9.14. Overall, study 2 shows an 
improvement in comparison with study 1 in both evaluation stages. The standard 
deviation (SDV) is also lower in study 2. To understand how the SIMPI has improved, 
it is better to analyse the perspectives and indicators performance. Figure 9.5 illustrates 
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the comparison of study 1 and study 2 for the perspectives for Plant B. Every 
perspective performance had a slightly higher score in study 2. However, User 
Orientation perspective and Technology perspective did not gain much improvement. It 
indicates that these two perspectives cannot be improved in a short period of time for 
plant B. 
Table 9.14 the results of study 1 and 2 for Plant B 
Study Date SIM checklist 
SIMPI (stage 2) 
(stage 1) SIMPI score SDV SP OP UP TP 
Study 1 23/03/05 0.46 4.281 1.273 3.649 6.448 3.412 3.486 
Study 2 12/08/05 0.72 5.835 1.186 4.600 6.846 3.822 4.049 
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Figure 9.5 Comparison of study 1 and study 2 for Plant B 
Analysing the improvement in the performance of the indicators shows that there has 
been an increase in performance towards the categories 'moderate' and 'good'. On the 
other hand, the number of indicators in the 'poor' group score had remained unchanged 
but with different indicators. Only 2 indicators, 87 and T5 did not show any 
improvement. This is worthy of further analysis. The overall performance of the 
indicators in both study 1 and study 2 can be observed from Table 9.15. 
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Table 9.15 Indicator performance score of Plant B (study 1 and study 2) 
Indicators study 1 study 2 Change 
SI Strategic planning 0.338 0.506 0.168 
S2 Organisation and responsibilities 0.420 0.541 0.121 
S3 Acquisition 0.317 0.477 0.161 
S4 Leadership 0.400 0.490 0.090 
SS Evaluation 0.288 0.390 0.103 
S6 Standardisation 0.425 0.500 0.075 
S7 External relationship 0.367 0.289 -0.078 
01 Process knowledge 0.603 0.665 0.062 
02 Process Hazard Analysis 0.505 0.550 0.045 
03 Operation procedures 0.629 0.683 0.053 
04 Incidents reporting 0.819 0.832 0.013 
05 Permit to work 0.783 0.811 0.028 
06 Management of change 0.644 0.674 0.030 
07 Emergency response 0.495 0.539 0.044 
08 Safety work practices 0.684 0.727 0.043 
Ul User awareness 0.280 0.410 0.130 
U2 User training & support 0.357 0.385 0.028 
U3 User competence 0.300 0.363 0.063 
U4 Information behaviours 0.340 0.410 0.070 
US System utilization 0.280 0.322 0.042 
U6 User satisfaction 0.271 0.363 0.091 
Tl SIM tools 0.260 0.323 0.063 
T2 Technology integration 0.333 0.388 0.055 
T3 Security 0.433 0.462 0.029 
T4 Privacy 0.329 0.402 0.074 
T5 Work continuity 0.500 0.497 -0.003 
T6 Maintenance and preservation 0.420 0.520 0.100 
T7 Disposition 0.120 0.211 0.091 
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PlantC 
The results of both studies are shown in Table 9.16. 
Table 9.16 the results of study 1 and 2 for Plant C 
Study Date SIM checklist 
SIMPI (stage 2) 
(stage 1) SIMPI score SDV SP OP UP TP 
Study 1 03/03/05 0.75 6.479 0.879 6.634 7.686 5.616 5.520 
Study 2 05108/05 0.79 7.236 0.853 7.226 8.158 6.269 5.992 
Overall, the results of study 2 shows an improvement compared with those of study 1. 
Also the standard deviation is lower in study 2. To understand how the SIMPM has 
improved in plant C, it is better to analysis the perspectives and indicators performance. 
Figure 9.6 illustrates the comparison of study 1 and study 2 in perspective performance 
for Plant C. Study 2 has all four perspectives while study 1 has only 2 perspectives 
above the score of 6. The Strategic perspective improved from the category of 
'moderate' to 'good'. This was a good improvement for the plant. Besides having more 
'good' group scores, study 2 does not have any perspective in the 'poor' and 
'unacceptable' category. Every perspective had a slightly higher score in study 2. 
Therefore, an incremental improvement was achieved in all four perspectives without 
any important change in the score of a specific perspective. 
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Figure 9.6 Comparison of study 1 and 2 for Plant C 
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The overall performance of indicators in both study 1 and 2 are shown in Table 9.17. 
Analysing the improvement of indicator performance, there has been an increase in 
indicators performance towards categories 'moderate' and 'good'. On the other hand, 
the number of indicators in the 'poor' group score had remained unchanged but with 
different indicators. The performance of all indicators improved except for the 
indicators S7 (External relationship) and UI (User awareness). It can be observed that 
both plant Band C did not show improvement in S7 (External relationship). 
Table 9.17 Indicator performance score of Plant C (study 1 and study 2) 
Indicator Study 1 Study 2 Change 
SI Strategic planning 0.750 0.813 0.063 
S2 Organisation and responsibilities 0.740 0.880 0.140 
S3 Acquisition 0.567 0.667 0.100 
S4 Leadership 0.780 0.793 0.013 
S5 Evaluation 0.588 0.660 0.072 
S6 Standardisation 0.625 0.650 0.025 
S7 External relationship .. 0.567 0.564 -0.002 
01 Process knowledge 0.760 0.816 0.056 
02 Process Hazard Analysis 0.699 0.758 0.060 
03 Operation procedures 0.800 0.833 0.033 
04 Incidents reporting 0.828 0.852 0.024 
05 Permit to work 0.860 0.912 0.051 
06 Management of change 0.734 0.753 0.019 
07 Emergency response 0.658 0.768 0.110 
08 Safety work practices 0.812 0.834 0.022 
I!Jl User awareness 0.660 0.637 -0.023 
U2 User training & support 0.643 0.686 0.043 
U3 User competence 0.450 0.517 0.067 
U4 Information behaviours 0.580 0.640 0.060 
US System utilization 0.540 0.680 0.140 
U6 User satisfaction 0.486 0.600 0.114 
Tl SIM tools 0.380 0.440 0.060 
T2 Technology integration 0.550 0.595 0.045 
T3 Security 0.583 0.617 0.033 
T4 Privacy 0.586 0.629 0.043 
TS Work continuity 0.660 0.660 0.000 
T6 Maintenance and preservation 0.560 0.613 0.053 
T7 Disposition 0.560 0.673 0.113 
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9.4.4 Comparison with safety records 
A comparison was carried out to collect the reactive safety records with the SIMPI. The 
data are shown in Table 9.18. All the data and reactive safety records are for three years 
from 2002 to 2004. The purpose of using records from a three-year period rather than a 
one-year period was to reduce significant deviation. The fatality was not used for 
comparison because such a small figure cannot be used as a measure. Two incident rates, 
F.R. and S.R., are calculated as follows: 
• Disabling Frequency Rate (F.R.)= lost day cases x 1,000,000/work hours 
• Disabling Severity Rate (S.R.)= lost days from accidents x 1,000,000/work hours 
Table 9.18 Reactive safety records of five testin2 plants 
Information Plant A PlantB Plant C PlantD PlantE 
Total workforce (number) 1175 245 148 221 145 
Total man-four (per year) 2958766 663031 2187510 417024 305912 
Reactive safety records 
- - - - -
• Fatality (2002-2004, worker) 1 0 0 0 0 
• Lost day cases (2002-2004, case) 7 2 1 1 2 
• Lost days (2002-2004, days) 150 168 3 4 7 
• Violations (2002-2004, items) 96 114 78 57 125 
• Fine (2002-2004, per 1000 Pounds) 9.3 6.2 4.2 3.5 7.8 
• F.R 0.9 1.01 0.23 0.80 2.18 
• S.R. 16.90 84.46 0.69 3.2 7.63 
SIMPI 5.496 4.281 6.479 5.620 4.534 
In addition, two other reactive safety records, violations and fines, were collected for 
further comparison and analysis. Violations are citation times which were issued by the 
local heath and safety authority from 2002 to 2004. Fines are the amount of money 
which was issued by the local heath and safety authority after inspection. Failure to 
comply with a violation within a specified period of time is the main conditions that the 
inspected plant receives a fine. 
The sample was too small from which to derive significant conclusions, nevertheless, a 
comparison with these reactive data was carried out to draw trends. Figures 9.7,9.8,9.9 
and 9.10, all reveal that the SIMPI has a good correlation with these reactive safety 
records. These comparisons reveal that the SIMPM tool can not only be used to improve 
SIM but can also predict safety performance at an early stage as well as provide 
information for accident prevention. 
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9.5 Validity of the SIMPM tool 
The SIMPM tool was implemented on five process plants in Taiwan. From the 
processes and results of the case study, the validity of the SIMPM tool can be assessed 
in terms of information gathering, practical use, and reliability. 
9.5.1 Validity of information gathered 
In using the score from the second stage evaluation, SIMPI, the plants and other 
organisations need to be convinced that it is a realistic reflection of a plant's SIM 
performance. This question was addressed in the case study and although most 
participating plants agreed that the result was fair reflection of their performance, some 
identified a number of difficulties. Particularly striking for potential users of the SIMPI 
was the view that 'headline performance' should be given more weighting. This is 
based on the premise that the management system may not be effective, but also 
because it may be important that the publication of incidents help shape respondents 
perceptions that in turn will influence managers and other respondents. 
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9.5.2 Practical use of the tool 
Overall there were few issues related to the practical use of the tool, and most 
respondents in these five case-study plants found the experience trouble free. At the 
most basic level, respondents found the interface relatively straightforward to use and 
few found the need to engage with the helpdesk. The main practical suggestion from 
participating plants was that the SIMPM tool should be provided by an official 
organisation such as the Health and Safety Authority (which is the Labour Department 
in Taiwan) to enhance credibility. It was also suggested that the tool should be provided 
free of charge, at least for an initial period. The main difficulties with the SIMPM tool 
pertained to specific indicators, in particular the definitions around some of the 
indicators such as information behaviours, SIM tools and technology integration. 
In terms of enhancing the credibility of the tool, and therefore its validity, a majority of 
the respondents and experts argued the need for verification of the SIMPM data. This 
concern has been solved to a certain extent by the added weight to perspectives and 
indicators that were determined from the results of Survey I. Independent verification is 
important, although this would be extremely burdensome. Two particularly important 
points are: that the verification was voluntary which has encouraged less well resourced 
plants to participate in the determination of the weights of perspectives and indicators; 
and that verification or not will follow if the SIMPM tool is introduced, used, and is 
shown to be effective. 
Demonstrating commitment to SIM was identified as the main benefit of completing an 
assessment using the SIMPM tool by plants from the sectors participating in the 
research. This was reflected by expert views that improving reputation was important. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, keeping information usable was not only a requirement for the 
plants, but is also of interest to the public. Participants identified a number of internal 
benefits of completing an assessment using the tool, in particular benchmarking within a 
sectors and the provision of information and drivers for SIM improvement. Using the 
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SIMPM to benchmark was also identified as a potential use by inspectors from the 
Health and Safety Authority. 
The proposed SIMPM tool is a self-explanatory tool that was shown to be able to be 
implemented without fuss following a two-hour briefing with the site supervisor by the 
researcher. All five plants successfully implemented SIMPM without much further 
intervention. The language used was simple and easy to understand. In particular, the 
two-stage evaluation process was welcomed because the first stage of the SIMPM tool 
provided a screening measurement to avoid the possibility of performing a full 
evaluation unnecessarily. The verbal comments made by the management demonstrated 
the simplicity of the SIMPM tool. 
The culmination of feedback from participants on the case studies was ultimately a 
question about whether they would complete a live version of the SIMPM for their 
organisation. The responses to this question were mixed. Although all five plants 
indicated that they personally would have no difficulty in completing the SIMPM in a 
live situation, they were unable to commit one way or the other about the industry as a 
whole. The most common explanation for their reluctance may be that the board would 
need to be consulted. It is tempting to speculate how the board responds to a poor score. 
It is also worth noting that the above is a limitation of research based on trials rather 
than on live situations. 
9.5.3 Reliability 
Any measurement tool must demonstrate its reliability, meaning the degree of 
consistency in producing the same results every time a repeat measurement is made. 
The SIMPM tool also demonstrated during all the case studies on the plants its ability to 
identify the level of performance of each perspective and indicator. The identification of 
the weaker perspectives and indicators enabled management to focus on improving their 
performance. Plant B and Plant C both identified the weaker indicators and planned 
remedial actions accordingly. In order to measure the effectiveness of the actions taken, 
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another assessment was carried out. The result demonstrated an improvement on the 
identified weak perspectives and indictors. 
SIMPM is not only a measurement tool, but is also a tool that can be used to identify 
weaknesses and, hence, improve the performance of the SIM perspectives and 
indicators on the plant. However, the samples of this case study are small and reliability 
across time cannot be demonstrated. The reliability test that can be carried out is within 
the tool itself. This means looking at the uniformity within the responses to questions 
asked. The responses gathered from the Plants A, B, C, D and E, gave a total of 25 data 
sets. These data sets can be analysed to demonstrate reliability. 
9.6 Summary 
The case study has been carried out to test the proposed SIMPM tool. This case study 
included two tests called 'study l' and 'study 2'. Five plants participated in study 1 and 
two plants in study 2. The two plants in study 2 were those with the best and worst 
scores in study 1. The gap between study 1 and study 2 was 5 months. The analysis of 
the results from the five plants was not intended to compare the performance of the 
plants but rather to demonstrate the capabilities of the SIMPM. The summary of this 
case study is as follow: 
• Overall the five plants performed within the 'poor' to 'moderate' categories in 
study 1. This is not surprising because the participating plants had, traditionally, 
followed conservative polices of safety information sharing. Most of the 
management expected a higher score but were concerning about the issue of 
business security which inhibited their management of safety information. 
• The dispersion of indicators performance score was as expected. The highest 
standard deviation was 0.24 and the lowest was 0.04. This shows a big dispersion 
from the mean for the SIMPM indicators that obtained the standard deviation 0.24. 
• In average, the highest performance was 0.81 for indicator 05-permit to work. 
This shows that the staff at all five plants agreed on this indicator. Overall 70fthe 
28 indicators achieved a mean performance score of 0.6 and above. The five 
216 
Chapter 9 Implementation and Validation 
indicators that obtained a mean performance score of below 0.4 are U4-
Information behaviour, US-system utilisation, TI-SIM tools U3-Users 
competence and T7-Disposition. 
• It is encouraged that SIMPM would be applied periodically on the same plant. 
The management of Plants Band C agreed to participate with a second follow-up 
study (study 2). Periodic testing will enable management to monitor the weak 
perspectives and indicators or respondent categories that tend to respond 
negatively in order to improve performance. Overall, both plants improved on the 
second study. SIMPM had helped management to identify weak SIM indicators 
and management had taken steps to improve performance. 
• The SIMPM tool tests have demonstrated the difficulty in comparing SIMPI results 
with reactive safety data due to different interpretations by different companies. 
This difficulty is compounded by doubts concerning the reliability of data sources. 
Reactive data is not a reliable guide as there is no consistency with the data from 
one plant to another. On the contrary it was easier to do comparisons using the 
results of the SIMPI because all the trial plants were being compared with the same 
perspectives and indicators. This clearly proves that the process industry will 
benefit from having a single generic SIMPM tool. 
• The case study results showed that the better respondents were the safety manger 
and line supervisor. The main reason is that these two types of respondents control 
and deal with most of the safety information in their daily activities. They can 
easily understand the indicators in the SIMPM and realise that SIM problems exist 
in their plant after viewing the results of evaluations. Therefore, for the purpose of 
adopting SIMPM effectively, further study may consider the possibility of limiting 
the number of respondents. For example, the safety manager and a line supervisor 
might be sufficient to enable a valid result to be obtained from the SIMPM tool. 
• The comparison of the results of the two stages of the full evaluation process 
shows a strong correlation. All the plants participating in the case study accepted 
the first stage evaluation using the SIM checklist. Few of the respondents 
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mentioned that the second stage evaluation needed further development to reduce 
the time required. 
• Even though SIMPM tool was implemented using the hardcopy version, from 
discussions during the case study it was expressed that the potential of SIMPM 
would be maximised of package as an information communication technology 
(leT) tool. The design of an electronic version of the SIMPM tool would greatly 
assist its future use on any size and type of process plant. 
218 
Chapter 10 Discussion and Conclusions 
Chapter 10 - Discussion and Conclusions 
10.1 General remarks 
The original thought that induced the research was that if a SIM system is not managing 
the right aspects it is ineffective in providing an integrated information infrastructure for 
safety. In order to adequately perform SIM, process plants have to establish a SIM 
system with comprehensive characteristics and to identify their objectives from the 
continuous evaluation of current SIM conditions by a scientific and systematic 
methodology. 
The degree to which the research objectives have been achieved is discussed and 
shown in this chapter. The first part presents an overview of the key discussion issues 
associated with the development of the SIMPM framework and tool. Then, the 
conclusions and the implications that emerge from this research are provided. Lastly, 
recommendations for further work are given. 
10.2 Discussion 
The degree of validation of the SIMPM tool has been presented in Section 9.5. This 
section provides the discussion through different aspects from the effectiveness of the 
proposed framework for the measurement of the performance of a SIM system to the 
limitations of the SIMPM tool. Therefore, the results of this research are discussed in 
three sections as follows: 
• Providing a framework for SIM performance measurement. 
• Value ofthe SIMPM tool to organisations and others. 
• Limitations of the SIMPM tool. 
10.2.1 Providing a framework for SIM performance measurement 
Although many previous researchers have addressed the performance measurement of 
both Information Management (lM) and Safety Management (SM), and in some cases 
discussed the possibility of using the BSC concept for performance measurement, none 
of them provided a practical framework for SIM performance measurement. To the best 
of the author's knowledge this research is the first work aimed at developing a SIM 
performance measurement framework by adopting the BSC concept as well as 
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combining the general considerations of IM and SM performance measurement. 
Therefore, the validity of the proposed SIM performance framework can be discussed 
from IM and SM viewpoints. 
10.2.1.1 From the IM point of view 
As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 5, previous researchers have addressed the problem 
that theoretical IM evaluation models may not be easily applied to real situations. 
Particularly, the problem that current IM performance frameworks do not address the 
relationship between importance of safety information for users internal and external to 
the organisation. As a result, it is difficult to use the evaluation results directly to any 
related business decision-makings. In order to overcome these limitations, this research 
proposed the SIMPM framework, as a corresponding evaluation system, which is 
expected to estimate the current SIM status from four perspectives and to feedback the 
results into a SIM correction process. The evidence from the case study for the SIMPM 
tool suggests that two common errors must be avoided when implementing the BSC 
concept. 
1. Failure to include specific long-term objectives: A Balanced Scorecard can 
easily become part of the operational-level management systems rather than 
serving as the foundation for a strategic management system. In four of the five 
observed cases, this was due largely to the absence of specific long-term 
objectives for SIM, particularly related to the Strategic perspective. With a 
continuing emphasis on short-term goals such as 'up-to-date safety operation 
procedures', the SIM performance objectives are unlikely to represent much of a 
change from business as usual. The strategic performance objectives in the case 
study plants were sub-optimal and rather modest, or else peripheral to 
improvements in a system performance. As a result, it can be suggested that the 
effectiveness of a BSC for SIM will be enhanced by including stretch goals that 
require significant improvement in key areas. 
2. Failure to relate key measures to performance drives by means of cause-and-
effect relationships: Each of the case study plants was only able to identify a few 
cause-and-effect relationships and performance drivers in its SIM performance 
evaluation. In one case, system availability, responsiveness to user requests, and 
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timely delivery of new applications were agreed to be performance drivers for 
user satisfaction. However, the management team neglected to specify how the 
performance in these three areas would be improved. 
This research suggests that such improvements are possible through different 
mechanisms, including the development of a competent employee for SIM, the adoption 
of new practical SIM tools, and/or the employment of better project management 
methods. As a result, it is required that explicit cause-and-effect relationships must be 
identified before a BSC for SIM is implemented. It is critical not only to relate 
performance drivers to the performance measures in each key area, but also to consider 
how each of the performance drivers will significantly improve one or more of the key 
measures of performance. 
The cases studied reinforced a belief that while the specifics of a BSC for SIM could 
differ from plant to plant, it is beneficial to build upon a standard framework, such as 
the one proposed in this research, rather than starting from scratch. For example, in one 
case where a clean-sheet approach for SIM was employed, the User Orientation 
perspective contained some measures that were clearly related to internal operations, the 
Strategic perspective was poorly developed, and the Operational perspective neglected 
measures for hardware acquisition and user training. Therefore, from the viewpoint of 
IM, a well-defined BSC for SIM can avoid the problem of non-standardisation for 
performance measurement. 
10.2.1.2 From the SM point of view 
Businesses require a simple and low cost measurement of performance (if possible a 
single indicator) covering every main area. It would be optimal if such a measure were 
to be found, but there is no such single measure that is completely adequate to measure 
occupational health and safety. Some theorists believe that where people and complex 
technology meet, there are always going to be safety problems and accidents are to be 
expected where such systems are operating. This means that a balance between 
suggested performance perspectives is needed. A publication from the UK regulator, 
the Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 2001) supports the arguments outlined above 
and recommends a "Balanced Scorecard (BSC)" approach as a reliable measure of 
health and safety performance. 
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It was found that none of the five plants in the case study used a BSC approach in 
implementing their SM strategy and SIM in particular. All of the companies checked 
some important safety information but none considered the process and input measures 
for assessing SIM performance. The thoughts of respondents gathered in the case study 
revealed that all levels within the plant do not understand the need for a clear and 
cohesive SIM performance measurement framework. After the case study exercise the 
managers involved all agreed that the BSC for SIM is an easy-to-understand concept 
and the SIMPM result can be a leading indicator for safety management. 
From the information collected in this paper it is evident that the management within 
the process industry endorse the value of applying a BSC approach to SIM as well as 
safety management. However, the results are not yet available that will show the real 
benefit of the SIM performance measurement to safety management in Taiwan. There is 
much scope for improvement, particularly in selecting and including critical indicators 
for SIM using the BSC concept. 
10.2.2 Value of the SIMPM tool to organisations and others 
Without doubt, safety performance improvement is a fundamental pre-requisite of 
global sustainabiIity. As a result, and in the long run, it is undeniable that all businesses 
whose activities and products have safety (and health and environment) impacts will be 
required, whether by regulation, international trade requirements or public pressure, to 
track, report and improve safety management. Consequently, and given that safety 
managers and operators presently spend a majority of their time recording data rather 
than managing safety information, improving SIM should be seen as a paramount and 
primary step in the right direction. Ultimately, therefore, evaluation of SIM 
performance through an effective tool must be recognised as both an essential 
component of corporate and global sustainabiIity and a solution that will provide 
enormous short term rewards as well as unparalleled and wide-spread long term benefits 
for all stakeholders affected by safety performance. 
In addition to being able to compare SIM system components across sites, when using a 
standard application that provides a common performance measurement framework for 
all users, it is similarly possible to monitor key performance perspectives and indicators 
across the organisation. Standard key performance perspectives and indicators provide 
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the basis for a regular, systematic and consistent approach to data collection and 
presentation and thus an improvement in the credibility, reliability and usefulness of key 
performance perspectives data. Stipulating and setting corporate key performance 
perspectives and indicators, while simultaneously providing a mechanism for sites to 
quickly and easily enter performance data, results in increased quality, 
comprehensiveness, comparability and confidence in the information available and thus 
a greater ability to implement effective performance improvement both at the site and 
across the organisation is achieved. 
Reaction to the proposed SIMPM tool from potential users was clear. However, views 
may have been formed on minimal understanding of the SIMPM tool. The majority saw 
the benefit of having a uniform score for SIM performance and how this could assist 
their work especially through benchmarking and engagement. This could be updated on 
a yearly basis which would be in line with authority review. However, this information 
would probably be supplementary to a portfolio of other tools and information sources 
that the plant itself, the authority and the public have access to and in many cases would 
lead to further research. 
10.2.3 Limitations of the tool 
It is true that the proposed SIMPM tool is not perfect and can never be absolutely 
perfect. Limitations of the tool were identified as follows and they can be used as the 
basis of further research for continuous improvement. 
1. Tacit safety knowledge 
It can be said that knowledge is something that evolves in people's minds by a 
combination of data, information and experiences. There are two general 
categories of knowledge, which have to be differentiated: tacit knowledge and 
explicit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is the internal knowledge which is hard to 
describe (like e.g. how to ride a bike - everyone can do it, but hardly describe it), 
while explicit knowledge is codified knowledge, that is, knowledge written down 
(like e.g. a handbook). Therefore, in contrast to explicit safety knowledge, the 
parameters of tacit safety knowledge are unfortunately hardly countable and 
definable. This makes it difficult to record or document tacit safety knowledge in 
such a way that others can benefit from it. Although it is difficult it is, however, 
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possible to turn tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge. This kind of knowledge 
can be stored and transferred and be later turned into implicit knowledge by the 
receivers. However, such explicit knowledge never describes the original tacit 
knowledge as a whole, but instead assumes a common basis of understanding on 
which the transmission back to implicit knowledge is based. 
Although tacit safety knowledge might be checked using the experience of a team, 
it is, as yet, not clearly defined and accepted. In the management of safety 
information, the difficulty of identifying tacit safety knowledge still exists, before 
the problem of evaluating it can be solved. Therefore, the proposed SIMPM tool 
does not include tacit safety knowledge. 
2. Quantitative measures of indicator 
One of the main requirements of the BSC is the need for both quantitative and 
qualitative measures. However, for most SIM indicators, quantitative measures are 
difficult to identify. Therefore, this research adopted a relative ranking method 
which can provide a score for each measure. Further research may be needed to 
transfer these semi-quantitative measures into quantitative ones. 
3. Same evaluation questions for all respondents 
The tool applied a single evaluation form for all respondents. Every respondent 
answers the same questions. When comparing the results it is easy to reveal the 
agreement level between different categories of respondents and to identify where 
and who needs improvement. However, it is clear that some indictors in the 
SIMPM tool directly relate to specific respondents. It can be argued that the 
correct response for these indicators should be collected from the appropriate 
respondents only. In the case study, some respondents also suggested that they 
were not able to answer some questions for a specific indicator. Therefore, it may 
be required to consider that for each indicator a different question is set for each 
respondent. 
4. MUltiple respondents 
There will be a tendency that some respondents will respond simply to please the 
management or to make a point. The practice of involving several representatives 
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will reduce any bias. For example, at least two respondents from each category 
could participate in the measurement at the same time. However, it is also 
important to avoid the requirement for excessive human resources in the 
evaluation activity. 
5. Sector specific indicators 
This research has developed a feasible and valid framework for an index to score 
SIM performance within organisations. The objective was to set a standard that 
enabled the index to be completed by all possible types of process plants so that 
plants could be compared regardless of the sector of the process industry in which 
they reside. Some respondents indicated that they would welcome, or indeed, 
prefer sector specific indices. Hence, an option is to build on the current index and 
further strengthen its appeal by identifying and developing sector-specific 
indicators. These could operate in connection with or as a supplement to the cross-
sector index. 
10.3 Conclusion 
10.3.1 Research objectives and outcomes 
Despite the large number of studies that have addressed the concept of misinformation 
and information failure as causes of accidents, limited research has focused on the 
evaluation of SI M performance in the process industry. To the best of knowledge of the 
author, such research investigations have not developed a dynamic framework that 
provides for the continuous identification, selection, implementation, monitoring and 
performance measurement of SIM. Therefore, the main aim of this research was to 
develop a practical and valid tool to measure not only the level of SIM but to evaluate 
the effectiveness of SIM performance. It is thus intended to provide continuous 
information concerning changes in the SIM state and to introduce a further incentive for 
plant directors and safety managers to improve SIM and safety management. The aim of 
the research was realised through the achievement ofthe following four objectives: 
• Identify and classify inadequate SIM by conducting a plant investigation 
• Identify the important perspectives and indicators of SIM performance 
• Develop a SIM Performance Measurement (SIMPM) tool 
• Implement the of SI MP M tool by conducting a case study 
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The SIMPM tool has been developed and tested. Use of the SIMPM tool yields the 
following main infonnation: 
• The plant SIM perfonnance level 
• The analysis of the perfonnance of each perspective and indicator 
• The respondents influence on indicators 
• The strong and the weak indicators 
In addition to the actual development of the SIMPM tool, the research also addressed a 
number of underlying factors of SI M research as follows: 
• The establishment of four perspectives with 28 indicators to measure SIM 
perfonnance on sites. These four perspectives with 28 indicators have undergone a 
rigorous validation process to ensure that only the important factors are chosen for 
SIMPM. The indicators were chosen to best represent generic SIM factors 
affecting SIM perfonnance on site and should form the basis of any deeper 
measurement system. 
• This research has also developed a scoring method to calculated SIM performance. 
It is easily implemented and understood. The scoring method consists of five main 
components as follows: 
• The performance criteria of perspectives and indicators. 
• The performance scale which compares the measured valued of the criterion to a 
standard or selected benchmark value. 
• The weights which determine the relative importance of each perspective and 
indicator to the others and to the overall measure of SIM performance. 
• The value of each perspectives and indicator which is the result of multiplying 
the score with the average. 
• The overall performance score that is the SIMPI to indicate and track 
performance. 
10.3.2 Implications for the research 
What the research has shown is that the current SIM systems are, in reality, an odd 
collection of spreadsheets and point IT applications that do not properly connect and 
communicate with each other. In addition to developing SIMPM as a proactive SIM 
performance measurement tool in accordance with the objectives, this research also 
reviewed the industry problems regarding safety information and identified the issues 
226 
Chapter 10 Discussion and Conclusions 
that warrant future investigations. The implications that were drawn from this research 
to establish the objectives ofthis research are presented on the following sections. 
I. Measure SIM performance against accident statistics 
The process industry still measures safety performance against accident statistics 
even though they may adopt a pro active approach. Accident prevention requires 
the creation and maintenance of a safe working environment and promotion of 
safety behaviour. Safety management effort has been directed at the prevention of 
repetitions of accidents that have already occurred, largely on the basis of 
information derived from detailed accident investigation. Consequently, safety 
information management is the core of safety management. The main reason why 
safety management has concentrated on reactive prevention is that it is easier to 
deal with than proactive prevention. However, assessing risks and devising plans 
without the help of information is difficult; it involves weighting the probabilities 
of a wide range of unwanted outcomes and preparing an integrated control plan to 
cope with all the hazards detected. The reasons that reactive data is limited in 
function to measure SIM performance are as follows: 
• Most accident reports only include activities which were directly and 
immediately involved m the accident. The failure to look towards 
understanding the factors such as misinformation causing the unsafe 
behaviour, limits the suitability of most accident reports. 
• For each accident there are a large number of minor accidents and, 
correspondingly, a much large number of unsafe acts and misinformation. 
• Inefficiency of reporting where important information was missing. 
• Under-reporting of accident and cases of ill-health disguises the true 
accident situation. 
2. The performance measurement adopted should be generic and comprehensive 
While the need for SIM performance measurement is clear, many organisations 
neglect its importance and most attempts result in unsatisfactory measures. When 
industry attempts to collect consistent data it must be tailored to suit the 
information that is readily available. Therefore, if statistics are to be used to 
monitor SIM information performance, it is extremely important that common and 
consistent records/data be collected industry-wide. Confidence in industry SIM 
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performance will not grow until a set of data besides accident figures is available 
that honestly reflects industry status with respect to SIM performance. If industry 
cannot accurately measure SIM performance, it cannot manage it. Furthermore, the 
commitment to SIM appears extremely negligent if performance data are not 
available to back it up. 
3. The potential of the SIMPM tool 
The proposed framework was the primary focus of this research and was structured 
using the BSC principles adapted to the specific requirements of the process 
industry. Although the BSC is a mature concept employed extensively by 
researchers and practitioners across a broad range of industries worldwide, this is 
the first attempt that has been made to utilise it for evaluating the performance of 
SIM in the process industry. This study conducted an in-depth research 
methodology to extract, screen, refine and validate SIM performance indicators 
across four distinct BSC perspectives. The development of the SIM performance 
measurement framework is unique in structure and has the advantage of being 
easily adapted to suit other decision tiers (business unit, enterprise) of process 
industry organisations. 
The SIMPM tool was designed to be a generic measurement tool that is applicable 
to any process plant at any phase. The development of the SIMPM as a proactive 
measurement tool reduces the dependency to measure safety against reactive data. 
The SIMPM tool also involves the participation of various levels of personnel from 
plant manager to operatives. The feedback of results from carrying out the SIMPM 
tool is informative and able to highlight in detail the performance of each SIM 
indicator. Each assessment will be able to identify weaknesses in the management 
of safety information and hence SIMPM has the potential to be a generic 
measurement tool capable of enhancing SIM on a plant. 
4. Involve key categories of personnel in SIM performance measurement 
The measurement tool that was discussed above generally encourages a more 
proactive approach with good management practice and the transfer of ownership 
of safety information to every individual. Employees should recognise that the key 
determinant of successful management is the promotion of positive safety 
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information behaviour and that good SIM performance is not just a matter of the 
preparation of well-structured safety procedures and documents. The attitudes and 
beliefs of directors and all employees to the problems are crucial. It is vital that 
everyone believes that the control measures are appropriate in relation to the risk, 
they are workable and they are effective. Once such a positive mood prevails 
within an organisation, then there is a real prospect of willing compliance with the 
SIM measures. 
It is also essential to check that the policies and procedures set up by the company 
director and site management are actually implemented on site and the best way to 
establish this is to ask the operatives. IT staff also play an important role in SIM to 
keep the systems running properly. 
10.3.3 Implications for the process industry 
Industries can gain benefits and competitive advantages from the successful 
implementation of SIM projects. However, one of the results of the research was a 
demonstration that the process industry does not measure SIM performance properly. 
Adopting a performance measurement approach is the first step to efficiently and 
effectively transform or re-engineer the traditional process industries view of safety 
information and, ultimately, to improve the safety and productivity of the process 
industry. 
It was found that the process industry needs pro active SIM performance measurement 
techniques that are able to do the following: 
• Assess SIM performance in a way that helps to prevent and not just record accidents. 
• Describe when and where to expect trouble and provide guidelines concerning 
what should be done to manage safety information effectively. 
• Evaluate the effects of changes in SIM as rapidly as possible and report 
continuously on the change in the level of the performance ofSIM. 
• Measure the presence of important safety information instead of the lack of 
unnecessary information. 
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It is essential to have measurements reflecting current practice, trends and productivity, 
in order to improve safety performance through SIM implementation. To achieve this, 
Chapters 5 through to 9 of this thesis detail the development and application of a 
practical SIMPM framework and the associated tool for all decision-making. The 
attractiveness of the framework and tool to the process industry is its simplicity and 
flexibility. It is the author's contention that SIMPM should be measured across the 
proposed four perspectives and 28 indicators. However, the remaining elements of the 
framework might not be considered fixed. For example, SIM performance measures 
under their mother factors (indicators) can be individually developed to suit the 
objectives of the organisation. 
The research also attempts to promote a SIM culture for the process industry. The 
SIMPM framework is designed as a lifecycle management framework to help industry 
professionals evaluate their SIM projects for their plants, strategically implement these 
evaluations and continuously monitor the implemented SIM projects. Such a tool will 
mitigate again SIM risk factors and ensure that efficient and effective SIM occurs. 
10.4 Directions for future research 
This thesis demonstrated the development of a prototype SIMPM tool and its 
application to a limited sample only. Overall the tool has the future potential to be a 
generic measurement tool that is easily implemented on any process plant. Nevertheless, 
current limitations of the tool, which have been presented in section 10.2.3, should be 
taken into account for further work in order to improve the tool's prospective 
applications. In addition to the improvement of the limitations mentioned above, 
particular parts of the tool and analysis methods reported in this thesis need future 
research and development. They are summarised in the following sections: 
1. Glossary and examples 
Throughout the SIMPM tool, there are terms which may benefit from further 
explanation and guidance. An extensive glossary is likely to benefit the clarity of 
the SIMPM tool and hence users confidence that the information is consistent and 
accurate. A wider piloting process that captures a wider set of examples of 
'information failure' would benefit from a clarification ofterms and reporting needs. 
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2. Best practice advice for each indicator 
Best practice advice for each indicator must be defined in order to help the 
management to improve performance. This can be developed based on current 
practices, literature reviews and expert opinions. This 'best practice 'information 
will aid management to design action plans, to tackle weak indicators, and will 
ensure that management is taking the right steps to deal with the situation and 
should in itself form the best of training material for site personnel. 
3. Large scale validation of the SIMPM tool 
The current form of the SIMPM tool is the result of a serious of investigation and 
case studies involving a number of plants and experts. The investigations and case 
studies relied on a relatively small number of respondents. Ideally, a large number 
of responses are acquired to enable a large scale validation of the results. 
Therefore, the next stage in the SIMPMT tool's development should be a large 
scale validation through an electronic interface. Work should also be undertaken to 
evaluate the long-term performance of SIM in the process industry. Case studies 
should employ the proposed tool not only at the plant alone but also across the 
whole enterprise. To capture the transfer of SIM performance improvement from 
the plant unit to the whole enterprise, and eventually to the whole industries, the 
case studies will need to be undertaken over a relatively long-term period (Le. 3 to 
5 year). 
4. Electronic version ofthe SIMPM tool 
The case study was performed using a paper-based version of the SIMPM tool. 
This required a transcription of the responses into the Excel calculation sheet. 
Ideally, a computer based form of the SIMPM tool is suggested to be available on-
line for either downloading by plants and/or online completion. This would ease 
completion of the SIMPM and encourage its application. When SIMPM is 
designed as a computer-aided object-based interactive assessment tool to measure 
SIM performance on site, an interactive tool would be able to feedback the correct 
information much faster and thus save time. For this situation, database 
application such as Microsoft Access could be chosen, as it is a powerful database 
package and a development tool under Microsoft Windows which ensures wide 
applicability. The windows environment means that the software responds to 
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events performed by the user by means of clicking an icon or selecting menu 
options. The main concern in selecting an application package is to allow easy 
exchange of data between MS Excel spreadsheets. Another issue is that the 
selected application must be used as a platform for various plant measurement and 
data collection applications. 
5. Further areas for SIM performance measurement 
This research primarily focused on medium to large process plants. Further 
research could extend the study to examine the applicability of the SIMPM tool to 
small process plants and even to other industries such as manufacturing after 
reasonable modifications and case studies. 
10.5 Closure 
In order to evaluate and improve SIM performance, this research developed an 
integrated measurement framework and its application tool that can be used to diagnose 
the SIM performance level, identify the deficiencies ofthe current status, and return this 
information into improvement processes. The developed SIMPM framework utilised the 
BSC concept to encompass the full spectrum of direct and indirect factors associated 
with SIM. This framework was developed from a critical review of existing literature 
and applied through industry-based surveys. The framework is premised on a hybrid 
analysis utilising fuzzy logic and statistical analysis. The integrated framework and 
proposed tool were tested through case study to illustrate their adaptability and efficacy. 
Several conclusions were drawn from the work, the most important of which are as 
follows. First, it confirmed the need for enhanced safety information management 
performance in the process industry. Second, the research defined the concept of SIM 
performance improvement. Third, it extended the SIM performance measurement 
framework comprehensively via systematic translation of the conceptual framework 
into measurable items. Fourth, it supported practical evaluation tools. Fifth, it provided 
a foundation for further research and practice of SIM in the industry. 
During the course of this research a number of publications have been produced as 
listed in Appendix G. 
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Type Name of Authors Methods Evaluation elements Related 
assessment (Year) toSIM 
Safety Performance Magyar On site audit 5 main elements: N/A 
audit Rating (1983) Safety/work practices; Housekeeping standards; 
Storage practices; Machinery equipment and Injury 
experience 
Safety International Bond Yes/no 20 elements including 640 guestions: 2/20 
rating Safety Rating (1985) questions Leadership & Administration 
Systems Management training 
(lSRS) Planned inspection 
Task analysis and procedures 
Accident/incident investigation 
Task observation 
Emergency preparedness 
Organizational rules 
Accident/incident analysis 
Employee training 
Personal protective equipment 
Health control 
Programme evaluation system 
Engineering control 
Personal communication* 
Group meetings 
General promotion* 
Hiring and placement 
Purchasing control 
Off-the-job safety 
Safety Elements of Waldram On site 11 elements: 1111 
audit loss prevention (1991) Audit Leadership, commitment and accountability 
management Hazard identification, evaluation and control 
Rule, regulation and procedures and personnel 
selection and placement 
Skill, safety and management training 
Communication* 
Purchasing and engineering control 
Protective equipment 
Incident/accident reporting, investigation and analysis 
Emergency preparedness 
Audit 
Safety TOTAL Cote. et al. Survey 5 sections: N/A 
audit (1991) Check-list Operation and safety organization 
Exercises General safety practices 
Test Process hazard controls 
Technical condition of the installation 
Test and exercise 
Safety Safety System Fitts (1994) Interview 5 levels: 1/5 
audit Observation Safety basis (the objectives) 
Review Safety polices (that what) 
documentation Safety procedures (the how) 
Safety Documentation (the verification)* 
Safety system auditing (the confirmation) 
Safety Process risk Hurst& Questionnaire 8 key audit areas: N/A 
audit management Donald Audit Hazard review of design 
audit (PRIMA) (1996) Human factors review of maintenance 
Checking/supervision of maintenance tasks 
Routine inspection and maintenance 
Human factors review of operations 
Checking/supervision construction installation 
Hazard review of operation 
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Appendix A - Existing positive safety performance approaches (continued) 
Type Name of Authors Methods Evaluation elements Related 
assessment (Year) toSIM 
Safety Resource EPSC Audit 2 parts: N/A 
audit efficient (1996) Review REALM I-a management system component 
auditing for essentially common across all element ofHSE 
line REALM2-a technicaVphysical conditions framework, 
management 
I (REALM) 
subdivided according to the HSE disciplines 
I~~ Operating EPSC Questionnaire 13 areas: 3713 autt system (1996) Management of change 
Process technology documentation* 
Training 
Safety process 
Process risk management 
Operating procedures 
Dynamic process information* 
Product and service quality 
Environmental 
Industrial hygiene 
Administration* 
Safety Safety Culture ATA Interviews 3 grouIls. 9 key sub-grouIls: 1/9 
cultui'e Assessment Technology Questionnaire Management and organizational factors 
Tool (1996) Positive organizational attributes 
Management commitment to safety 
Strategic flexibility 
Participation and empowerment 
Enabling activities 
Reinforcement and incentives 
Communication* 
Individual factors 
Individual ownership 
Individual perceptions 
Training 
S~ety Climate Survey HSE Questionnaire 10 factors: 1720 
cultui'e Tool (1997a) Organisational commitment & communication* 
Line management commitment 
Supervisor's role 
Personal role 
Work mate influence 
Competence 
Risk taking behaviour and some contributory 
influences 
Obstacles to safe behaviour 
Permit to work systems 
Reporting of accident and near misses 
S~~ 'Tri Safe' Queensland Interview 10 elements: 1710 
autt Audit Government Questionnaire Health and safety policy 
(1998) Allocation of responsibility laccountability 
Suppliers, sub-contractors and purchasing controls 
Health and safety consultation 
Hazard identification, evaluation and control 
Provision ofinformation* 
Workplace specific issues 
Training 
Reporting and investigation 
Emergency planning 
Safety Complete H&S HASTAM Questions Set of questions (modules) which are available from N/A 
audit evaluation (1999) HAST AM or which can be created by the clients. 
(CHASE) 
243 
Appendix 
Appendix B - The recording form for plant investigation 
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The recording form for plant investigation 
1. Basic information 
Company Name: Company Type: 
Employee: Main product: 
Interviewee name Department: Interviewee position Date 
2. Current practices 
2.1 What type of your company's SIM system is? (full-manual, half-computerised-part 
manual and part computerised, or full-computerised) 
2.2 The type of your plant's SIM system? (self-developed, commercial package, or 
developed by software contractor) 
23 h b k t e ac :groun d fIt' SIM t o pan s sys em: 
Basic 
. nformation 
Features 
2.4 SIM status 
2.4.1 Police and management domains: 
• Does the plant have a policy for SIM? If so, is the policy documented and 
understood by employees, contactors and business partners? 
• Does the plant culture recognise information as a strategic asset? If yes, what are 
the indicators that support this answer? 
• How has senior management demonstrated their understanding, commitment and 
leadership for SIM? 
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• Are SIM roles, responsibilities and accountabilities clearly defined and understood? 
• How is SIM integrated into the organization's strategic and operational goals and 
objectives? 
• How importance do you think SIM is to an efficient safety management program? 
• Does your company carry out performance evaluation for SIM? If yes, what 
kinds of methods are used? And do you think the method(s) is (are) reliable 
to pick up the problems on SIM? 
2.4.2 Internal operation domains 
• Has safety information been defined and categorised? 
• How dose your plant handle each kind of safety information as showing 
following? 
Process knowledge 
Process Hazard 
Analysis (PHA) 
Operation procedures 
Incidents/near misses 
reporting/investigation 
246 
Permit to work 
Management of 
change 
Emergency response 
Safety work practices 
2.4.3 User and culture domain 
• Is user (internal & external) satisfaction of SIM measured regularly? 
Appendix 
• Are the users' expectations/ needs/ wants considered in planning and delivery of 
information products and services? 
• What roles do users play in moulding the information product and services? What 
more do you think the Organization could be doing in this area? 
2.4.4 Technology and system domain 
• What are main strengths of your company's SIM system? 
• What are the weaknesses of your company's SIM system? 
• 
• How would you assess the Organisation's capabilities with respect to SIM? The 
gaps? What suggestions would you offer to improve these capabilities? 
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Appendix C - The questionnaire for Survey I 
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Department of Chemical Engineering 
Loughborough University Leicestershire LE11 3TU UK 
Switchboard:+44(O) 1509 263171 Department:+44(O) 1509 2253213 
Dear SirlMadam, 
Appendix 
~ Loughborough 
.. University 
Information failures have been cited as a significant contributing factor and precondition in 
studies of organization disasters and accidents. Examples abound of missed or ignored 
warning signals and failure to handle safety information in ways that could have prevented 
catastrophic outcomes. Thus a research project at Loughborough University is 
investigating Safety Information Management (SIM) and its measurement and is 
developing a prototype tool for the process industries. 
The first step in the research programme is to solicit and consolidate industry knowledge 
for the formulation of an industry-based framework for SIM performance evaluation in the 
process industries. You are requested kindly to take approximately 20 minutes to complete 
the questionnaire and post it back to me in the envelop enclosed, ASAP. 
All data will be used for academic purposes only, as a critical part of a PhD research 
project at Loughborough University. Individual responses will be kept strictly confidential 
and shall only be available to the research team. Only a consolidated summary of the 
results may be published. Your assistance in completing the questionnaire is very much 
appreciated. Thank you. 
Your sincerely 
Department of Chemical Engineering 
Loughborough University 
Leicestershire LEt 1 3TU, UK 
Attn: Tzu-Lien Tzou Tel: 01509 222546 Email: T.L.Tzou@lboro.ac.uk 
Definition: 
Safety Information (SI): A complete and up-to-date set of documents required to maintain a 
good performance in the safety area. The crucial safety information includes material safety data 
sheets, process knowledge, operation procedures, safety work practices, maintenance records, 
accident/near miss reports, and emergency response information etc. 
Safety Information Management (SIM): A set of management initiatives used to effectively 
produce, co-ordinate, store, retrieve and disseminate safety information from internal and 
external sources in order to improve the safety performance of the organization. 
Safety Information Management system (SIM system): A system that optimizes the 
collection, transfer, and presentation of safety information through an organisation, in accordance 
with defined procedures, whether automated or manual. 
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A. General information 
1.1 Your position: 0 Safety Manager or Safety engineer 
o Supervisor 
o Operator 
o other (please state) _______________ _ 
1.2 Length of time in process industry: 
o Less than 2 years 0 2-10 years 0 Over 10 years 
1.3 Company type:O Petroleum Products Manufacturing 
o Chemical material Manufacturing 
o Chemical Products Manufacturing 
o Other (please state) _______________ _ 
1.4 Company size(number of employee): 0 Over 500 0 100-499 0 99-30 0 Under 30 
1.5 Does the company have hazardous site that needs a permit by an authority: 
ONo 
DYes, has one (than please answer 1.5.1) 
DYes, has more than one (than please answer 1.5.2) 
1.5.1 Has the hazardous site been permitted to operate? 
ONo DYes 
1.5.2 Have the hazardous sites been permitted to operate? 
ONone of all DYes, part of them DYes, all of them 
1.6 Does the company receive any safety related certification 
o ISO 9000 0 ISO 14000 0 OHSAS 18001 0 Other (please state ) _____ _ 
B. Current practice 
2.1 What type of SIM system does your company use? 
o All manual 
o Part manual and part computerised (than please answer 2.1.1) 
o Fully computerised (than please answer 2.1.1) 
2.1.1 The system(s) is/are (multiple): 
o Self-developed 0 Commercial package 0 Developed by software contractor 
o Other (please state), ________________ _ 
2.2 How important do you think SIM is to an efficient safety management program? 
OLess important OSlightly important Olmportant OVery important OAbsolutely important 
2.3 Does your company carry out performance evaluation for SIM? 
ONo 
DYes (than please answer 2.3.1,2.3.2 and 2.3.3) 
2.3.1 Which of the following methods are used (You may tick more than one answer): 
OChecklists ODocuments review OQuestionnaires OObservations 
Olntemal audit OExtemal audit OOther (please state ), __________ _ 
2.3.2 Do you think the method(s) is (are) reliable in picking up any problems related to SIM: 
OAbsolutely reliable 0 very reliable 0 slightly reliable 0 unreliable 0 very unreliable 
2.3.3 Are the results made known to everyone in the company? 
DYes ONo 0 I don't know 
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2.4 What is your opinion of your company's SIM system on a scale of 1-57 Please rate the listed 
performance factors using the scale shown. 
__ ._~<""'ry""."."'''_''''''t',,~.-_. -, '.....-.. .... ~--,..,." ...... .,.--...--"'.'.'...,"-..... "'-.-.,.....,...,.,.-.~.';'Y"'~ ..... ~:"'--~.~'...,'"'~~ J ,=Strongly Aisag!~~;~7"=:l)isaw:ee;3=S lightly" a:gre"e;_~_=.Agt:e.e; ?::Strongly. ~gr~~ 
Rank Performance factors I 2 3 4 5 
~.4.1 The planning and organization are adequate 
12.4.2 The responsibility of the system has been identified and informed 
~.4.3 It complies with company's safety policy and help preventing accident 
~.4.4 It is highly supported by header quarter 
~.4.5 It is audited frequently 
~.4.6 It improves external relationship 
12.4.7 It provides all process knowledge you need 
~.4.8 It provides all hazard analysis information you need 
12.4.9 It provides all operation procedures you need 
~.4.1 0 From it you can get internal and external incident messages you need 
~.4.11 It contends many unnecessary information 
~.4.l2 Most information from it is up-to-data 
~.4.l3.1t can provide most external safety information you require 
~.4.14 It helps you to do you work more safely 
~.4.15 You have been formally trained to use it 
~.4.16 It reduces your information load 
~.4.l71t usually provides information you need on time 
12.4.18 It improved safety learning and innovation 
~.4.l9 Most of the employees are not satisfied the system 
~.4.20 It is easy-to-use 
~.4.21 It provides good communication channels for exchanging information 
~.4.22 It can help generating related report 
~.4.23 The security and privacy of the system is adequate 
~.4.24 It has good mechanisms to preservation and disposition information 
~.4.25 It is maintained and technically supported by specific person 
C. Relative importance of the perspectives and indicators contributing to improve SIM performance 
1. An initial study identified four perspectives for SIM performance measurement. These 
perspectives are designed to be broad in nature and encompass distinct areas from where 
SIM-induced performance improvement may be derived. Please provide the percentage (%) 
weighting you wish to allocate to each of the four perspectives. The total weighting of the 
four perspectives must sum to 100%. 
Perspective: description Wei!!br»1o 
Strategic perspective: Concerned with how SIM contributes to the accomplishment 
of the organisation's overall safety mission and strategic goals. 
Operational perspective: Concerned with a complete and up-to-date set of 
engineering documentation functioning to improve performance of operation as well 
as all safety related tasks. 
User orientation perspective: Covers issues associated with usage such as tool 
utilisation, availability of training and technical support and satisfaction with the 
SIM system. This perspective is also concerned with the extent to which internal and 
external personal value safety information products and services. 
Technology/system perspective: Refers to the hardware, software, application 
programs, telecommunication networks, and the technical expertise that support the 
safety information processing and communications activities at all level of a plant. 
SUM 100% 
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2. Each perspective incorporates a number of performance indicators. These indicators examine the 
process plant where implementing SIM can improve safety as well as other benefits. In your 
opinion and on a scale of 1-5, please rate the importance level of the listed performance 
indicators within each perspective: 
I.:es§1iIiix>rtaiit(i)··.~(fgljtl~.@PQ~i(2)fu1P9~(3rV~~iriiP9~t(4)A!J~i~iY3~Wl18!li(~ 
Strategic perspective: Concerned with how SIM contribute to the accomplishment of the 
organisation's overall safety mission and strategic goals. 
Indicators for strategic perspective Rank 
1 2 3 
Strategic planning (Quality of strategic and operational plans for SIM, and the linkages 
between plans, resources, controls and safety policy) 
Organisation and responsibilities (appropriateness of the organisational structures to 
support SIM Extent to which roles and responsibilities are defined, understand and accepted) 
Acquisition (The extent to which mechanisms exist to ensure the optimal design, development 
and deployment of SI M initiatives) 
Leadership (The extent to which senior management is aware, understands, demonstrates 
commitment to a clear vision and set of strategic objectives) 
Evaluation (The extent to which SIM audit and review processes are in place to ensure 
awareness of and compliance with) 
Standardisation (Degree to which SI standards exist, are understand and applied) 
External relationship (The extent to which mechanisms tofacilitate partnerships and 
consultations with external organisations in support of effective SIM) 
Other (please specify): 
4 
Operational perspective: Concerned with the complete and up-to-date set of engineering 
documentation functioning to improve performance of operation as weD as aD safety related tasks. 
Indicators for operational perspective Rank 
1 2 3 4 
Process knowledge (The extent to which process knowledge is identified, catalogued, stored 
and applied to support the plant operation process) 
Process Hazard Analysis (The extent to which hazard information is identified and applied 
to support risk management) 
Operation procedures (The extent to which operational procedures are created, applied and 
reviewed to ensure normal and abnormal operation safely) 
Incidents/near misses reporting/investigation (The extent to which internal and 
external incidents/accidents are collected, analysed and learned to avoid similar case happens) 
Permit to work (The existence of mechanisms to ensure dangerous works are permitted 
through carefully preview and confirm and on-site observation) 
Management of change (The existence of mechanisms to ensure any major change in the 
plant is well defined, recorded and managed) 
Emergency response (The extent to which emergency response plans and procedures are 
prepared communicated and tested) 
Safety work practices (The extent to which every safety work practices are planed, 
implemented and recorded) 
Other (please specify): 
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User orientation perspective: covers issues associated with usage such as tool utilisation, 
availability of training and technical support and satisfaction with the SIM s stem. 
Indicators for user orientation perspective 
Rank 
1 2 3 
User awareness (The extent to which users are aware ofSIM's products and services) 
User training and support (the availability of user training and support programs to 
facilitate the access and use of safety information) 
User competence (the extent to which SIM users have the competencies and capacities to 
meet the challenKes ojSIM on a sustained basis) 
Information behaviours (Users' attitudes on SIM and the extent of sharing and 
communicating safety information) 
System utilisation (The extent to which users can located, retrieved and delivered SI with 
timely and convenient access) 
User satisfaction (mechanisms to measure and learn from user feedback on SIM products 
and services) 
Other (please specify): 
Technology/system perspective: Refers to the hardware, software, application programs, 
telecommunication networks, and the technical expertise that support the safety 
information processing and communications activities at all level of a plant. 
Rank 
4 
Indicators for technology/system perspective 
1 2 3 4 
SIM tools (the extent to which SIM tools effectively and efficiently support SIM) 
Technology integration (the degree to which SIM enabling technologies are integrated 
across the plant to support the delivery oisafety information) 
Security (extent to which mechanisms ensure safety information is protectedJrom 
unauthorised access, use and destruction) 
Privacy (Mechanisms to ensure that an individuals rights to the privacy in the handling SI are 
respected) 
Work continuity (The existence of mechanisms to ensure timely information recovery, 
restoration of essential records and work resumption) 
Maintenance and preservation (The extent to which the long-term usability and 
safeguarding of SI is ensured) 
Disposition (Mechanisms to ensure SI retention and disposal plans are followed) 
Other (please specify): 
4. If you have any general comments on SIM and its performance evaluation, please feel 
free to suggest any clarification, argue in favour of or against an issue, or ask any 
questions in the space below. 
Your assistance in completing the questionnaire is very much appreciated. Thank you. 
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Appendix D - The questionnaire for Survey 11 
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Developing a proactive Safety Information Management (SIM) 
performance measurement tool for the process industries 
Survey 11: An expert opinion survey 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Information failures have been cited as a significant contributing factor and 
precondition in studies of organisation disasters and accidents. Examples abound of 
missed or ignored warning signals and failure to handle safety information in ways 
that could have prevented catastrophic outcomes. Thus the aim of this study is to 
develop a tool to measure SIM performance for the process industries. To achieve the 
aim, the research objectives are: (1) to identify realistic proactive factors and sub-
factors that affect SIM performance on site; (2) to develop and test the SIM 
performance measurement tool that: (1) will be able to identify problem areas; (2) 
will allow a more focused remedial effort to be applied; (3) will evaluate over time 
the degree of progress or retrogression of SIM performance on site, and (4) will be a 
benchmark for future measurement. 
After reviewing the literature and accident reports, four perspectives of SIM have 
been identified: Operational, Strategic, User Orientation, and Technology/system, 
which emerge as the main factors affecting SIM performance. Research now needs to 
determine sets of indictors for these domains. A method to identify these indicators is 
required that will provide reliable. Consequently, a technique has been selected that 
is based on the elicitation of knowledge from experts in safety issues. Thus this 
survey sets out to provide an organized method for correlating views and information 
pertaining to safety and information issues that affects SIM performance. 
We will be grateful if you could spare about 30 minutes of your time to complete the 
questionnaire and post it back to me in the envelop enclosed, ASAP. 
Your Sincerely, 
Department of Chemical Engineering 
Loughborough University 
Loughborough, Leics, LEll 3TU, UK 
Attn: Tzu-Lien Tzou Tel: 01509222546 Email: T.L.Tzou@lboro.ac.uk 
Your assistance in completing the questionnaire is very much appreciated. Thank you. 
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Developing a proactive Safety Information Management (SIM) 
performance measurement tool for the process industries 
Survey 11: An expert opinion survey 
Definition: 
Safety Information (SI): A complete and up-to-date set of documents required to maintain a 
good performance in the safety area. The crucial safety information includes material safety 
data sheets, process knowledge, operation procedures, safety work practices, maintenance 
records, accident/near miss reports, and emergency response information etc. 
Safety Information Management (SIM): A set of management initiatives used to effectively 
produce, co-ordinate, store, retrieve and disseminate safety information from internal and 
external sources in order to improve the safety performance of the organization. 
Safety Information Management system (SIM system): A system that optimizes the 
collection, transfer, and presentation of safety information through an organisation, in 
accordance with defined procedures, whether automated or manual. 
A. Background of Expert 
l.Name: ____________________________ __ 
2. Position:, ____________________________ _ 
3.CompanyName: __________________________________________ __ 
4. Company type: 0 Academic/research institute 
o Process industry 
o Regulatory 
o Other (please state) ______________________ _ 
5. Process safety related experience (years): 0 0- 5 05-10 0 10-15 0 15-20 020+ 
6. Main expertises (You may tick more than one) : 
o Safety management 
o Safety performance measurement 
o Information managementllnformation technology 
o Safety Inspection/Audit/Accident investigation 
o Other (please state) ___________ _ 
7. How importance do you think SIM is to an efficient safety management program: 
DLess important 
DSlightly important 
DImportant 
DVery important 
DAbsolutely important 
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B. Relative importance of the perspectives and indicators contributing to improve SIM petfonnance 
1. An initial study identified four perspectives for SIM performance measurement. These 
perspectives are designed to be broad in nature and encompass distinct areas from where SIM-
induced performance improvement may be derived. Please provide the percentage (%) 
weighting you wish to allocate to each of the four perspectives. The total weighting of the four 
perspectives must sum to 100%. 
Perspective: description 
Strategic perspective: Concerned with how SIM contributes to the accomplishment 
of the organisation's overall safety mission and strategic goals. 
Operational perspective: Concerned with a complete and up-to-date set of 
engineering documentation functioning to improve performance of operation as well 
as all safety related tasks. 
User orientation perspective: Covers issues associated with usage such as tool 
utilisation, availability of training and technical support and satisfaction with the 
SIM system. This perspective is also concerned with the extent to which internal 
and external personal value safety information products and services. 
Technology/system perspective: Refers to the hardware, software, application 
programs, telecommunication networks, and the technical expertise that support the 
safety information processing and communications activities at all level of a plant. 
SUM 
Weight% 
100% 
2. Each perspective incorporates a number of performance indicators. These indicators examine 
the process plant where implementing SIM can improve safety as well as other benefits. In your 
opinion and on a scale of 1-5, please rate the importance level of the listed performance 
indicators within each perspective: 
tess<lmpo:r:tant(f5:SI1ghiiY:Tmp9:rtant(2)JroP()rian~3)~yery.Impol1ant(4fA.~soluteliImportani(5) 
2.1 Strategic perspective 
-
Indicators for strategic perspective Rank 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strategic planning (Quality o/strategic and operational plans/or SIM, and the linkages 
between plans, resources, controls and safety policy) 
Organisation and responsibilities (appropriateness o/the organisational structures to 
support SIM. Extent to which roles and responsibilities are defined, understand and accepted) 
Acquisition (The extent to which mechanisms exist to ensure the optimal design, development and 
deployment o/SIM initiatives) 
Leadership (The extent to which senior management is aware, understands, demonstrates 
commitment to a clear vision and set o/strategic objectives) 
Evaluation (The extent to which SIM audit and review processes are in place to ensure awareness 
0/ and compliance with) 
Standardisation (Degree to which SI standards exist, are understand and applied) 
External relationship (The extent to which mechanisms to facilitate partnerships and 
consultations with external organisations in support 0/ effective SIM) 
Other (please specify): 
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Indicators for operational perspective Rank 
1 2 3 4 5 
Process knowledge (The extent to which process knowledge is identified, catalogued, stored 
and applied to support the plant operation process) 
Process Hazard Analysis (The extent to which hazard information is identified and applied to 
support risk management) 
Operation procedures (The extent to which operational procedures are created, applied and 
reviewed to ensure normal and abnormal operation safely) 
Incidents/near misses reporting/investigation (The extent to which internal and external 
incidents/accidents are collected, analysed and learned to avoid similar case happens) 
Permit to work (The existence of mechanisms to ensure dangerous works are permitted through 
carefully preview and confirm and on-site observation) 
Management of change (The existence of mechanisms to ensure any major change in the plant 
is well defined, recorded and managed) 
Emergency response (The extent to which emergency response plans and procedures are 
prepared communicated and tested) 
Safety work practices (The extent to which every safety work practices are planed, 
implemented and recorded) 
Other (pJease specify): 
2.3 User orientation perspective 
Indicators for user orientation perspective Rank 
1 2 3 4 5 
User awareness (The extent to which users are aware ofSIM's products and services) 
User training and support (the availability of user training and support programs to facilitate 
the access and use of safety information) 
User competence (the extent to which SIM users have the competencies and capacities to meet 
the challenges of SI M on a sustained basis) 
Information behaviours (Users' attitudes on SIM and the extent of sharing and communicating 
safety information) 
System utilisation (The extent to which users can located, retrieved and delivered SI with timely 
and convenient access) 
User satisfaction (mechanisms to measure and learn from user feedback on SIM products and 
services) 
Other (please specify): 
2.4 Technology/system perspective 
Indicators for technology/system perspective Rank 
1 2 3 4 5 
SIM tools (the extent to which SIM tools effectively and efficiently support SIM) 
Technology integration (the degree to which SIM enabling technologies are integrated across 
the plant to support the delivery of safety information) 
Security (extent to which mechanisms ensure safety information is protectedfrom unauthorised 
access, use and destruction) 
Privacy (Mechanisms to ensure that an individuals rights to the privacy in the handling SI are respected) 
Work continuity (The existence of mechanisms to ensure timely information recovery, 
restoration of essential records and work resumption) 
Maintenance and preservation (The extent to which the long-term usability and safeguarding 
of SI is ensured) 
Disposition (Mechanisms to ensure SI retention and disposal plans are followed) 
Other (please specify): 
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C. Rating the Measures 
The Indicators in 3.2 are quantified by evaluating Measures. In your opinion, which of the 
.. J,?!!9wi!?-KM~.~~u.!:~~_~E~2re iI!!R.2r.t!l1!HPle~~.!!~~~he !!!~RE£9priate an~~e!L __ .. " ,~.~,,., 
~here 1 :=Not important; 2=:SlightlyjIllRortant; 3,=:Some",hat important; 4=:Important;,5=:Yery Important 
No Indicators Measures Rank 1 2 3 4 
1 Strategic S1.p.1 Senior management is involved in developing and 
planning debating the content of SIM plan 
S l.p.2 SIM plan is developed in collaboration with the workforce 
S l.p.3 Define a strategic SIM plan 
SI.p.4 Linkage of SI M plan and safety management systems 
S l.p.5 Provide the strategic SIM plan 
S1.p.6 SIM targets are defined for continuous improvement 
S1.p.7 Communicate SIM plan to the workforce/representatives 
S l.p.8 SIM plan is viewed and updated at least annually 
Other and comments (please specify): 
2 Organisation and S2.p.l Establish a steering committee for SIM 
responsibilities S2.p.2 Safety/employee representatives are involved in the SIM 
committee 
S2.p.3 Identify the specific population who are the SIM system 
targets 
S2.p.4 Define SIM's responsibility of target person 
S2.p.5 Assign a chairman for SIM performance measurement 
S2.p.6 SIM's responsibility is viewed at least annually 
Other and comments (please specify): 
3 Acquisition S3.p.1 Ensure person in charge on SIM system acquisition 
S3.p.2 Identify SIM system solutions 
S3.p.3 Manage SIM investment 
S3.p.4 Ensure purchasing procedure 
S3.p 5 Ensure both internal and external requirements 
S3.p.6 Deploy SIM systems to user 
S3.p.7 Manage and check SIM service level 
Other and comments (please specify): 
4 Leadership S4.p.l Identify the role of senior management in SIM 
S4.p.2 Define a mechanism to help senior management involving 
SIM 
S4.p.3 Senior management participate in SIM activities 
S4.p.4 Senior management demonstrate whose awareness and 
support 
S4.p.5 Measure the result of senior management involving in 
SIM 
Other (please specify): 
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5 Evaluation SS.p.1 Define a team for evaluating SIM 
SS.p.2 Pre-evaluation training for evaluators 
SS.p.3 Establish a plan for evaluating SIM 
SS.pA Implementing SIM evaluation 
SS.p.5 Frequency of evaluation 
SS.p.6 Result analysis and follow-up 
SS.p.7 Review SIM evaluation programme 
SS.p.8 Track and check the result offollow-up 
Other and comments (please specify): 
6 Standardisation S6.p.1 Establish a team to determine which standard is apply for 
SI 
S6.p.2 Communicate document standard to SIM related person 
S6.p.3 Define safety document standard applying plan 
S6.pA Apply documents/ information transfer standards/codes 
S6.p.5 Review document standard regularly 
Other (please specify): 
7 External S7.p.1 Identify the person who are in charge in communicate 
relationship safety information with external organisations 
S7.p.2 Identify external organisations and whose requirement of 
safety information 
S7.p.3 Establish mechanism of communication with external 
organisations 
S7.pA Provide up-to-data safety information to external 
S7.p.S Regularly report plant's safety news to the medium 
S7.p.6 Identify Authorities satisfaction 
S7.p.7 Check the public satisfaction 
Other (please specify): 
8 Process Ol.p.l Assigning person the responsibilities for assembling and 
knowledge creating process knowledge 
01.p.2 Establish methods to provide up-to-date process 
information 
01.p.3 Establish methods to provide up-to-date equipment 
information 
OI.pA Establish methods to provide up-to-date technology 
information 
01.p.S Communicate process knowledge to personnel 
01.p.6 Provide access to databases of code, regulation and 
standards related to process knowledge 
01.p.7 Review process knowledge to ensure its up-to-date 
Other and comments (please specify): 
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9 Process Hazard 02.p.1 Identify person who are in charge of PH A information 
Analysis (PHA) control 
02.p.2 Identify a plan for PHA data documenting and 
disseminating 
02.p.3 Define and communicate the PHA plan to personnel 
02.p.4 Communicate and disseminate PHA results to personnel 
02.p.5 Implementing PHA Follow-up and records revalidation 
02.p.6 Review PHA documentation 
02.p.7 Audit HPA communication 
Other and comments (please specify): 
10 Operation 03.p.! Identify person who are in charge ofinformation control 
procedures of Operation procedures 
03.p.2 Define a plan for creating and providing Operation 
procedures 
03.p.3 Provide up-to-data Operation procedures through efficient 
methods 
03.p.4 Training of accessing and applying Operation procedure 
03.p.5 Review Operation procedures 
03.p.6 Review the methods of providing Op_eration procedures 
Other and comments (please specify): 
11 Incidents/near 04.p.l Identify person who are in charge of information control 
misses of incident reporting 
reporting/investig 04.p.2 Define incident reporting! investigation processes 
ation 04.pJ Define incident report formats 
04.p.4 Manage incident reporting and investigation systems 
04.p.5 Collect external related accident information 
04.p.6 Provide incident report through efficient methods 
04.p.7 Incident analysis and its follow-up 
04.p.8 Review incident report and its follow-up 
04.p.9 Evaluate incident reporting system 
Other and comments (please specify): 
12 Permit to work 05.p.1 Identify person who are in charge of information control 
of permit-to-work 
05.p.2 Identify required permits 
05.pJ Identify permit procedures 
05.p.4 Establish mechanism to manage and provide permit-to-
work information up-to-data 
05.p.5 Training of permit of work process 
05.p.6 Keep and analyse records of permit to work 
05.p.7 Review procedures and records of permit to work 
05.p.S Evaluate Permit-to-work efficiency 
Other and comments (please specify): 
13 Management of 06.p.l Identify person who are in charge ofMOC information 
change control 
(MOC) 06.p.2 Establish a programme existing for implementing MOC 
06.p.3 Identi~ MOC procedures 
06.p.4 MOC flow chart indicating all affected parties must be 
notified 
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06.p.5 Communicate changes to affected people/units 
06.p.6 Manage records of notification and follow-up 
06.p.7 Verify that a documented programme existing for 
implementing MOC 
06.p.S Verify the results of implementing MOC have been 
documented 
Other (please specify): 
14 Emergency 07.p.l Identify person who are in charge of information control 
response (ER) of emergency response 
07.p.2 Identify emergency action plan 
07.p.3 Identify emergency response procedures 
07.pA Identify external agencies coordination plan 
07.p.5 Provide emergency plan 
07.p.6 Communicating and training for emergency response 
07.p.7 Manage emergency response records 
07.p.S Verify that a documented programme existing for 
implementing emergency response 
Other and comments (please specify): 
15 Safety work OS.p.1 Identify person who are in charge of information control 
practices of safety work practices 
OS.p.2 Identify needed safety work practices and their frequency 
OS.p.3 Provide a paper-form of safety work plan to employee 
OS.pA Manage records of safety work practices 
OS.p.5 Analysis of deviations from safety work practices 
OS.p.6 Communicating and Implementing follow-up of safety 
work practices 
OS.p.7 Verify that a documented programme existing for 
implementing safety work practices 
OS.p.S Review the follow-up and its records 
16 User awareness U1.p.1 Communicate the concept of user awareness to SIM user 
U1.p.2 Establish user awareness evaluation programme 
U1.p.3 Implementing user awareness programme 
U1.pA Users are informed new services and resources 
U1.p.5 Review the user awareness programme and its results 
Other and comments (please specify): 
17 User training and U2.p.1 Appointed person who are in charge in SIM training and 
support support services 
U2.p.2 Select an external SIM user training centre 
U2.p.3 Identify SIM user training and support plan 
U2.pA Implementing training programme 
U2.p.5 Provide technical support as requirement 
U2.p.6 The % of training complement 
U2.p.7 The % of technical support complement 
U2.p.S Review SIM training programme and support services 
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Other and comments (please specify): 
18 User competence U3.p.1 Identify key person who are in charge of SI M user 
competence 
U3.p.2 Identify the standard of user competence 
U3.p.3 Identify programme to confirm the competence of SI M 
users 
U3.p.4 Evaluate the % of users qualified in using SIM systems 
U3.p.5 The extent of user innovation and learning 
U3.p.6 Review user competence programme 
Other and comments (please specify): 
19 Information U4.p.1 Identify key person who are responsible for improving 
behaviours information behaviours 
U4.p.2 Identify mechanisms of handing information overload and 
multiple information 
U4.p.3 Implementing information sharing programme 
U4.p.4 Require employees to report their information sharing 
results 
U4.p.S Review the mechanisms handing information overload 
and multiple information 
U4.p.6 Evaluate the % of sharing information 
Other and comments (please specify): 
20 System utilisation US.p.l Identify the person who are in charge of evaluating 
system utilisation 
US.p.2 Requirement of external support for SIM system 
utilisation 
US.p.3 Identify a plan to ensure SIM system utilisation 
US.p.4 Ensure usage of SIM system from different level in the 
organisation from HQ to Operators 
US.p.S Analysis suggestions made by user 
US.p.6 Evaluate the frequency of restoring system to old manual 
procedures 
Other and comments (please specify): 
21 User satisfaction U6.p.l Identify key users of SI M 
U6.p.2 Requirement of external survey organisation for user 
satisfaction 
U6.p.3 Establish user satisfaction evaluation plan 
U6.p.4 Identify key factors of user satisfaction 
U6.p.S Implementing user satisfaction evaluation and its follow 
up 
U6.p.6 The % of user satisfied with SIM application 
U6.p.7 The % user satisfied with SIM training and technical 
support 
U6.p.8 Review user satisfaction evaluation programme 
Other and comments (please specify): 
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2 SIM tools T1.p.l Identify various users for suitable IT tools 
T1.p.2 Have a plan for applying effective IT tools to support SIM 
initiatives. 
T1.p.3 A suit of flexible and versatile internal and corporate tools 
are available 
T1.pA Users have on-line access to SIM supported tools and 
models 
T1.p.5 Tools and models are assessed on a continual basis and 
updated based on evolving SIM requirements 
Other and comments (please specify): 
23 Technology T2.p.l Identify person who are in charge of ensuring technology 
integration integration of SIM 
T2.p.2 Technology support staff have a broad range of expertise 
in technology functionality and integration. 
T2.p.3 Have a plan for SIM technology integration 
T2.pA A technology architecture exists to support SIM initiatives 
T2.p.5 Review technology integration regularly 
T2.p.6 Technology architectures are continually Optimised based 
on changing business. Needs 
Other and comments (please specify): 
24 Security T3.p.1 Identify person who are in charge of managing SIM 
security 
T3.p.2 Identify a plan for SIM system protection from 
unauthorised access, use and destruction 
T3.p.3 Establish firewall between plant's IT system and SIM 
system 
T3.pA SIM system security architecture, controls and procedures 
are in place. 
T3.p.5 All SIM security requirements are communicated 
throughout the organisation and are consistently applied to SIM 
initiatives 
T3.p.6 SIM system security controls and procedures are regularly 
reviewed 
T3.p.7 SIM security immediate corrective action is taken after 
identifying potential vulnerability 
Other and comments (please specify): 
25 Privacy T4.p.1 Ensure aIJ of person in the organisation involving in SIM 
privacy programme 
T4.p.2 Define the individual right in SIM system 
T4.p.3 Identify SIM system privacy requirements 
T4.p.4 Establish a policy for restoring paper-form SI 
T4.p.5 Have initiated a programme of privacy compliance for 
SIM initiatives 
T4.p.6 All privacy requirements are communicated throughout 
T4.p.7 Conduced DSIM privacy impact assessments 
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T4.p.8 Regularly review the SIM privacy policy and to take 
required corrective actions 
Other and comments (please specify): 
26 Work continuity T5.p.1 Identify person who are in charge of SI M system 
emergency response 
T5.p.2 Have a plan for keeping SIM system continuing service 
T5.p.3 Establish an effective network to reduce SIM system shut-
down 
T5.pA Temporarily emergency backup for SIM system 
T5.p.5 Evaluate the extent of timely SIM system recovery and 
restoration 
Other and comments (please specify): 
27 Maintenance and T6.p.1 Identify person and place for maintaining and preservation 
preservation SIM systems 
T6.p.2 Have a plan for safeguarding and maintaining SIM 
systems 
T6.p.3 Implementing the mechanism of long-turn usability of 
SIM system 
T6.pA Implementing the mechanism of safeguarding SIM 
systems 
T6.p.5 Review the long-turn usability and safeguarding of SI M 
system 
Other and comments (please specify): 
28 Disposition T7.p.1 Identify person who are in charge of managing 
information dis)Josition work 
T7.p.2 Establish an approach to information disposal which 
adheres to retention and disposition plan 
T7.p.3 Have a formal set of principles, policies and standards for 
disposing of safety information 
T7.pA These principles, policies and standards for disposing of 
safety information are in widespread use throughout 
T7.p.5 Regularly review to ensure the disposition of safety 
information is legal and policy obligations 
Other and comments (please specify): 
4. Comments 
If you have general comments on SIM and its performance evaluation, please feel free to 
suggest clarification, argue in favour of or against an issue, ask questions in the space below. 
Your assistance in completing the questionnaire is very much appreciated. Thank you. 
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The important degree of measures 
Indicators Measures Mean 
SI Strategic S l.p.l Senior management is involved in developing and debating 4.25 
planning the content of SIM plan 
Sl.p.2 SIM plan is developed in collaboration with the workforce 4.33 
Sl.p.3 Define a strategic SIM plan 4.25 
Sl.po4 Linkage of SI M plan and safety management systems 4042 
Sl.p.5 Provide the strategic SIM plan 4.58 
Sl.p.6 SIM targets are defined for continuous improvement 3.92 
Sl.p.7 Communicate SIM plan to the workforce/representatives 4.17 
Sl.p.8 SIM plan is viewed and updated at least annually 3.67 
S2 Organisation and S2.p.l Establish a steering committee for SIM 4.33 
responsibilities S2.p.2 Safety/employee representatives are involved in the SIM 4.25 
committee 
S2.p.3 Identify the specific population who are the SIM system 4.17 
targets 
S2.po4 Define SIM's responsibility of target person 3.83 
S2.p.5 Assign a chairman for SIM performance measurement 3.17 
S2.p.6 SIM's responsibility is viewed at least annually 3.92 
S3 Acquisition S3.p.l Ensure person in charge on SIM system acquisition 4.33 
S3.p.2 Identify SIM system solutions 4.56 
S3.p.3 Manage SIM investment 4.67 
S3.po4 Ensure purchasing procedure 3.33 
S3.p 5 Ensure both internal and external requirements 3.83 
S3.p.6 Deploy SIM systems to user 3.57 
S3.p.7 Manage and check SIM service level 3.75 
S4 Leadership S4.p.l Identify the role of senior management in SIM 4.67 
S4.p.2 Define a mechanism to help senior management involving 4.67 
SIM 
S4.p.3 Senior management participate in SIM activities 4.58 
S4.po4 Senior management demonstrate whose awareness and 4.17 
support 
S4.p.5 Measure the result of senior management involving in SIM 4.33 
SS Evaluation S5.p.l Define a team for evaluating SIM 4.25 
S5.p.2 Pre-evaluation training for evaluators 3.75 
S5.p.3 Establish a plan for evaluating SIM 3.92 
S5.po4 Implementing SIM evaluation 4.17 
S5.p.5 Frequency of evaluation 3.58 
S5.p.6 Result analysis and follow-up 4.08 
S5.p.7 Review SIM evaluation programme 3.58 
S5.p.8 Track and check the result offollow-up 4.00 
S6 Standardisation S6.p.1 Establish a team to determine which standard is apply for SI 3.00 
S6.p.2 Communicate document standard to SIM related person 4.08 
S6.p.3 Define safety document standard applying plan 3.92 
S6.po4 Apply documents/ information transfer standards/codes 4042 
S6.p.5 Review document standard regularly 3.57 
S7 External S7.p.l Identify the person who are in charge in communicate safety 3.67 
relationship information with external organisations 
S7.p.2 Identify external organisations and whose requirement of 4.25 
safety information 
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S 7. p.3 Establish mechanism of communication with external 3.92 
organisations 
S7.p.4 Provide up-to-data safety information to external 3.67 
S7.p.S Regularly report plant's safety news to the medium 2.56 
S7.p.6 Identify Authorities satisfaction 3.92 
S7.p.7 Check the public satisfaction 3.57 
pi Process OI.p.I Assigning person the responsibilities for assembling and 4.08 
knowledge creating process knowledge 
Ol.p.2 Establish methods to provide up-to-date process information 4.00 
Ol.p.3 Establish methods to provide up-to-date equipment 4.08 
information 
Ol.p.4 Establish methods to provide up-to-date technology 3.83 
information 
OI.p.S Communicate process knowledge to personnel 3.92 
01. p.6 Provide access to databases of code, regulation and 4.08 
standards related to process knowledge 
Ol.p.7 Review process knowledge to ensure its up-to-date 4.42 
P2 Process Hazard 02.p.I Identify person who are in charge ofPHA information 4.08 
Analysis control 
02.p.2 Identify a plan for PHA data documenting and disseminating 4.00 
02.p.3 Define and communicate the PHA plan to personnel 3.50 
02.p.4 Communicate and disseminate PHA results to personnel 4.42 
02.p.S Implementing PHA Follow-up and records revalidation 4.33 
02.p.6 Review PHA documentation 4.08 
02.p.7 AuditHPA communication 3.83 
03 Operation 03.p.l Identify person who are in charge of information control of 4.42 
procedures Operation procedures 
03.p.2 Define a plan for creating and providing Operation 4.00 
procedures 
03.p.3 Provide up-to-data Operation procedures through efficient 4.33 
methods 
03.p.4 Training of accessing and applying Operation procedure 3.58 
03.p.5 Review Operation procedures 4.08 
03.p.6 Review the methods of providing Operation procedures 3.58 
04 Incidents 04.p.l Identify person who are in charge ofinformation control of 4.67 
reporting incident reporting 
04.p.2 Define incident reporting! investigation processes 4.42 
04.p.3 Define incident report formats 4.33 
04.p.4 Manage incident reporting and investigation systems 4.58 
04.p.S Collect external related accident information 4.08 
04.p.6 Provide incident report through efficient methods 4.00 
04.p.7 Incident analysis and its follow-up 4.17 
04.p.8 Review incident report and its follow-up 3.92 
04.p.9 Evaluate incident reporting system 3.83 
pS Permit to work OS.p.l Identify person who are in charge of information control of 4.58 
permit-to-work 
OS.p.2 Identify required permits 4.67 
OS.p.3 Identify permit procedures 4.42 
OS.p.4 Establish mechanism to manage and provide permit-to-work 4.12 
information up-to-data 
OS.p.S Training of permit of work process 3.92 
OS.p.6 Keep and analyse records of permit to work 3.75 
OS.p.7 Review procedures and records of permit to work 3.58 
OS.p.8 Evaluate Permit-to-work efficiency 2.68 
06 Management of 06.p.l Identify person who are in charge ofMOC information 4.50 
change control 
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06.p.2 Establish a programme existing for implementing MOC 4.17 
06.p.3 Identify MOC procedures 4.25 
06.p.4 MOC flow chart indicating all affected parties must be 4.42 
notified 
06.p.5 Communicate changes to affected people/units 4.08 
06.p.6 Manage records of notification and follow-up 3.92 
06.p.7 Verify that a documented programme existing for 4.00 
implementing MOC 
06.p.8 Verify the results of implementing MOC have been 4.17 
documented 
P7 Emergency 07.p.l Identify person who are in charge of information control of 4.58 
response emergency response 
07.p.2 Identify emergency actionJ)lan 4.42 
07.p.3 Identify emergency response procedures 4.00 
07.p.4 Identify external agencies coordination plan 3.67 
07.p.5 Provide emergency plan 4.12 
07.p.6 Communicating and training for emergency response 3.83 
07.p.7 Manage emergency response records 4.12 
07.p.8 Verify that a documented programme existing for 4.00 
implementing emergency response 
07. p.9 Verify the results of implementing emergency response have 4.33 
been documented 
p8 Safety work 08.p.l Identify person who are in charge of information control of 3.58 
practices safety work practices 
08.p.2 Identify needed safety work practices and their frequency 3.83 
08.p.3 Provide a paper-form of safety work plan to employee 3.17 
08.p.4 Manage records of safety work practices 3.58 
08.p.5 Analysis of deviations from safety work practices 3.92 
08.p.6 Communicating and Implementing follow-up of safety work 3.83 
practices 
08.p.7 Verify that a documented programme existing for 4.00 
implementing safety work practices 
08.p.8 Review the follow-up and its records 3.75 
~l User awareness U1.p.l Communicate the concept of user awareness to SIM user 3.83 
U 1. p.2 Establish user awareness evaluation programme 3.75 
U1.p.3 Implementing user awareness programme 3.75 
U1.p.4 Users are informed new services and resources 4.12 
U1.p.5 Review the user awareness programme and its results 3.58 
U2 User training & U2.p.l Appointed person who are in charge in SIM training and 3.68 
support support services 
U2.p.2 Select an extemal SIM user training centre 2.22 
U2.p.3 Identify SIM user training and support plan 3.92 
U2.p.4 Implementing training programme 3.75 
U2.p.5 Provide technical support as requirement 4.17 
U2.p.6 The % of training complement 4.00 
U2.p.7 The % oftechnical support complement 4.25 
U2.p.8 Review SIM training programme and support services 3.58 
~3 User competence U3.p.1 Identify key person who are in charge of SI M user 4.00 
competence 
U3.p.2 Identify the st~ndard of user competence 4.08 
U3.p.3 Identify programme to confirm the competence of SI M users 3.75 
U3.p.4 Evaluate the % of users Qualified in using SIM systems 3.83 
U3.p.5 The extent of user innovation and learning 4.17 
U3.p.6 Review user competence ,,-rogramme 3.58 
U4 Information U4.p.l Identify key person who are responsible for improving 3.92 
behaviours information behaviours 
U4.p.2 Identify mechanisms of handing information overload and 3.75 
multiple information 
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U4.p.3 Implementing infonnation sharing programme 4.00 
U4.po4 Require employees to report their infonnation sharing 2.75 
results 
U4.p.5 Review the mechanisms handing infonnation overload and 3.75 
multipJe infonnation 
U4.p.6 Evaluate the % of sharing infonnation 3.83 
~5 System U5.p.l Identify the person who are in charge of evaluating system 3.75 
utilisation utilisation 
U5.p.2 Requirement of external support for SIM system utilisation 2.68 
U5.p.3 Identify a plan to ensure SIM system utilisation 3.58 
U5.po4 Ensure usage of SIM system from different level in the 3.87 
organisation from HQ to Operators 
U5.p.5 Analysis suggestions made by user 3.75 
U5.p.6 Evaluate the frequency of restoring system to old manual 3.58 
procedures 
U6 User satisfaction U6.p.l Identify key users of SI M 4042 
U6.p.2 Requirement of external survey organisation for user 3.00 
satisfaction 
U6.p.3 Establish user satisfaction evaluation plan 4.00 
U6.po4 Identify key factors of user satisfaction 4.33 
U6.p.s Implementing user satisfaction evaluation and its follow up 4.17 
U6.p.6 The % of user satisfied with SIM application 4.17 
U6.p.7 The % user satisfied with SIM training and technical support 4.25 
U6.p.8 Review user satisfaction evaluation programme 3.75 
T1 SIM tools T 1. p.l Identify various users for suitable IT tools 4.17 
Tl.p.2 Have a plan for applying effective IT tools to support SIM 4042 
initiatives. 
T1.p.3 A suit of flexible and versatile internal and corporate tools 3.83 
are available 
T1.po4 Users have on-line access to SIM supported tools and 3.83 
models 
T1.p.5 Tools and models are assessed on a continual basis and 3.58 
updated based on evolving SIM requirements 
T2 Technology T2.p.l Identify person who are in charge of ensuring technology 3.75 
integration integration of SIM 
T2.p.2 Technology support staff have a broad range of expertise in 4.00 
technology functionality and integration. 
T2.p.3 Have a plan for SIM technology integration 3.92 
T2.po4 A technology architecture exists to support SIM initiatives 3.83 
T2.p.5 Review technology integration regularly 3.83 
T2.p.6 Technology architectures are continually Optimised based 3.67 
on changing business. Needs 
rf3 Security T3.p.1 Identify person who are in charge of managing SIM security 4.00 
T3.p.2 Identify a plan for SIM system protection from unauthorised 3.92 
access use and destruction 
T3.p.3 Establish firewall between plant's IT system and SIM 3.17 
system 
T3.po4 SIM system security architecture, controls and procedures 3.83 
are in place. 
T3.p.s All SIM security requirements are communicated throughout 3.58 
the organisation and are consistently applied to SIM initiatives 
T3.p.6 SIM system security controls and procedures are regularly 3.83 
reviewed 
T3.p.7 SIM security immediate corrective action is taken after 3.75 
identifying potential vulnerability 
rr4 Privacy T4.p.l Ensure all of person in the organisation involving in SIM 3.92 
privacy programme 
T4.p.2 Define the individual right in SIM system 3.83 
T4.p.3 Identify SIM system privacy requirements 3.67 
T4.po4 Establish a policy for restoring paper-fonn SI 3.33 
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T4.p.5 Have initiated a programme of privacy compliance for SIM 3.75 
initiatives 
T4.p.6 All privacy requirements are communicated throughout 3.57 
T4.p.7 Conduced DSIM privacy impact assessments 3.92 
T4.p.8 Regularly review the SIM privacy policy and to take 3.67 
required corrective actions 
ifS Work continuity T5.p.1 Identify person who are in charge of SIM system emergency 3.92 
response 
T5.p.2 Have a plan for keeping SIM system continuing service 3.87 
T5.p.3 Establish an effective network to reduce SIM system shut- 3.75 
down 
T5.p.4 Temporarily emergency backup for SIM system 4.00 
T5.p.5 Evaluate the extent of timely SIM system recovery and 
restoration 
3.92 
rr6 Maintenance and T6.p.l Identify person and place for maintaining and preservation 3.87 
preservation SIM systems 
T6.p.2 Have a plan for safeguarding and maintaining SIM systems 4.12 
T6.p.3 Implementing the mechanism of long-turn usability of SIM 4.00 
system 
T6. p.4 Implementing the mechanism of safeguarding SIM systems 4.17 
T6. p.5 Review the long-turn usability and safeguarding of SIM 3.75 
system 
rr7 Disposition T7.p.l Identify person who are in charge of managing information 3.67 
disposition work 
T7.p.2 Establish an approach to information disposal which adheres 3.58 
to retention and disposition plan 
T7.p.3 Have a formal set of principles, policies and standards for 3.92 
disposing of safety information 
T7.p.4 These principles, policies and standards for disposing of 3.83 
safety information are in widespread use throughout 
T7.p.5 Regularly review to ensure the disposition of safety 3.67 
information is legal and policy obligations 
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The first stage evaluation - SIM checklist 
Organisation: __________ .....;Date: 
Auditor: 
------------
Respondent: : __________ _ 
Indicator Finding Evidence 
YES NO NA 
SI Strategic planning No clear SIM strategy or plan 
Is there a good understanding ofthe SIM plan and are available. 
senior management and staff signed on to it? 
S2 Organisation and responsibilities Safety management system 
Has the SIM implementing teams and responsibility of requires individual's duty for 
the individual been identified and informed? handling SI. 
S3 Acquisition 2004 Budget did not demonstrate 
Does a method exist to ensure the optimal design, the support of SIM system 
development and deployment of SIM system? development. 
S4 Leadership Monthly safety meeting and 
Are mechanisms in place for senior management to be safety review by managers. 
made aware, understand and demonstrate leadership and 
support of SIM? 
S5 Evaluation No SIM audit or evaluation 
Does the SIM audit and review processes that are in place available. 
to ensure awareness of and compliance with SIM? 
S6 Standardisation No standard for safety 
Have documentation standards been applied to most documents. 
safety information? 
S7 External relationship Has a good Web page to 
Are mechanisms in place to facilitate partnership and communicate safety issue with 
consultations with external organisations in support of external. 
SIM? 
01 Process knowledge Have a mechanism to keep and 
Are effective processes in place to ensure compliance update process documents into 
with the applicable safety related knowledge? hardcopy well as IT system. 
02 Process Hazard Analysis Good performance AT hazard 
Is there a mechanism to ensure compliance with PHA and Identification and its follow-up 
hazard communication? by controlling in paper-form. 
03 Operation procedures Apply ISO 9000 standard to Is there a mechanism to provide up-to-date Operation 
manage operation procedures. procedures? 
04 Incidents reporting Incident reporting by paper-form 
Are effective processes in place for reporting, collecting, but has a database to manage 
investigating and learning about internal as well as incident investigation and 
external incidents? reports. 
05 Permit to work 
Is a mechanism in place to ensure dangerous works are Has a well defined permit-to-
not permitted through preview and confirm? work system (paper form) 
06 Management of change 
No mechanism to control MOC Is there a mechanism to ensure major change is well 
defined, recorded and managed? records. 
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07 Emergency response ER plan and relating information 
Have emergency response plans and procedures been are managed using software 
prepared, communicated and tested? package. 
08 Safety work practices Check, tool box meeting, self-Have safety work practices such as routing check, 
assessing are planed, tool box meeting, self-assessing been planed, implemented and recorded. implemented and recorded? 
Ul User awareness When a new safety mechanism is 
Are processes in place to check the extent to which users set, User will be informed both 
are aware ofSIM's products and services? by notes and email. 
U2 User training and support Safety Training includes the 
What is the process to ensure the availability of user operation of SM systems and 
training and support programs to facilitate the access and relating sub-systems. 
use of safety information? 
U3 User competence Most of users are professional at 
Are processes in place to identify the extent to which work and CAN use SI no 
SIM users have the competencies and capacities to meet difficulty. 
the challenges of SIM? 
U4 Information behaviours No particular process to manage 
Has a mechanism been implemented to identify users' and encourage safety information 
attitudes on SIM and the extent of sharing and sharing. 
communicating safety information? 
US System utilization IT infrastructure allows users to 
Is a process in place to ensure users can locate, retrieve locate, retrieve and transfer SI 
and transfer SI with timely and convenient access? with timely and convenient 
access. 
[U6 User satisfaction No evaluation of user satisfaction 
Are mechanisms in place to measure user satisfaction and for SIM system. 
learn from user feedback on SIM activities and services? 
Tl SIM tools IT and new advices support SIM 
What is the process to ensure the extent to which SIM well. 
tools effectively_ and efficiently support SIM? 
T2 Technology integration Has a SM system with many 
Does a process exist to enable technologies integrated subsystems to integrate SI. 
across the plant to support the delivery of SI? 
T3 Security Its IT system has set firewall for 
Are mechanisms in place to ensure safety information is security. The process control 
Iprotected from unauthorised access, use and destruction? system is independent. 
T4 Privacy 
Have mechanisms been implemented to ensure that Not considering it yet. individual rights to the privacy in the handling SI are 
respected? 
T5 Work continuity 
Are mechanisms in place to ensure timely information 
recovery, restoration of essential records and work 
Uninterrupted Power System and 
also preserve SI externally. 
resumption) 
T6 Maintenance and preservation Has a process to preserve and 
Is there a process to ensure the long-term usability and maintain important safety 
safeguarding of safety information? information such installation, 
P&ID, PHA, control data .... 
T7 Disposition No specific rule for safety Is there a Mechanism to ensure safety information information disposition. 
retention and disposal plans are followed? 
Total for all --.-
Score= (yES number/28-NA) ----
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The second stage evaluation - SIMPI 
SIMPI (Safety Information Management Performance Index) 
Organisation: 00000000 
Measurement date: / / (dd/mm/yy) 
Leader of the evaluation team: 
SIMPI :Overall rating (Scale ofOto 10: O=worst, 10= best) 
Details of SIMPI 
Perspectives Score (S) Relative Importance Weighted rating (W) (SXW) 
Strategic 0.276 
Operational 0.290 
User Orientation 0.255 
Technology 0.179 
Extra Information related to SIM performance 
1. Has a director's declaration for SIM been made? 
2. Does this plant conduct highly regulated activities requiring a 
report or documentation that are covered by regulations such 
as MHWAO* (similar to COMAH) in Taiwan etc? 
3. Does this plant conduct highly regulated activities that are 
covered by safety international/national standards such as 
OHSAS 18001 etc? 
* MHWAO(Major Hazardous Workplace Approving for Operation) regulation 
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The second stage evaluation - SIMPI form 
Organisation: ___________ ....;Date: 
Auditor: 
-------------
respondent: :, __________ _ 
a. St t ra eglc p f erspec lve 
process/procedure evaluation 
Indicators Check points (measures) YES SOME NO 
SI Sl.p.l Senior management is involved in developing and debating the 
Strategic content of SI M plan 
planning S l.p.2 SIM plan is developed in collaboration with the workforce 
S1.p.3 Define a strategic SIM plan 
S1.po4 Linkage of SI M plan and safety management systems 
S 1.p.5 Provide the strategic SIM plan 
S1.p.6 SIM targets are defined for continuous improvement 
S1.p.7 Communicate SIM plan to the workforce/representatives 
S l.p.8 SIM plan is viewed and updated at least annually 
SI Total 
S2 S2.p.1 Establish a steering committee for SIM 
Organisation S2.p.2 Safety/employee representatives are involved in the SIM 
and committee 
responsibilities S2.p.3 Identify the specific population who are the SIM system targets 
S2.po4 Define SIM's responsibility of target person 
S2.p.5 SIM's responsibility is viewed at least annually 
S2 Total 
S3 S3.p.l Ensure person in charge on SIM system acquisition 
Acquisition S3.p.2 Identify SIM system solutions 
S3.p.3 Manage SIM investment 
S3.po4 Ensure both internal and external requirements 
S3.p 5 Deploy SIM systems to user 
S3.p.6 Manage and check SIM service level 
S3 Total 
S4 S4.p.l Identify the role of senior management in SIM 
Leadership S4.p.2 Define a mechanism to help senior management involving SIM 
S4.p.3 Senior management participate in SIM activities 
S4.po4 Senior management demonstrate whose awareness and support 
S4.p.5 Measure the result of senior management involving in SIM 
S4 Total 
S5 S5.p.1 Define a team for evaluating SIM 
Evaluation S5.p.2 Pre-evaluation training for evaluators 
S5.p.3 Establish a plan for evaluating SIM 
S5.1204 Im12lementing SIM evaluation 
S5.p.5 Frequency of evaluation 
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S5.p.6 Result analysis and follow-up 
S5.p.7 Review SIM evaluation programme 
S5.p.8 Track and check the result of follow-up 
S5 Total 
S6 S6.p.1 Communicate document standard to SIM related person 
Standardisation S6.p.2 Define safety document standard applying plan 
S6.p.3 Apply documents/ information transfer standards/codes 
S6.pA Review document standard regularly 
S6 Total 
S7 S7.p.1 Identify the person who are in charge in communicate safety 
External information with external organisations 
relationship S7.p.2 Identify external organisations and whose requirement of 
safety information 
S7.p.3 Establish mechanism of communication with external 
organisations 
S7.pA Provide up-to-data safety information to external 
S7.p.5 Identify Authorities satisfaction 
S7.p.6 Check the public satisfaction 
S7Total 
St t . p ra eglc f C I I f erspec lve a Cll a IOn 
(Y) (S) (N) (T) Score 
Strategic Perspective (0.276) (w) Number Number Total Possible [00+ Yz(S)1 (T)xW 
of YES of SOME NO ticks I(N) 
Sl Strategic planning 0.143 
S2 Organisation and 0.145 
responsibilities 
S3 Acquisition 0.141 
S4 Leadership 0.166 
S5 Evaluation 0.144 
S6 Standardisation 0.140 
S7 External relationship 0.119 
S Total 
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. 'pera IOna hO f lP f erspec Ive 
b.l Safety information checklist 
Score Evidence 
Safety infonnation categories NA 00.25 0.5 0.75 1 DBIIT Manual Report/file Others 
Ol.i process o l.i.l Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) 
knowledge 01.i.2 block flow diagrams 
01.i.3 Process Flow Diagrams (PFD) 
Q l.iA inventory of chemical used 
o l.i.5 consequences of deviation 
o 1.i.6 safety upper and lower limits 
p l.i. 7 documents for materials of construction 
01.i.8 Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams 
01.i.9 piping service specification 
o l.i.l 0 equipment instrument specifications 
o l.i.ll hazardous area classification drawings 
o 1.i.12 electrical area classification drawings 
p 1.i.13 relief system design data 
p l.i.14 ventilation systems data 
p 1.i.15 documents of safety systems 
o 1.i.16 fire protection system drawings 
o l.i.17 records of installation 
p l.i.18 equipment lists and specifications 
p 1.i.19 equipment reference to codes and 
~tandards used for design and selection 
P1.i.20 manufacture/supplier documents with all 
related certifications, mill tests, and similar data 
P1.i.2l equipment control systems records 
p 1.i.22 outside maintenance testing, inspection 
~ontractor qualification records 
Pl.i.23 corporate standards 
P1.i.24 industry codes and standards 
Pl.i.25 local and national safety regulations 
sum A B C D E F 
- - - -
Score =(CxO.25+DxO.5+ExO.75+Fxl)/(all items-A' 01.i - - - -
02.i process 02.i.l PHA methodology/technique procedures 
hazard 02.i.2 organization chart of responsible parties 
analysis 02.i.3 records of PHA leader and members (include 02.iA records of past PHAs and its follow-up 
human 02.i.5 relevant accidents/incidents documents factors) 
02.i.6 facility sitting records 
02.i.7 PHA reports 
02.i.8 PHA follow-up records 
02.i.9 employee participation 
02.i.lO human factors analysis procedure 
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P2.i.ll human factors analysis records 
p2.i.12 human errors record and investigation 
suI!1 A B C D E F - - - -
Score =(CxO.2S+DxO.S+ExO.7S+Fxl)l(all items-A 02.i) 
- - - -
03.i p3.i.l initial start-up 
Operating P3.i.2 initial star-up records 
procedures P3.i.3 normal Operations 
P3.i.4 shutdown 
P3.i.S emergency 
P3.i.6 preparation for maintenance 
P3.i.7 Operation records 
P3.i.8 Operation deviation records 
sum A B C D E F 
- - - -
Score =(CxO.2S+Dx0.5+ExO.7S+Fxl)/(all items-A (03.i' 
- - - -
04.i incident ~4.i.1 reporting/investigating plan 
reporting p4.i.2 reporting/investigation procedure 
and p4.i.3 investigation methods 
investigation ~4.i.4 investigation teams 
P4.i.S investigation records 
P4.i.6 incident reports 
P4.i.7 investigation recommendation records 
P4.i.8 follow-up records 
sum A B C D E F - - - -
Score =(CxO.2S+Dx0.5+ExO.7S+Fxl)/(all items-A \ (04.i' - - - -
OS.i permit PS .i. I permit to work plan 
to work PS.i.2 permit to work lists and definitions 
PS.i.3 permit to work application and format 
PS.i.4 permit responsibility 
PS.i.5 requirement for display permits 
pS.i.6 requirements for monitoring permit 
Qs.i.7 records of monitoring permit 
PS.i.8 records of permit to work 
sum A B C D E F - - - -
OS.i' - - - -
06.i ~6.i.1 MOC implementing procedure 
management P6.i.2 MOC implementation requirements 
ofcbange P6.i.3 MOC follow-up procedure 
P6.i.4 flow chart indicating parties to be notified 
and all affected documents 
06.i.5 records of notification 
06.i.6 follow-up records that process is complete 
06.i.7 personal reassignment and replacement 
procedures 
06.i.8 personal reassignment and replacement 
ecords 
sum A B C D E F - - - -
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Score =(CxO.25+Dx0.5+ExO.75+Fxl)/(all items-A 06.i 
- - - -
07.i 07.i.1 emergency action plan 
emergency 07.i.2 escape procedures and routes with 
response drawings 
07.i.3 key personnel organisation chart and job 
descriptions 
07.i.4 alarm/escape route/muster point card 
07.i.5 alarm systems records of installation, 
maintenance, inspection 
07.i.6 outside agency_ coordination plan 
07.i.7 community plot plan which indicates 
ocation of all support agencies with contacts 
'nformation 
07.i.S emergency response records 
sum A B C D E F 
- - - -
Score =(CxO.25+DxO.5+ExO.75+Fxl)/(all items-A 07.i' - - - -
OS.i OS.i.1 employee and contractor training plan 
safety work OS.i.2 safety training programme records (e.g. 
practices names, dates, modules, verification, and trainers) 
PS.i.3 audit police and plan 
bS.iA auditors and their qualifications 
OS.i.5 audit procedures 
OS.i.6 records of audit and its follow-up 
OS.i.7 contractor evaluation 
PS.i.S contractor safety qualification 
pS.i.9 process control software data 
PS.i.IO self safety check records 
pS.i.11 safety observation records 
PS.i.12 authority inspection records 
PS.i.13 tool box meeting 
PS.i.14 safety management policy document 
PS.i.15 safety management plan 
PS.i.16 documents of safety responsibilities 
pS.i.17 safety management performance 
sum A B C D E F - - - -
Score =(Cx0.25+Dx0.5+ExO.75+Fxl)/(all items-A (OS.i) 
- - - -
Average of O.i (Ol.i+ 02.i-----+ OS.i)/S 
cormg n ena S C't' 
Not provided (0) Approximately less than 112 document/information does not existlhas not been 
provided 
Part of available (0.25) Approximately ~ to 4/5 document/information exists/ has been provided 
Most of available (0.5) Approximately more than 4/5 document/information exists/ has been provided 
Easy to access (0.75) Most document/information are provided and is easy to access through 
intranet/database 
Up-to-date (1) Most document/information also have been up-to-date regularly 
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b.2 process/procedure evaluation 
Indicators Check points (measures) YES SOME NO 
01 01.p.1 Assigning person the responsibilities for assembling and 
Process creating process knowledge 
knowledge 01.p.2 Establish methods to provide up-to-date process information 01.p.3 Establish methods to provide up-to-date equipment 
information 
OI.pA Establish methods to provide up-to-date technology 
information 
01.p.5 Communicate_process knowledge to personnel 
OI.p.6 Provide access to databases of code, regulation and standards 
related to process knowledge 
01.p.7 Review process knowledge to ensure its up-to-date 
Ol Total 
02 02.p.1 Identify person who are in charge of PH A information 
Process Hazard control 
Analysis (PHA) 02.p.2 Identify a plan for PHA data documenting and disseminating 02.p.3 Define and communicate the PHA plan to personnel 
02.pA Communicate and disseminate PHA results to personnel 
02.p.S Implementing PHA Follow-up and records revalidation 
02.p.6 Review PHA documentation 
02.p.7 Audit HPA communication 
02 Total 
03 03.p.1 Identify person who are in charge of information control of 
Operation Operation procedures 
procedures 03.p.2 Define a plan for creating and providing Operation procedures 
03.p.3 Provide up-to-data Operation procedures through efficient 
methods 
03.pA Training of accessing and applying Operation procedure 
03.p.S Review Operation procedures 
03.p.6 Review the methods of providing Operation procedures 
03 Total 
04 04.p.1 Identify person who are in charge of information control of 
Incidents incident reporting 
reporting 04.p.2 Define incident reporting! investigation processes 04.p.3 Define incident report formats 
04.pA Manage incident reporting and investigation systems 
04.p.S Collect external related accident information 
04.p.6 Provide incident report through efficient methods 
04.p.7 Incident analysis and its follow-up 
04.p.8 Review incident report and its follow-up 
04.p.9 Evaluate incident reporting system 
04 Total 
05 OS.p.1 Identify person who are in charge of information control of 
Permit to work permit-to-work 
OS.p.2 Identify required permits 
OS.p.3 Identify_permit procedures 
OS.p.4 Establish mechanism to manage and provide permit-to-work 
information up-to-data 
OS.p.S Training of permit of work process 
OS.p.6 Keep and analyse records of permit to work 
OS.p.7 Review procedures and records of permit to work 
05 Total 
06 06.p.1 Identify person who are in charge ofMOC information 
Management of control 
06.p.2 Establish a programme existing for implementing MOC 
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change 06.p.3 Identify MOC procedures 
06.pA MOC flow chart indicating all affected parties must be 
notified 
06.p.5 Communicate changes to affected people/units 
06.p.6 Manage records of notification and follow-up 
06.p.7 Verify that a documented programme existing for 
implementing MOC 
06.p.S Verify the results of implementing MOC have been 
documented 
06 Total 
07 07.p.1 Identify person who are in charge of information control of 
Emergency emergency response 
07.p.2 Identify emergency action plan 
response 07.p.3 Identify emergency response procedures 
07.pA Identify external agencies coordination plan 
07.p.5 Provide emergency plan 
07.p.6 Communicatin~and training for emergency response 
07.p.7 Manage emergency response records 
07.p.S Verify that a documented programme existing for 
implementing emergen~ response 
07.p.9 Verify the results ofimplementing emergency response have 
been documented 
07 Total 
08 OS.p.l Identify person who are in charge of information control of 
Safety work safety work practices 
OS.p.2 Identify needed safety work practices and their frequency practices OS.p.3 Manage records of safety work practices 
OS.pA Analysis of deviations from safety work practices 
OS.p.5 Communicating and Implementing follow-up of safety work 
practices 
OS.p.6 Verify that a documented programme existing for 
implementing safety work practices 
OS.p.7 Review the follow-up and its records 
08 Total 
o f 'pera IOna IP f erspee lve ell f a el  a IOn 
(Y) (S) (N) (T) (Oi) Score 
Operational Perspective 
Number Number Total Possible [(Y)+ YZ(S)] From [(T)+(Oi)]/2 (0.290) W of YES of SOME NO ticks /(N) b.l xW 
01 Process knowledge 0.124 
02 Process Hazard 0.127 Analysis 
03 Operation procedures 0.136 
04 Incidents reporting 0.127 
05 Permit to work 0.127 
06 Management of 0.122 
change 
07 Emergency response 0.123 
OS Safety work practices 0.113 
o Total 
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c. u ser o· nentatlOn p erspectlve 
Process/procedure evaluation 
Indicators Check points (measures) YES SOME NO 
Ut U1.p.1 Communicate the concept of user awareness to SIM user 
User awareness U1.p.2 Establish user awareness evaluation programme 
U1.p.3 Implementing user awareness programme 
U1.pA Users are informed new services and resources 
U !.p.5 Review the user awareness programme and its results 
Ul Total 
U2 U2.p.1 Appointed person who are in charge in SIM training and support 
User training & services 
U2.p.2 Identify SIM user training and support plan 
support U2.p.3 Implementing training programme 
U2.pA Provide technical support as requirement 
U2.p.5 The % oftraining complement 
U2.p.6 The % of technical support complement 
U2.p.7 Review SIM training programme and support services 
U2 Total 
U3 U3.p.! Identify key person who are in charge of SIM user competence 
User U3.p.2 Identify the standard of user competence 
competence U3.p.3 Identify programme to confirm the competence of SI M users 
U3.pA Evaluate the % of users qualified in using SIM systems 
U3.p.5 The extent of user innovation and learning 
U3.p.6 Review user competence programme 
U3 Total 
U4 U4.p.1 Identify key person who are responsible for improving 
Information information behaviours 
behaviours U4.p.2 Identify mechanisms of handing information overload and 
multiple information 
U4.p.3 Implementing information sharing programme 
U4.pA Review the mechanisms handing information overload and 
multiple information 
U4.p.S Evaluate the % of sharing information 
U4 Total 
US US.p.1 Identify the person who are in charge of evaluating system 
System utilisation 
utilisation US.p.2 Identify a plan to ensure SIM system utilisation US.p.3 Ensure usage of SI M system from different level in the 
organisation from HQ to Operators 
US.pA Analysis suggestions made by user 
U5.p.5 Evaluate the frequency of restoring system to old manual 
procedures 
U5 Total 
U6 U6.p.1 Identify key users of SI M 
User U6.p.2 Establish user satisfaction evaluation plan 
satisfaction U6.p.3 Identify key factors of user satisfaction 
U6.pA Implementing user satisfaction evaluation and its follow up 
U6.p.5 The % of user satisfied with SIM application 
U6.p.6 The % user satisfied with SIM training and technical support 
U6.p.7 Review user satisfaction evaluation programme 
U6 Total 
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u ser o· t f P rlen a IOn f C I I f erspec Ive a ell a Ion 
User Orientation Perspective (Y) (S) (N) (T) Score W Number Number Total Possible [(Y)+ (T)x W (0.255) 
of YES of SOME NO ticks ~(S)] f(N) 
UI User awareness 0.169 
U2 User training & support 0.169 
U3 User competence 0.165 
U4 Information behaviours 0.182 
US System utilisation 0.158 
U6 User satisfaction 0.157 
UTotal 
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d T h I f • ec no ogy perspec lye 
Process/procedure evaluation 
Indicators Check points (measures) YE SOM NO S E 
Tt T1.p.l Identify various users for suitable IT tools 
SIM tools T1.p.2 Have a plan for applying effective IT tools to support SIM initiatives. 
T1.p.3 A suit of flexible and versatile internal and corporate tools are 
available 
T1.pA Users have on-line access to SIM supported tools and models 
Tl.p.5 Tools and models are assessed on a continual basis and updated 
based on evolving SIM reguirements 
Tt Total 
T2 T2.p.l Identify person who are in charge of ensuring technology integration 
Technology of SI M 
integration T2.p.2 Technology support staff have a broad range of expertise in technology functionality and integration. 
T2.p.3 Have a plan for SIM technology integration 
T2.pA A technology architecture exists to support SIM initiatives 
T2.p.5 Review technology integration regularly 
T2.p.6 Technology architectures are continually Optimised based on 
chan~in~ business. Needs 
T2 Total 
T3 T3.p.l Identify person who are in charge of managing SIM security 
Security T3.p.2 Identify a plan for SIM system protection from unauthorised access, 
use and destruction 
T3.p.3 SIM system security architecture, controls and procedures are in 
place. 
T3.pA All SIM security requirements are communicated throughout the 
organisation and are consistently applied to SIM initiatives 
T3.p.5 SIM system security controls and procedures are regularly reviewed 
T3.p.6 SIM security immediate corrective action is taken after identifying 
potential vulnerability 
T3 Total 
T4 T4.p.l Ensure all of person in the organisation involving in SIM privacy 
Privacy programme 
T4.p.2 Define the individual right in SIM system 
T4.p.3 Identify SIM system privacy requirements 
T4.pA Have initiated a programme of privacy compliance for SIM 
initiatives 
T4.p.5 All privacy requirements are communicated throughout 
T4.p.6 Conduced DSIM privacy impact assessments 
T4.p.7 Regularly review the SIM privacy policy and to take required 
corrective actions 
T4 Total 
T5 T5.p.l Identify person who are in charge of SI M system emergency response 
Work T5.p.2 Have a plan for keeping SIM system continuing service 
continuity T5.p.3 Establish an effective network to reduce SIM system shut-down 
T5.pA Temporarily emergency backup for SIM system 
T5.p.5 Evaluate the extent of timely SIM system recovery and restoration 
T5 Total 
T6 T6.p.l Identify person and place for maintaining and preservation SIM 
Maintenance systems 
and T6.p.2 Have a plan for safeguarding and maintaining SIM systems 
preservation T6.p.3 Implementing the mechanism oflong-turn usability of SI M system 
T6.pA Implementing the mechanism of safeguarding SIM systems 
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T6.p.5 Review the long-turn usability and safeguarding of SIM system 
T6 Total 
T7 T7.p.l IdentifY person who are in charge of managing information 
Disposition disposition work 
T7.p.2 Establish an approach to information disposal which adheres to 
retention and disposition plan 
T7.p.3 Have a formal set of principles, policies and standards for disposing 
of safety information 
T7.p.4 These principles, policies and standards for disposing of safety 
information are in widespread use throughout 
T7.p.5 Regularly review to ensure the disposition of safety information is 
legal and policy obligations 
T7 Total 
ec no ogy T h I p erspec lve a cu a IOn f C I I f 
Technology Perspective 
(Y) (S) (N) (T) Score 
W Number Number Total Possible [(Y)+ YZ(S)] (T)xW (0.179) 
of YES of SOME NO ticks I(N) 
Tt SIM tools 0.158 
T2 Technology integration 0.158 
T3 Security 0.147 
T4 Privacy 0.142 
T5 Work continuity 0.147 
T6 Maintenance and 0.138 preservation 
T7 Disposition 0.110 
T Total 
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• Tzou, T. L., Edwards, D. & Chung, P.W. (2003) An explosion accident- causes and 
safety information management lessons to be learned, Loss Prevention Bulletin, No. 
178, ppI8-25, IChemE, UK. 
• Tzou, T. L., Hankinson, G. & Chung, P.W. (2004) A Evaluation study of safety 
information management in the petrochemical industry, Hazards XVIII 
International Symposium, IChemE, 22-25 November 2004, Manchester, UK 
• Tzou, T. L., Hankinson, G., Edwards, D. & Chung, P.W. (2004) Evaluating Safety 
Information Management Performance - A key to prevent disaster, International 
Conference on the 20th Anniversary of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy at Indian Institute 
of Technology, December 1 to 3, 2004, Kanpur, India. 
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